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Abstract
The neofunctionalist literature asserts that supranational institutions play 
a crucial role in shaping the process of European integration. Yet, it is not 
apparently obvious why institutions with far less capabilities and 
resources than national ones can be so effective.
The thesis tries to explain this puzzle focusing on the European 
Commission. It takes up two related questions: Which motives drive this 
institution? Under which conditions does it reach its objective (and, hence, 
affect integration)? In other words, the thesis applies domestic theories of 
bureaucratic and executive politics to the European Union. First, it tests 
Niskanen's and Dunleavy's hypotheses on bureaucratic preferences on the 
Union competition and regional policies. It asserts the preeminence of the 
work-related preferences of the Commission, consisting of managerial 
discretion and broad scope of functions. Second, it uses a formal model of 
EU legislative politics and the work of Epstein and CYHalloran and of 
Gilligan and Krehbiel to quantitatively test the factors that increase the 
statutory discretion delegated to the Commission. The results show that 
the uncertainty facing Union legislators about policy actions, policy types 
and informal decision rules are the most important determinants. Finally, 
it uses the work of McCubbins and Page to quantitatively test the factors 
that increase the likelihood and the stringency of procedural controls of 
the Commission's functions. The results show that unanimity, level of 
conflict among the Union institutions and uncertainty are key 
determinants for the establishment of these controls. Level of conflict and 
uncertainty are also important factors affecting the degree of stringency in 
control.
In conclusion, the Commission enjoys broader discretion and, hence, 
affects integration when 1) qualified majority is used in the Council and 2) 
only the Commission is in charge of implementation. However, we should 
be cautious about its actual room of maneuver because broader discretion 
correlates positively with the stringency of control.
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Introduction
The study of European integration has generated probably one of the most 
heated debates about its causes in the political science community. 
Scholars, however, agree on one point: the European Union1 represents 
the most institutionalized system of international governance in modern 
world politics.
Its resemblance to a modern nation-state, as much as to an international 
institution, is recognized even by the most rigorous proponent of an 
intergovernmentalist interpretation of the Union (Moravcsik, 1998:1, 488). 
It includes a court, a central bank, a bicameral legislature, a dual executive 
and a bureaucracy. Students would have branded such a comparison as 
ideologically motivated and unscientific probably just twenty years ago. 
Today, the study of its executive, legislative and judicial institutions and 
politics is one of the most dynamic areas of European studies (cf. Attina, 
1992; Hix, 1999; Wallace and Wallace, 1996). This thesis investigates how 
executive and bureaucratic politics shape the political system of the 
European Union.
Puzzles of European integration: supranational institutions and
trajectories
In the words of Moravcsik (1998: 1), 'the most fundamental puzzle 
confronting those who seek to understand European integration [is] to 
explain why sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to 
coordinate their core economic policies and surrender sovereign 
prerogatives within an international institution'. As I will analyze in detail 
in chapter 1, Moravcsik goes on developing and testing one the most 
rigorous framework to understand the outcome of treaty-amending 
negotiations of the Union extant.
1 Although the focus of the thesis is the European Community pillar, I consistently use 
the term European Union. However, I retain the reference to its law as EC law.
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Yet, does the resolution of this puzzle explain European integration? The 
neofunctionalist and institutionalist literature on integration answers 
negatively to this question. Once a Treaty has been signed, integration can 
follow a multitude of paths, some of which might be unintended. And, 
even if the majority of these "states of the world" are originally expected 
by Member States, this literature argues that supranational institutions can 
play an important role in the selection of the specific 'equilibrium path'. 
Consider the following illustration. Member States agree by Treaty to pool
or delegate sovereignty2 in a subset of policy dimensions nQ m  so that Tn is
the set of expected implementation outcomes and Tn<=Rm, where Rm is an 
/77-dimensional Euclidean space. The dependent variable, namely 
European integration, is the implemented policy point i. This outcome is 
the result of a set of legislative, executive and judicial rules where 
supranational institutions may play a pivotal role.
Now, the 'fundamental puzzle' for Moravcsik is the explanation of the 
existence and the contour of Tn. Two assumptions underline this 
perspective. The first one is that the implemented policy belongs to the set
of expected outcomes, namely that i'ETn. This is reasonable. As I will argue 
in chapter 1, the neofunctionalist critique of intergovernmentalism on the 
basis of some unexpected outcomes whereby /£T n is not amenable to 
cumulative and comparative research. The second assumption is that 
explaining Tn is more important than explaining the specific equilibrium 
outcome i  or an 'equilibrium path' leading to i. This assumption is 
warranted only if Tn represents a small subset of Rm, namely if few policy 
dimensions are pooled or delegated, because the identification of i  could 
be a rather trivial exercise. However, the agenda of the European Union
2 Sovereignty is pooled when Member States agree to decide future matters in some 
policy areas by voting procedures other than unanimity, it is delegated when 
supranational actors can take autonomous decisions without a government's unilateral 
veto. Pooling and delegation is more likely in those policy areas where it is either too 
costly or technically impossible to specify all future contingencies involved in legislating 
or enforcing Treaty provisions (cf. Moravcsik, 1998: 67, 73).
8
has been expanding to such an extent that it covers, directly or indirectly, 
almost all policy areas (Hix, 1999: 6; Nugent, 1994: 293; Pollack, 1994). As 
the agenda expands (i.e. as Tn -> Rm), explaining the role of supranational 
institutions in shaping the 'equilibrium path' leading to i  is becoming 
equally, or even relatively more, important. There can be no claim of 
'fundamental puzzle' to understand European integration. Consequently, 
another important question -  and the core question of this thesis - is to 
explain w hy apparently weak supranational institu tions substantially 
affect the process o f European integration across the m u ltitude o f possible  
trajectories.
The crucial role played by these institutions is probably one of the most 
frequent conclusion in the neofunctionalist literature. Yet, it is not 
apparently obvious why supranational institutions with far less 
capabilities and resources than national ones can be so effective.3 Further, 
saying that they affect the process of integration is essentially linked to 
questions such as: which motives drive these institutions? Under which 
conditions do they reach their objectives (and, hence, affect integration)?
The argument applied to the Commission: preferences, delegation and 
control
This thesis focuses on the European Commission, the executive4 and 
bureaucracy of the Union and one of its most important supranational 
institutions. The short answer to the core question would be that the 
Commission affects the path of European integration because it can 
strategically use its formal powers. The Commission has an array of 
institutional resources at its disposal. Those more relevant for this thesis
3 The Commission has a 13,000 staff and manages a budget that is slightly more than 1 
percent of the Union's GNP. These figures are comparable to single departments of small 
or medium states of the Union.
4 To be more precise, the Commission shares its executive powers with the Council. In 
broad terms, the Commission is more involved in the operational day-to-day working of 
the Union while the Council, especially the European Council, deals with more medium- 
long term and strategic issues (Hix, 1999: 21-55).
9
are the monopoly of legislative and budgetary initiation. Others include 
the power to initiate infringement proceedings, to take decisions, to 
formulate recommendations and to deliver opinions. Further, the Council 
is under an obligation to delegate to the Commission most of the executive 
and administrative functions of the Union policies (Art. 202.3 [ex 145] 
EC).
This answer is however unsatisfactory. Modern political science 
emphasizes three key variables to explain political outcomes: preferences, 
institutions and information (e.g. Hinich and Munger, 1997). The behavior 
of a political actor is informed by its preferences (desires or motivations), 
by the institutions (i.e. formal or informal rules of the game), by the 
preferences of other relevant political actors and by the distribution of 
information across time and actors.
Consider this example. One of the conclusions of chapter 3 is that the 
Commission has work-related preferences in terms of executive discretion 
and scope of policy-making functions. Yet, the Commission does not 
always enjoy broad discretion and, consequently, shape the path of 
integration according to its desires. Why? One of the reasons is related to 
the legislative procedures. The Council grants the Commission greater 
discretion under qualified majority than unanimity, given the 
Commission's monopoly of legislative initiation. A second reason is 
related to information. Union legislators grant more discretion to the 
Commission if they are uncertain about the future optimum course of 
actions (see chapters 2 and 4).
In conclusion, the core question would remain unanswered if we do not 
know 1) w hat the Commission will use its powers for and 2) the 
conditions that hinder or help the Commission to reach its objectives. To 
do this, we first have to shift the level of analysis and then answer three 
interrelated sets of questions.
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Level o f analysis and the preferences o f the Com m ission 
The level of analysis is the daily operation of the Union, instead of the 
Treaty negotiations. This is not because the Commission is epiphenomenal 
in the latter circumstances. In chapter 3, for instance, I show that, if the 
Commission is patient and enjoys an informational advantage, it can 
substantially affect a policy outcome even in case of unanimity in the 
Council.5 This shift is needed because the daily operations of the Union 
provide an abundance of more fine-grained data about the specific path 
that European integration is taking and a clearer understanding of how 
supranational institutions exercise their powers to shape this trajectory.6 
The first set of questions concern the preferences of the Commission. What 
does the Commission want? What type of preferences does it hold? Why 
does it have them? This is a crucial step to assess the role of the 
Commission. The impact of an actor can only be judged by relating the 
political outcome to its preferences. Preferences, however, should not be 
devised ad hoc. In case of the Commission, they should be derived from 
narrowly focused, but more generalizable, theories of bureaucratic 
preferences.
Chapters 1 and 2 deal in detail with how the general theories of European 
integration and the more specific work on the Commission have answered 
these first set of questions. There is a surprising similarity across them. 
The Commission has been characterized as an institution with a mission, 
namely furthering integration and expanding the tasks of the Union, or 
with specific policy preferences (e.g. severity of environmental protection). 
These works have three shortcomings. First, task-expansion does not 
guide us in the identification of the Commission's preferences about
5 Even Moravcsik (1999) recognizes that this can be the case under specific, though rare, 
circumstances.
6 Over the last ten years there has been a gradual shift in academic attention towards this 
level of analysis (see e.g. Attina, 1992; Bulmer and Scott, 1994; Cini, 1996; Cram, 1994; 
Edwards and Spence, 1994; Hix, 1994; 1999; Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; Majone, 1996; 
Rhodes and Mazey, 1995; Richardson, 1996; Tsoukalis, 1993; Wallace and Wallace, 1996; 
Wallace et al., 1979). This is probably another sign of its rising importance to understand 
European integration.
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policy-making functions or when existing policies are being reformed. 
Second, specific policy preferences are exogenous, cannot be generalized 
across policy areas and impede comparative analysis. Third, task- 
expansion is a too broad objective function. New policies might grant very 
limited powers to the Commission.
This thesis uses more focused theories of executive and bureaucratic 
politics, namely those derived from the works of Niskanen (1971) and 
Dunleavy (1985, 1991). This approach renders the study of the Union 
comparable with other country studies and more amenable to cumulative 
work. Niskanen emphasizes the predominance of budget-related 
preferences held by public officials; Dunleavy instead asserts that 
bureaucrats show predominantly work-related preferences under certain 
circumstances. Chapter 3 tests these hypotheses on the twenty-year 
development of the competition and regional policies of the Union. It 
concludes that the Commission has selective budgetary preferences on 
some components of its activities and budget More importantly, it 
emphasizes that work-related preferences, consisting of managerial 
discretion and broad scope of functions, emerge as the most persistent 
over time and across policies.
The delegation o f executive discretion to the Com m ission 
The second set of questions is about the conditions under which the 
Commission reaches its objectives. Under what circumstances and why is 
the Commission granted broad executive discretion? How do the 
legislative procedures, uncertainty and preference distribution affect this 
delegation? In order to understand why the Commission affects the path 
of integration, we need to know not only its objectives but also the 
conditions that hinder or support their achievement. This should help us 
to answer why the Commission has been more successful in certain 
circumstances but not in others. My contribution in chapters 2 and 4 build
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on theories of executive politics and on the formal literature on the Union 
legislative politics.
There is considerable disagreement on these issues. For 
intergovemmentalism, the Commission achieving its objectives is a rare 
and transient occurrence and the delegation of policy-making functions to 
this institution rests on the need to bolster the credibility of the 
commitments undertaken by Member States. This conclusion is correct 
only if the level of analysis is the Treaty amending negotiations where the 
Commission has few resources. As already pointed out, this institution 
enjoys at the operational level formal powers that can substantially affect 
the trajectory of integration. Further, the literature on executive politics is 
more detailed about the variables that affect the Commission's executive 
discretion at this level.
The neofunctionalist writings are much more optimistic, but the 
conditions are underspecified and rely heavily on unintended 
consequences. As I analyze in detail in chapter 1, this reliance runs into 
logical and empirical problems and renders this approach scarcely 
amenable to comparative and cumulative research. Priority should be 
given to the predictable components of a political system.
So far the institutionalist literature, based on narrowly focused theories of 
legislative politics and formal modeling, has provided the most rigorous 
set of conditions. Three factors are highlighted: decision rules (namely the 
Union legislative procedures), the distribution of preferences of pivotal 
actors, and the location of the status quo. In the appendix of chapter 2, I 
set up a formal model of legislative politics whereby the Commission's 
utility function is positively correlated with its executive discretion. This 
model and the more specific literature on executive politics (e.g. Epstein 
and O'Halloran, 1994; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; McCubbins, 1985) 
allow me to specify four core factors that increase the Commission's 
executive discretion. These are 1) the uncertainty facing Union legislators 
about the optimum policy actions, 2) the convergence of preferences
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between the Commission and the pivotal legislator, 3) the use of qualified 
majority in the Council, and 4) policies that require limited involvement of 
national administrations. The hypothesis is quantitatively tested on a 
stratified sample of non-amending legislation in chapter 4. The results 
show that the best set of circumstances whereby the Commission affects 
the trajectory of integration is in case of 1) legislators' uncertainty, 2) 
policy implementation at the Union level and 3) qualified majority in the 
Council.
Control o f the C om m ission's executive functions
We turn now to issues of institutional choice and to the last set of 
questions. The literature on executive politics warns us that this is only 
half of the story. Why would legislators grant unrestrained discretion to 
their executive agents? Why not setting up administrative procedures to 
control them? To answer the core question of the thesis we cannot ignore 
the presence of control committees that oversee, with various procedures, 
the Commission's implementation of the Union policies. If the 
Commission is closely watched by the Member States, we need to question 
the extent to which it is free to pursue its objectives or, at least, we need to 
gain a more fine-grained view of its role in the process of integration. 
Chapter 5 uses the relevant literature on executive politics to test the 
factors that lead to the establishment of these control procedures.
The topic of control committees is mostly ignored by the main theoretical 
frameworks. There are instead many unrelated studies. These are critically 
analyzed in chapter 2. With few exceptions, this literature heavily relies on 
a su i generis characterization of the Union that is not amenable to 
comparative and cumulative research. I will argue that these works can be 
easily related to the core tenets of executive politics. This literature also 
regards these committees mainly as arenas producing information to 
coordinate and standardize implementation across the Member States. 
Other works acknowledge, but do not test, their control function.
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Chapters 5 uses the work of McCubbins (1985) and McCubbins and Page 
(1987) to identify three factors that lead to the establishment of control 
procedures and increase the stringency of control. These are 1) the 
uncertainty facing Union legislators about the optimum policy actions, 2) 
the level of conflict among legislators and 3) the need for unanimous 
agreement in the Council of Ministers. Chapter 5 also tests whether 
executive discretion and the stringency of procedural control are 
correlated (cf. Bawn, 1997; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994; McCubbins, 
1985). As in chapter 4, the hypotheses are quantitatively tested on a 
stratified sample of non-amending legislation. The results show that these 
variables are significant determinants of the establishment and stringency 
of control procedures. Discretion is also significantly correlated with the 
stringency of control. Although these results do not negate the 
informational role of committees, they reassert their control function as a 
result of substantive issue-specific conflict among the Union legislators. 
With respect to the core question of the thesis, the input of the 
Commission in the process of integration is likely to be greater in case of 
qualified majority because this rule increases discretion and reduces the 
likelihood of control. Other favourable circumstances include the 
Commission being the only institution in charge of implementation and 
limited conflict across legislators.
I will end however with a cautionary note. As the Commission can use 
strategically its powers and affect the path of integration, Member States 
are not less effective strategic actors. If they are disadvantaged by 
informational asymmetries or bureaucratic shirking, they show significant 
inventiveness in devising institutions that provide information and 
control the Commission. The fact that the stringency of control is 
associated with broader discretion invites caution about the Commission's 
true autonomy. More focused studies into the effectiveness of these 
committees are needed.
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The plan of the thesis
Chapter 1 critically reviews the main theoretical frameworks that study 
the process of European integration, with respect to the set of questions 
proposed in this introduction. It first emphasizes the middle-range nature 
of these theories. It also observes that these approaches fall short of either 
basing the preferences of the Commission on narrowly focused theories of 
executive politics or specifying the conditions that assist the Commission 
in reaching its objectives. Chapter 2 reviews the more specific work on the 
Commission and sets five detailed hypotheses to be tested in the following 
chapters. The chapter is divided in three main sections. The first one 
separates the Commission's task-expanding motivations from those that 
can be more easily related to the literature on bureaucratic preferences. It 
then uses the work of Niskanen and Dunleavy to devise the first two 
testable hypotheses on bureaucratic preferences. The second section uses a 
formal model of the Union legislative politics and the literature on 
executive politics to specify the third hypothesis on the determinants of 
the Commission's executive discretion. Finally, the last section critically 
reviews the work on control committees and uses the literature on 
executive politics to devise the fourth hypothesis on the determinants of 
control and the fifth one on the relation between discretion and control. 
Chapter 3 tests the first two hypotheses using as case studies the twenty- 
year development of the Union's regional and competition policies. 
Chapter 4 tests the third hypothesis on a stratified sample of non­
amending legislation. It uses bootstrapped regression analysis. The 
chapter also tests, and rejects, the addition of further explanatory 
variables. Finally, chapter 5 tests the fourth and fifth hypotheses on a 
similar sample of legislation. It uses binomial logistic regression, a 
cumulative logits model and bootstrapped co-graduation tests. The 
concluding chapter summarizes the hypotheses and the findings, it relates 
the contribution of the thesis to the specific literature on European
16
integration and to the general political science literature and, finally, it 
suggests avenues of further research.
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Chapter 1. 
Theories of European Integration and 
the Role of the Commission
Introduction
This chapter reviews the dominant theoretical frameworks that study the 
European Union. It makes two basic observations. First, none of them are 
actually theories of European integration. They are middle range theories 
that analyze some aspects of the political system of the European Union. 
Second, these frameworks share either one or both of two main 
shortcomings, with respect to the set of questions listed in the 
introduction. They do not ground the preferences of the Commission on 
theories of bureaucratic and executive politics. Or, they do not specify 
clearly the factors that help the Commission to achieve its objectives. 
There is also no important study that analyzes committee control from 
these perspectives. The literature that is more focused on the Commission 
is critically reviewed in chapter 2. I conclude with comments on how the 
recognition of these limits can further our understanding of the Union and 
our dialogue with the political science community at large.
Liberal intergovemmentalism
The basics o f the theory
Liberal intergovemmentalism is a collection of three theories. It aggregates 
theories of formation of national preferences1 with classical theories of 
bargaining and institutional choice. Its main added value consists of the 
definition the set of Pareto efficient outcomes that can be reached through 
international cooperation. This set is a function of the preferences of both 
societal and state actors.
1 These theories of formation of domestic preferences depend on the substantive issue at 
stake. They include, among others, theories of legitimate socioeconomic redistribution
18
Liberal intergovemmentalism gives analytical primacy to the preferences 
of individuals and private groups at the societal level. In areas of 
commercial liberalization for instance; preferences of industries are 
function of their competitive positions in domestic and international 
markets, while, in case of the provision of public goods such as 
environmental regulation, producers compete for representation with 
public interest groups or the general public. If societal interests are strong, 
homogeneous and unified, they reduce the size of the winset2 and the 
autonomy of state officials. Governments conform to their preferences. If 
societal groups are weak, heterogeneous and divided, states are more 
autonomous and can use international negotiations to pursue their 
objectives (Moravcsik, 1993: 488-96, 1997: 527-30; Putnam, 1988). For 
instance, Patterson (1997) shows how the homogeneity and cohesiveness 
of domestic interests where an obstacle to the 1988 agricultural reform 
while the weakness of domestic lobbying induced the Member States to 
agree on far more radical measures in the 1992 negotiations.
Moving from the societal to the state level of analysis, the substantive 
preferences of public officials are based on the interests of that subset of 
societal actors that, for various reasons, gain political representation. At 
this level, liberal intergovemmentalism however shares with the classical 
realist school of international relations the assumption that states operate 
in an institutionally sparse world system to protect their sovereignty, 
security and welfare (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1991: 26-7; Morgenthau, 
1967 [1948]). The maximization of welfare and security keeps 
policymakers in office, and government officials try to pursue such 
objectives without the sacrifice of national sovereignty. To the extent that
and regulation, endogenous tariff theory and theories of rent seeking (Moravcsik, 1992, 
1993,1997).
2 From an intergovernmental prospective, in Treaty-amending negotiations, the set of all 
possible agreements that the Member States prefer to unilateral or coalitional alternatives 
(define it y) is the winset of y, written as W(y). Larger winsets make agreements more 
likely, see Putnam (1988) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987).
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these goals are incompatible, governments are willing to selectively 
relinquish a certain degree of sovereignty.3
International cooperation arises when security and welfare and, 
ultimately, popular support cannot be achieved unilaterally. Thus, the 
rationale for cooperation among states is given by the existence of 
economic or political-military interdependence across issues that 
generates negative international policy externalities and leads states to 
prefer policy coordination to unilateral policies (Moravcsik, 1993: 485, 
1998). For Moravcsik (1993: 485), '[njegative policy externalities occur 
where the policies of one nation imposes costs on the domestic nationals 
of another, thereby undermining the policy goals of the second 
government7s policies/ Thus, interdependence of state preferences across 
issues determines whether international cooperation is Pareto efficient. 
For instance, the failure of independent economic policies in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s created pressure for coordinated liberalization which led 
to the signing of the Single European Act (Moravcsik, 1991). The 
unfeasibility of independent monetary policies, especially after the 
completion of the single market programme, led to increasing cooperation 
first through the European Monetary System, then with the Economic 
Monetary Union (Moravcsik, 1998; Sandholtz, 1993a).4 
Finally, the specific outcome from international cooperation is a function 
of the whole plethora of intervening factors suggested by the Nash 
solution of classical bargaining theory (e.g. the best alternative, the threat 
of exclusion or exit and issue linkages) (Binmore, 1987; Harsanyi, 1977; 
Moravcsik, 1993: 496-507; Raiffa, 1982).
3 Consider, for instance, the Member States of NATO that have given up the monopoly of 
control of armed forces in their territory to ensure protection from external aggression. 
The Member States of the Union have given up the monopoly of domestic legislation to 
create a European single market. The argument is taken to a certain extreme by Milward 
(1992: 2-3) which has argued that the survival of the nation state perse was at stake in the 
1950s. States' primary goal was then to retain the allegiance and support of their citizens 
and rescue themselves from collapse after two World Wars.
4 Some works of Sandholz fall squarely within the intergovemmentalist agenda although 
he might not consider himself an intergovemmentalist.
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Intergovemmentalism however tends to give predominance to shifts in 
domestic political preferences to explain some important bargaining 
outcomes. For instance, Moravcsik (1991) stresses how the preference shift 
in France toward a more liberal economic policy was a key factor in 
explaining the adoption of the Single European Act. Similarly, Moravcsik 
and Nicolai’dis (1999) show how the election of a new government in 
Britain and France explains part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Finally, 
Sandholtz (1993a; see also Henning, 1998) asserts that shifts toward 
macroeconomic discipline at the domestic level, especially in France and 
Italy, were crucial for the adoption of the EMU.
Hence its real strength relies on theories of national preference formation. 
Preferences of individuals and groups are based on ideational and 
commercial factors. Preferences of state officials are based on a subset of 
societal preferences that gain representation through domestic political 
institutions. To sum up, intergovemmentalism defines the contour of the 
winset in the policy space. It does so 1) by identifying the relevant state 
and societal actors and 2) by mapping their preferences in the policy 
space. This exercise delineates the policy issues where international 
cooperation is a Pareto improvement, that is it shows how state 
preferences are interdependent across policy issues. Intergovemmentalism 
then uses bargaining theory to identify the equilibrium outcome within 
the set of Pareto efficient outcomes. However, it adds limited value to 
bargaining theory per se because it does not add to it further relevant 
explanatory variables.5 The empirical works are primarily valuable
5 In an interesting twist, one could argue that liberal intergovemmentalism contributes to 
bargaining theory by better specifying some of the institutional rules that guide 
international bargaining outcomes. By emphasizing the importance of the preferences of 
societal actors, liberal intergovemmentalism adds the rules of domestic ratification (see 
especially Patterson, 1997; Putnam, 1988). The inclusion of new actors (and preferences), 
whether they be state officials, individuals or private groups, is irrelevant for the central 
tenets of bargaining theory. Instead, rules shaping the interaction across these actors, 
within the bargaining game, can have an independent causal effect. Another interesting 
empirical contribution is the observation that the cost of international negotiations is 
small relative to their benefits (Moravcsik, 1999: 300-3).
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exercises in the identification of the key policy dimensions of bargaining 
(see for instance Garrett, 1992; Moravcsik, 1991,1992).
Liberal intergovem m entalism  and theories o f institu tional choice 
Institutional choice is simply another outcome from interstate negotiation 
and liberal intergovemmentalism uses rational choice institutionalism 
(and its applications) to explain the institutional design of the European 
Union.
Generally, the rules and institutions of the Union are created to provide 
credibility to the commitments undertaken by the Member States in Treaty 
negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998: 73-7). More specifically, institutions are 
designed to provide two benefits: 1) the provision of information and 2) 
the structuring of outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Shepsle, 1986a, 1989). 
First, institutions create value when information about future 
contingencies, compliance and the behavior of other actors is imperfect In 
the saying of Hayek, 'there would be no need for rules if men knew 
everything' (1976: 21). Politicians are unaware of future contingencies 
when they draft Treaties or regulations, so institutions are established for 
ex-post implementation and interpretation (see the theory of contracts, 
Williamson, 1985). The establishment of agencies helps monitoring 
compliance, produces informational gains from specialization and reduces 
transaction costs of international cooperation (Keohane, 1984; see also 
principal-agent theory, Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985).
Moravcsik echoes this view:
'M uch of the institutional structure of the EC can be readily explained by 
the functional theory of regimes, which argues that where transaction 
costs -  the costs of identifying issues, negotiating bargains, codifying 
agreements, and monitoring and enforcing compliance -  are significant, 
international institutions may promote greater co-operation by providing 
information and reducing uncertainty' (Moravcsik, 1993: 508).
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Policy-making functions are delegated to the Commission to solve the 
uncertainty surrounding the specific details of cooperation (Moravcsik, 
1993: 514). The Commission, as the guardian of the Treaty, monitors states' 
and private actors' compliance so it adds value to cooperation by reducing 
uncertainty of actors' behavior and of incomplete contracting (Garrett, 
1992: 557; Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 197-9; Moravcsik, 1993: 507-14, 
1995: 623; Pollack, 1997: 105-7). Further, the Commission's monopoly of 
legislative initiation generates informational gains from specialization and 
its independence is valued because capabilities vary considerably across 
the Member States (Moravcsik, 1993: 507-14; Pollack, 1997:105-6).6 
Second, institutions add value by structuring policy outcomes (Shepsle, 
1979,1986a,b; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). Since equilibria are unstable in 
an institutionally sparse environment, institutions, such as germaneness 
rules, structure the choice of the relevant actors and stabilize equilibrium 
outcomes (McKelvey, 1976; Shepsle, 1979)7 Similarly institutions provide 
credibility when policies face problems of temporal inconsistency 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Thus, the monopoly of legislative initiation 
and the regulatory powers of the Commission a) structure outcomes by 
limiting voting cycles and b) provide intertemporal credibility8 (Gatsios 
and Seabright, 1989; Majone, 1996; Moravcsik, 1993: 507-14; Moravcsik and 
Nicolaidis, 1999: 76-7; Pollack, 1997:105-6).
The lim its o f liberal intergovem m entalism  and the role o f the Com m ission 
Since the dominant focus of intergovernmetalism lies on the 
interdependence of state preferences on substantive policy issues, it adds 
little value to the theories of institutional choice. It still remains
6 In his latest contributions, Moravcsik (1998: 487, 1999: 302) downplays the 
Commission's informational role and stresses the importance of transaction costs of 
legislation, implementation and enforcement relative to the costs of interstate bargaining.
7 In an institutionally sparse environment stable equilibria can only be guaranteed by a 
specific configuration of preferences and they can change for any slight perturbation 
(Shepsle, 1979: 28).
8 See, for instance, the policy of controlling state aids and cartels.
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institutionally sparse and does not take these theories to their natural 
consequences.9
Intergovernmentalists do not base the Commission's preferences on 
specific theories of preference formation. These have a simply mission- 
oriented descriptive value (see more on this below). The Commission 
reaches its objectives only to the extent that its preferences align with 
those of the relevant Member States. Its preferences are irrelevant because 
its actions are largely epiphenomenal (Moravcsik, 1999). This conclusion is 
generally correct if one agrees that Treaty-amending negotiations are the 
dominant level of analysis in the study of the politics of the European 
Union. Here, supranational institutions have limited causal impact 
because they have few formal powers (Moravcsik, 1991, 1999; Peterson, 
1995a). However, this dominance is becoming at least arguable.
In its most succinct formulation, intergovemmentalism encompasses the 
following sequence:
1) interdependence -> 2) negative policy externalities ->
-► 3) national preference formation —► 4) intergovernmental bargain ->
-► 5) policy and institutional outcomes -> 6) implementation 
(cf. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 302).
In most instances, intergovernmentalism stops the analysis (arbitrarily, 
but correctly from its perspective) at the fifth step. This is because 
implementation generally follows the expected track set by the negotiated 
bargain.
Moravcsik in effect acknowledges that in reality this is more a loop rather 
than a sequence. He (1998: 473-9) asserts that the timing of major 
European Treaty amendment negotiations follows or precedes major 
economic trends. So one could easily argue that interdependence is the 
resu lt of the implementation of previously negotiated institutions and
9 The latest contributions that apply agency theory to the Union institutions follow the 
intergovernmental tradition but it radically changes its perspective. Pollack's (1997) work 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
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policy objectives.10 If these institutions maintain predominant 
intergovernmental characteristics, intergovernmentalism is superior and 
the causal impact of supranational actors is rightly dismissed.
However, once budgetary or legislative procedures require qualified 
majority in the Council and involve supranational institutions, the 
intergovernmental sequence is disrupted. To the extent that supranational 
actors are pivotal in minimum winning coalitions, their preferences enjoy 
causal primacy. If these outcomes affect the structure of interdependence 
of state preferences and the specific path of integration, the actions of 
supranational institutions have at least the same explanatory potential as 
states' behavior does. Since Treaty negotiations are encroaching upon an 
increasing set of policies, the specific implementation paths tend to rise 
exponentially. Thus, Treaty negotiations as the dom inant level of analysis 
is giving way to the specific working of the European Union, namely the 
implementation stage.
Finally, the argument on information and credibility is too general. We do 
not know how these, and other, factors determine the exact extent of the 
Commission's executive discretion.
To conclude, liberal intergovernmentalism does not take the theories of 
institutional choice to their natural consequences because it downplays the 
fact that these choices can fundamentally change the nature of a game. 
Once new supranational actors are established, they develop their own 
interests and they use their own resources to pursue their objectives (Moe, 
1990:121). Since the Commission has institutional resources at its disposal 
to affect the process of European Integration over an increasing set of 
policies, understanding its preferences and the conditions under which it 
reaches its objectives is as important as understanding the outcome of 
Treaty negotiations.
10 For instance, the Treaty of Rome too can been seen as the result of rising 
interdependence generated by the GATT agreements.
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Neofunctionalism and its variants
The non-state agents o f interdependence
We can analyze neofunctionalism by referring to the sequence we 
highlighted above. This theoretical perspective focuses on the feedback 
loop between the implementation of policy and institutional outcomes and 
interdependence. It considers actors above and below the state as the 
primary agents of interdependence. The Member States are instead 
reactive to the demands and structural changes generated by these actors 
rather than proactive and in control of the integration process.
The works of Haas (1958, 1961, 1964a) and Lindberg and Scheingold 
(Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, 1971) set out the 
neofunctionalist agenda. For Haas, integration relies on the strategic 
convergence of interests between national actors and supranational 
institutions.11 On the one hand, actors below the state perceive that a 
supranational strategy is more effective than a national one in pursuing 
their interests, so they 'adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational 
means when this course appears profitable' (Haas, 1958: xiv). On the other 
hand, supranational institutions, with the aim of broadening their sphere 
of influence, operate as 'agent of integration' (Haas, 1958: 29) by fostering 
the development of interest groups and playing the role of broker to 
facilitate supranational decision-making (see also Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970).
11 Generally, neofunctionalism Stresses the instrumental motives of actors ... [it] takes 
self-interest for granted and relies on it for delineating actor perceptions' (Haas, 1971: 23). 
However, at least in its initial formulation, it was relatively ambiguous about the 
ontological basis of actors' behavior. Haas defined political integration as 'the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre' (Haas, 1958: 16, emphasis 
added). He envisioned a long term process where 'the end result ... is a new political 
community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones' (Haas, 1958: 16). This 
predominantly sociological process is usually referred to as 'political spill-over'. In his 
later work, Haas (1970) recognized the difficulty in measuring this transfer of loyalties 
and emphasized the importance of delegation of policy-making functions to 
supranational actors as well as the instrumental rationality of actors in general (cf. 
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970).
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This strategic convergence can be seen in the early 1980s when a 
transnational business coalition perceived that the existing national 
economic policies failed to enhance international competitiveness and 
promoted the 1992 initiative under the leadership of the Commission 
(Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; see also Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). 
Similarly, Cowles (1995) shows how the European Round Table of 
Industrialists have been a major policy player in setting the agenda for the 
single market project and interacting with Commissioners Davignon, 
Ortoli and, especially, Delors.12
Lately, Sweet, Sandholtz and Brunell (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997), relying on both neofunctionalism and 
Deutsch's (e.g. 1957) transactionalist school13, show that the process of 
European legal integration has been generally driven by transnational 
activity of non-state actors and the efforts of Union institutions to reduce 
transaction costs. Transnational exchange demands triadic dispute 
resolution and the elaboration of legal rules which, if effective, encourage 
more exchange and further disputes and rules. Further, 'once the causal 
connections among exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and rules are 
forged, the legal system will operate according to a self-sustaining and 
expansionary dynamic' (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 65).
This literature emphasizes the inability of the Member States in controlling 
the process of integration. Hence an emerging set of works, which has 
been loosely labeled historical institutionalism , has elaborated the 
conditions when there are gaps in the Member States' control.
12 Neofunctionalist writings abound especially in the study of the European Court of 
Justice (see, for instance, Alter, 1996; Burley and Mattli, 1993; Stein, 1981; Weiler, 1994; 
Wincott, 1995).
13 This school dates back to the work of Deutsch (1964, 1966, 1957). Deutsch focused on 
how political communities emerge from mutually responsive transactions and from an 
essentially sociological process of learning. Sweet, Sandholtz and Brunell have re­
emphasize the importance of transactions among non-state actors, but with two 
important differences from Deutsch's work. First, they essentially disregard the 
sociological aspect of community formation and consider the process of integration as an 
exercise to reduce transaction costs. Second, they give more emphasis to the role of 
supranational institutions for dispute resolution and rule-making.
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Control gaps and bounded rationality
Pierson (1996) lists four factors that create gaps between the institutional 
and policy preferences of the Member States and the actual functioning of 
institutions and policies in the Union.
D ecision rules and supranational institutions. As mentioned above, 
supranational institutions could have explanatory potential if they are 
pivotal actors and in case of qualified majority. The literature will be 
analyzed in more detail below. What is important to stress here is that 
governments face high institutional barriers to reassert control. They can 
amend secondary legislation, but supranational actors could still be 
pivotal, or they can amend the Treaty. The latter option in unlikely to be 
successful for two reasons. First, Treaty amendment needs unanimous 
agreement, so it is likely for governments to find themselves in joint 
decision traps (Scharpf, 1988). Second, the transaction costs of an 
intergovenmental conference can easily excess the benefits of a Treaty 
amendment (Pierson, 1996:143).14
Tim e horizons. A second element that leads to control gaps is the fact that 
politicians heavily discount the long-term consequences of their decisions. 
Pressed by the logic of electoral politics, governments have strong 
incentives to maximize net benefits in the short-term, so 'the long-term 
institutional consequences are often the by-products of actions taken for 
short-term political reasons' (Pierson, 1996: 136). The crucial difference 
from intergovernmentalism is that governments might take decisions to 
maximize the domestic political support in the short-term a t the expenses 
of their long-term sovereignty. This argument has been mainly applied to 
Treaty negotiations and the C ourt15
14 See Moravcsik (1999) for a dissenting view.
15 For instance, Pierson (1996) observes that the refusal of the Major government to sign 
the Maastricht Social Protocol was guided by short-term political reasons, that is to please 
the Euro-skeptic minority in his party. However, the much less watered down version 
that was adopted because of the British refusal is a considerable long-term threat to 
British sovereignty if a Labour government decides to join the Social Chapter. On 
'constitutionalization' of the Treaty, Alter (1998) argues that the Court has been able to 
develop legal doctrine against the interest of the Member States by exploiting the
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Path dependency. One could argue that a state has always the option of 
exit from the Union. However, Pierson (1996) observes that this is 
increasingly costly as integration progresses. Once a new rule has been 
adopted, individuals are likely to 'develop particular skills, make certain 
investments, purchase particular goods, or devote time and money to 
certain organizations. All these decisions generate sunk costs. That is to 
say, they create commitments. In many cases, initial actions push 
individual behavior onto paths that are hard to reverse' (Pierson, 1996: 
146, emphasis added).
Over time, sunk costs and path dependence make the option of exit almost 
implausible. Compare the impact on the Union of the 'empty chair' crisis 
in the mid 1960s and the BSE crisis in the mid 1990s. A credible threat of 
exit in the former case seriously slowed down the adoption of new 
legislation for twenty years. In the latter case, the threat was not even 
contemplated and the Major government had to resort to milder strategies. 
Bounded rationality and inform ation asym m etry. The last obstacle to 
control is based on the bounded nature of the rationality of actors. Their 
inability to foresee all future circumstances or to appreciate the 
technicalities of each issue diminishes their control over events and other 
actors. Neofunctionalism and its central concept of functional spill-over is 
based on this limited prescience. Haas argued that
'most political actors are incapable of long-range purposive behavior 
because they stumble from one set of decisions into the next as a result of 
n o t having been able to foresee many of the implications and 
consequences of earlier decisions... [a] new central authority may emerge
different time preferences between political and judicial actors. Politicians prioritize 'the 
material impact of legal decisions over the long-term effects of ECJ doctrine' (Alter, 1998: 
131). So 'the ECJ expanded its jurisdictional authority by establishing legal principles but 
not applying the principles to the cases at hand' (Alter, 1998:131). These principles, such 
as the supremacy of EC law, have serious long-term implications, which are however 
heavily discounted by governments.
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as an unintended consequence of incremental earlier steps' (Haas, 1971: 
23, emphasis added).
Integration emerges through a process of functional spill-over whereby 'a 
given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the 
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which create a 
further condition and a need for more, an so forth' (Lindberg, 1963: 9). The 
dynamic between exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and rules that have 
been identified by Sweet, Sandholtz and Brunell (1998, 1997) relies on a 
similar expansionary logic that, at the outset, is unforeseen by 
governments.
Haas cited as example the spill-over from the sectoral common market in 
the European Coal and Steel Community to the general common market 
of the European Economic Community (Haas, 1958: 298). Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen (1991) has observed that the typical measures of negative 
integration (i.e. elimination of barriers) of the Single Market spilled over 
measures of positive integration (i.e. the production of new rules as those 
approximating laws and on the environment) (cf. Pinder, 1968).
N eofunctionalism  and the role o f the Comm ission
These works address partially the core of the question in this thesis. Haas 
assumes that the dominant policy dimension in European politics is 
characterized by more and less integration and locates the Commission's 
ideal point in the integrationist end. There is not much of a difference from 
intergovernmentalism and, similarly, the Commission's preferences 
remain relatively underspecified. The fact that it is an agent of integration 
means that the Commission attaches a value to legislative intervention at 
the European level p erse , but neofunctionalist writings disregard theories 
of bureaucratic preferences and behavior. This is inappropriate for three 
reasons. First, the more-less integration dimension does not guide us in 
the identification of the Commission's preferences regarding the specific
30
details of policy instruments. For instance, w hat institutional design of 
competition policy does the Commission prefer? How should the regional 
funds be organized according to the Commission? Second, the dimension 
becomes irrelevant especially when existing policies are being reformed 
and it is not anymore a matter of expanding the policy agenda. Third, 
grounding the analysis of the Commission's behavior in theories of 
bureaucracy renders the study of the Union comparable with other 
country studies and more amenable to cumulative work.
The earlier neofunctionalist works on the conditions under which the 
Commission reaches its objectives still remain underspecified. Their 
reliance on the functional spill-over from unintended consequences runs 
into both theoretical and empirical problems.
Theoretically, the dependence on random accidents renders this approach 
scarcely amenable to comparative and cumulative research. The predictive 
power of a theory of unintended effects unfolds almost by definition. The 
only  phenomenon that it predicts is that actions lead to unintended effects. 
This is more stating the obvious rather than delineating a theory. The 
implications of this approach are even direr. It defies the whole purpose of 
academic research because it does not delineates the causal linkages 
among dependent and independent variables, apart from saying that they 
are random. Thus, explanations tend to be circular because the causes of 
unintended effects are b y definition  unpredictable and empirical 
researches reach the relatively meager conclusion that there have been 
unintended effects from  certain actions (cf. Guay, 1997; Hanson, 1998; 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). Further, if neofunctionalist premises are 
correct (i.e. the abundance of unintended effects from discrete political 
choices), one should question why rational actors should even bother to 
take decisions whose consequences are so unpredictable. Finally, the 
comparative value of this approach is also limited, apart from asserting 
that all political systems are subject to random shocks. For cumulative 
research, one should ask under what conditions the Commission can
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exploit unintended consequences to increase the policy agenda of the 
Union. Haas notes that, for spill-over to take place, tasks assigned to 
supranational institutions must be 'inherently expansive, thus capable of 
overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional context and of surviving 
changes in the policy aims of member states' (Haas, 1961: 376). 
Interestingly, this is not only an institutionally sparse view of integration 
but there is also a surprising similarity with Moravcsik's concept of 
interdependent state preferences. Moreover, Union legislators are likely to 
design institutions and policy instruments to deal directly with 
uncertainty and unintended consequences in the manner they prefer. 
Surely, research priority should be given to the predictable components of 
a political system, to theories that clearly specify causal linkages and are 
more amenable to comparative and cumulative research and, finally, to an 
ontology of human behavior whereby actors exercise rational foresight 
and deal with uncertainty.
Empirically, some scholars argue that the deterministic nature of further 
gradual and incremental integration through functional spill-over clashes 
with a process characterized by fits and starts (Moravcsik, 1993: 476; 
Schneider, 1996; Schneider and Cederman, 1994). This dynamics is not 
however an accepted description of integration (cf. Stone Sweet and 
Brunell, 1998). More importantly, unintended consequences need not 
always to be at the expenses of governments or lead to supranational 
solutions. The liberalization of external trade policy in the early 1990s can 
be understood as an unforeseen consequence of the Single Act, even 
though the position of the Commission has been sometimes openly 
protectionist (Hanson, 1998: 73). The spill-over of the Single Market 
Programme into national defense policies has led to very limited 
supranational actions (Guay, 1997).
A valuable contribution of earlier neofunctionalist writings is that 
supranational actors can exploit their expertise vis-a-vis the Member 
States to obtain w hat they want. The context where functional spill-over
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thrives is economic, social and technical; areas that are nominally 
apolitical (Haas, 1964b). Thus, it is the asymmetric distribution of 
information across actors (not about future contingencies) that help the 
Commission to pursue its objectives. However, the neofunctionalist 
tradition misses the link with the literature on bureaucratic politics that, 
not surprisingly, relies heavily on the informational advantage of 
bureaucrats (see chapter 2).16 Further, a rigorous emphasis on information 
asymmetries, and therefore on the fact that actors pursue their goals in the 
most efficient manner given  costly inform ation  and take decisions under 
some uncertainty, enables researchers to explain behavior that is 
traditionally attributed to bounded rationality or limited cognition (Knott 
and Miller, 1987: 180; Zeckerhauser and Schaefer, 1968). The next chapter 
will deal in more detail with the latest works that analyzes the 
informational resources of the Commission.
The works following the neofunctionalist school have predominantly 
focused on the conditions under which the Commission reaches its goals, 
rather than on its preferences. The most promising part of this literature 
has discarded the issue of unintended consequences and focused on 
decision rules. As we will show in the section below, these works have 
developed an original and institutionally rich set of hypotheses on the 
legislative politics of the Union.17
Another part of the literature offers some added value but it is 
institutionally less sophisticated and /o r offers minor contributions to 
classical bargaining theory (cf. Binmore, 1987; Harsanyi, 1977; Raiffa, 
1982). In effect, the interactions between supranational and sub-national
16 Some of the best neofunctionalist studies on European integration stress the 
informational advantage of the judges of the Court of Justice. Burley, Mattli and 
Slaughter (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995, 1998) studied how the 
Court used the rule of law as a mask to pursue to constitutionalization of the Treaty of 
Rome. The Court promoted its political objectives using the technicalities of legal 
reasoning and the apparent apolitical nature of judicial review and dispute resolution. It 
managed 'to camouflage controversial political decisions in "technical" legal garb' 
(Burley and Mattli, 1993: 70).
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actors stressed in the earlier works of Haas and his colleagues are 
strategies to increase the cost of no-agreement Sweet, Sandholtz and 
Brunell simply add that this cost is positively related to the transaction 
costs of transnational exchange. The arguments on time horizons and path 
dependency stress the well known facts that a relatively more patient 
actor will get more of what she wants and that the cost of exit forecloses 
some bargaining outcomes.
To conclude, the neofunctionalist literature and its variants generally 
stress the role of supranational actors in the politics of the Union. 
However, apart from a general interest in more integration, it does not 
clearly specify the preferences of the Commission within the more general 
literature of bureaucratic and executive politics. This is unfortunate 
because there is a clear similarity between the two sets of literature on the 
informational advantage of bureaucrats. For the large part, these works 
remain also institutionally sparse and introduce standard intervening 
variables of negotiation (e.g. time horizons, cost of no-agreement and of 
exist). It is the recognition of this weakness that propelled the 
development of institutionally sophisticated studies of legislative politics 
in the Union.
Institutionalism and legislative politics
The dim inishing legislative pow ers o f the Com m ission
The most developed and rigorous supranational critique of
intergovernmentalism consists of the analysis of the conditions under
which supranational actors influence legislative outcomes in the Union.
The literature predominantly focuses on the formal powers18 of the
17 The insights on European integration have also become substantially different from 
neofunctionalism.
18 Formal powers are conferred upon the Commission by the Treaty or by secondary 
legislation. Informal power (which I will not consider) consists of political 
entrepreneurship through the persuasive manipulation of information and ideas. 
Moravcsik (1999) contends that informal supranational entrepreneurship is largely 
redundant in Treaty amending negotiations (cf. Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989).
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Commission, and specifically on the implications of its monopoly power 
of initiation.19 This set of work emphasizes the importance of three factors 
that affect the likelihood of the Commission obtaining its preferred policy: 
decision rules (namely the Union legislative procedures), the distribution 
of preferences of pivotal actors, and the location of the status quo.20 
Crombez (1996, 1997a, 1999) locates the ideal policy of the Commission 
between those of the Member States. He (1996) observes that the 
Commission is more likely to obtain its ideal policy under the consultation 
procedure, followed by cooperation and then assent procedures.21 
However, if the ideal policy of the Parliament is relatively close to the 
ideal policy of the Commission, there is no difference between the 
consultation and the cooperation procedures. For instance, Pollack (1994) 
shows how the Commission has cleverly exploited the legislative and 
budgetary procedures and the preferences of the Member States and the 
Parliament to shape the directives of the Single market programme and to 
direct resources to new areas (e.g. research and development, education 
and consumer protection). Further, the Commission might also enjoy a 
negative agenda power, that is 'the ability ... to maintain the status quo 
even though a qualified majority in the Council prefers to change iff 
(Crombez, 1996: 213). The Commission refusal to adopt an independent 
European Cartel Office and to postpone the elimination of duty free 
shopping are two examples where the Commission prefers, and 
maintains, the status quo over suggested reforms (see chapter 3).
The Commission has however progressively lost the ability to affect the 
policy equilibrium under the co-decision procedure. In fact, it may obtain 
a policy equilibrium that is more distant from its ideal policy than under 
cooperation. This is because of the conciliation committee's right to agree
19 The Commission initiates new legislation, the annual budgetary circle and the 
multiannual financial perspective.
20 A fourth variable, namely the number of policy dimensions, has not generated different 
results as to the power of the Commission. Compare Crombez (19%, 1999) with Tsebelis 
(1994) and Garrett and Tsebelis (19%).
211 will not describe in details these procedures, for a good analysis see Hix (1999).
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on a joint text under co-decision (Crombez, 1997a: 113). Finally, the 
Commission loses completely its agenda setting power under co-decision 
as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (Crombez, 1999). Thus, the Union is 
operating now like a bicameral system where the Commission, like 
national bureaucracies in parliamentary democracies, drafts the legislation 
on which the politicians decide (Tsebelis and Money, 1997).
There is a surprising degree of agreement on these results. Steunenberg 
(1994) focuses more directly on the different configurations of the 
Commission's policy preferences but he reaches similar conclusions. 
Garrett and Tsebelis (1996; see also Garrett, 1995; Tsebelis, 1997) assume, 
similar to the neofunctionalist literature, that the dominant policy 
dimension in European politics is characterized by more and less 
integration and locates the Parliament's and the Commission's ideal 
policies in the integrationist end. Their results do not differ from 
Crombez's.22
Toward a theory o f executive and bureaucratic po litics in  the European 
Union
The value added of these works consists predominantly in the rigorous 
specification of the conditions under which the Commission reaches its 
goals. However, the preferences of the Commission across policy domains 
remain poorly specified. The Commission is treated as any other 
legislator. The location of its preferences in the policy space is either based 
on empirical descriptive analysis (e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996) or on the 
fact that Commissioners are appointed by the Member States (e.g. 
Crombez, 1996). In this sense, these works share the same drawbacks with 
the other literatures analyzed above.
However, by showing that the Commission's legislative role is phasing 
out, they invite us to take the logical step of dealing directly with the
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'executive vocation' of the Commission (Lenaerts, 1991: 30).23 The 
Commission is the traditional candidate upon which policy-making 
functions are conferred (see Article 211 [ex 155.4] EC). This vocation was 
also strengthened with the introduction by the Single European Act of the 
third indent of Article 202 [ex 145] EC according to which the Council is 
under an obligation to delegate executive functions to the Commission24 
(Bradley, 1992: 714-7).
In other words, these theories of legislative politics need to be 
complemented by theories of delegation, bureaucratic preferences and 
executive behavior, which better qualify the preferences of the 
Commission across different policy domains and evaluate more 
appropriately the position of the Commission in the institutional 
framework of the Union. In a sense, these works ignore the fact that some 
preferences can be 'institutionally-determined', namely they are functions 
of the specific institutional location of an actor.
Finally, these works use institutional rules as independent variables; they 
are theories of structure induced equilibria. However, the executive 
functions and the bureaucratic structure of the Commission are essentially 
matter of institutional choice. Only theories of executive and bureaucratic 
politics can inform us of this choice.
22 The literature produces instead different results as to the powers of the Parliament. See 
Crombez (1996) and Tsebelis (1994) and the debate between Tsebelis and Garrett 
(Tsebelis, 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997), Scully (1997a,b) and Moser (1996,1997).
23 This is not to say that the Commission's executive functions do not affect legislative 
production. On the contrary, there are many empirical studies that show how the 
Commission has used its executive powers to increase the cost of not adopting 
legislation. For instance, the Commission has increased the cost of no-agreement in the 
agricultural stabilizers reform package in 1988. It took the Council to court for failing to 
adopt the 1988 budget of which agricultural reform was a cornerstone (Patterson, 1997). It 
has also used its executive powers for the same purpose. In the merger control regulation 
in 1990, the Commission actively pursued a judicial interpretation that applied Article 81 
(ex 85) EC of the Treaty to mergers, thus showing how the lack of a regulation 
considerably increased legal uncertainty surrounding these activities (see chapter 3 and 
Bulmer, 1994). The possibility of initiating infringement proceedings can also have a 
substantial impact on the legislative outcome.
24 The Council may reserve the right to exercise directly implementing powers itself. This 
must be justified on clear substantive grounds in the initial act of delegation and limited
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Conclusion
The general theoretical perspectives on the European Union are becoming 
increasingly obsolete. Their added value is essentially middle range. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism illuminates how national domestic groups 
form their preferences across issues and gain representation. Its insights 
can be integrated with theories of legislative politics. Similarly, the 
emphasis on information of neofunctionalist works can be integrated with 
theories of legislative politics when Union legislators choose institutions to 
deal with unforeseen circumstances and information asymmetries.
More importantly, these frameworks deal incompletely with the core 
question of the thesis: why does the Commission substantially affect the 
process of European integration across the multitude of possible 
trajectories? We certainly first need to know the Commission's basic 
motivations before attempting an answer. None of the main approaches 
however ground the Commission's preferences on theories of bureaucratic 
politics. Chapter 2 reviews in detail the academic work that has so far 
dealt with this issue. These frameworks instead differ widely about the 
circumstances that support or hinder the Commission's objectives. 
Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the importance of Treaty amending 
negotiations vis-a-vis the day-to-day operation of the Union. The result is 
downplaying any relevant role of the Commission. Yet, the latter level of 
analysis is becoming relatively more important as policy dimensions are 
pooled and delegated and the possible trajectories of integration expand. 
If we want to understand why integration is following specific paths, we 
need to focus the attention on the daily working of the Union and the 
causal role of its supranational institutions. The reliance of the 
neofunctionalist literature on unexpected consequences runs into 
empirical and logical problems. Neofunctionalism does not clearly explain 
why, and the conditions under which, the Commission exploits
to only specific cases. The exceptional nature of this reserve safeguards the effet utile of 
Article 202.3 EC (Bradley, 1992).
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unintended effects from previous negotiations (although, its emphasis on 
information asymmetries sparks interesting parallels with theories of 
bureaucratic behavior). It also does not explain why Member States would 
even sign Treaties if their effects were so unpredictable and politically 
risky. The reliance on unpredictability impedes cumulative and 
comparative research.
This thesis builds instead on the more rigorous institutionalist work that 
applies formal theories of legislative politics to the Union and specifies the 
conditions that favor the Commission. A formal model is developed in the 
appendix of chapter 2. It differs from the existing contributions in the fact 
that the Commission's preference is operationalized as executive 
discretion, not as specific policy preferences. This is in order to focus on its 
executive role, rather than its legislative one. Finally, the main frameworks 
neglect the issue, which is object of intense scrutiny in the literature on 
executive politics, of procedural control.
My contribution remains essentially middle range. This has two benefits. 
First, a better understanding of executive politics improves our knowledge 
of the Union as a whole. Second, as mentioned, the use of classical theories 
of executive politics renders our work comparable and cumulative and 
fosters our dialogue with the political science community at large, 
therefore abandoning the su i generis paradigm that has plagued the study 
of the European Union (Hix, 1998).
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Chapter 2.
Studying the Commission:
Preferences, Delegation and Control
Introduction
This chapter critically reviews the works on the European Commission, 
highlights the gaps in the literature and lists the hypotheses that will be 
tested in the next chapters. As mentioned in the introduction, the thesis 
will not contribute to the literature that studies the role of the Commission 
during the Intergovermental Conferences that amends the Treaty. It will 
instead analyze the Commission from the perspective of the literature on 
executive and bureaucratic politics. As delineated, the first logical step is a 
study of the bureaucratic preferences of the Commission. The second is an 
analysis of the variables that help the Commission to achieve its goals. 
The final step consists instead of the analysis of the factors that induce 
Union legislators to establish mechanisms to oversee the Commission's 
behavior.
The Com m ission and the Intergovernm ental Conferences
In the first thirty years since the establishment of the European Economic
Community, the study of the European Commission reflected the ups and
downs of the neofunctionalist school. Haas and his colleagues gave a
central entrepreneurial role to the Commission, so articles and books
flourished in the 1960s. When the predictions of neofunctionalism felt
short of empirical validity in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s,
academic research on this institution almost stalled.1
The interest re-emerged in the late 1980s with the work of Sandholtz and
Zysman (1989) on the Commission's entrepreneurship in devising the
1 The list of 1960s studies is rather long, probably the most relevant works (apart from 
Haas and his colleagues) include Coombes (1970), Scheinmann (1966), Spinelli (1966) 
and Yondorf (1965). To my knowledge, sections in the book edited by Wallace et al. 
(1979) are some of the few contributions in the years that followed.
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Single Market Programme. They emphasized its 'leadership in proposing 
technical measures for the internal market that grabbed the attention of 
business and government elites' (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989:107). They 
stressed that the Commission's role went beyond that of an international 
secretariat. The Commission perceived the failure of national strategies of 
economic growth and the shift in domestic political preferences toward 
market-oriented policies and formulated proposals that 'transformed this 
new orientation into policy, and, more importantly, into a policy 
perspective and direction' (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989: 113). Cameron 
(1992) later echoed this view: 'Delors and his Commission did play a 
major role in the successful completion of the initiative ... they gave a 
complex, technical, and business-oriented process of market enlargement 
that was likely to drag on for years the image of a simple and finite 
adventure in "building Europe'" (Cameron, 1992: 51; see also Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen, 1991:10-2).
The political entrepreneurship of the Commission in Intergovernmental 
Conferences is however a highly contested issue. In his work on five 
major Treaty-amending negotiations, Moravcsik concludes that 
'supranational intervention, far from being a necessary condition for 
efficient interstate negotiation in the EC, is generally late, redundant, 
futile and sometimes even counterproductive (Moravcsik, 1999: 269-70; 
see also Moravcsik, 1998).
As already pointed out, this thesis does not deal directly with this issue 
because its level of analysis is Union legislation (instead of Treaty 
amendments) where the Commission enjoys formal legislative powers 
and has specific bureaucratic preferences. It will however contribute to the 
debate about the relative importance in the process of integration of 
Intergovernmental Conferences vis-a-vis the day-to-day implementation 
of Treaty provisions.
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The Com m ission's preferences and the expansion of the EU agenda 
In concomitance with the raising interest on supranational 
entrepreneurship, scholars have shifted the level of analysis of the 
Commission from Intergovernmental Conferences to the bureaucratic and 
legislative arena.
Majone has been one of the first scholars that analyzed the Commission's 
bureaucratic behavior from a rational choice perspective (see also 
Teutemann, 1990). He rejects budget maximization as the Commission's 
primary objective and asserts that this institution wants to maximize 'its 
influence as measured by the scope of its competence ... the utility 
function of the Commission is positively related to the scope rather than 
the scale of the services provided' (Majone, 1992: 138). Task expansion is 
the Commission's primary goal (Majone, 1996: 65).
Majone has inspired a considerable amount of empirical research. Cram 
(1994, 1997) has analyzed agenda expansion in social and technology 
policy. She concludes that 'much of the activity of the European 
Commission might well be interpreted as an attempt to expand gradually 
the scope of Union competence ... acting as a 'purposeful opportunist" 
(Cram, 1994:199; see also Eichener, 1997: 598-9; Mazey, 1995: 591-3, 602-7; 
Pollack, 1994:134-8; Sandholtz, 1992; Wendon, 1998). Telecommunications 
is another sector where the Commission's task expansion strategy has 
been especially successful. Fuchs notes that the Commission 'operated in 
the field of telecommunications with the clear intention of further 
developing its domain, overcoming all resistance, and creating new 
regulatory and organizational structures' (Fuchs, 1994: 190; see also Esser 
and Noppe, 1996: 553, 560; Sandholtz, 1993b; Schmidt, 1998: 172-6).2 In 
more general terms, Pollack (1994) observes that the Commission's task 
expansion strategy is especially successful in regulatory policies that are 
the result of functional spillover from Treaty objectives (e.g. environment 
and education) and in distributive policies if the Member States are
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supportive of a Community Initiative (e.g. technology and 
telecommunications).
Task-expanding behavior however looses explanatory power once 
delegation of policy-making authority to the Union has taken place. 
Moreover, the literature, including Majone, has frequently equated 'scope 
of competence of the Commission' with 'task expansion of the Union'. 
This is an unwarranted generalization as new policies of the Union might 
grant very limited executive discretion to the Commission. For instance, 
foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs are two new 
policies included in the Treaty of Maastricht where the role of the 
Commission is very limited (see e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997: 
ch.l, 3; Hix, 1999: 310-7, 341-7). The Commission can be heavily 
constrained also within the traditional activities of internal market 
regulation, as in risk assessment associated with food consumption (Vos, 
1999: ch. 3).
The Commission's preferences can then be associated with the whole 
agenda of the Union, hence reflecting the conflict for tasks across different 
level of government that is traditionally associated with federal polities. 
Or, they can be associated with the specific competence of the 
Commission at European level, hence reflecting the conflict among 
branches of government that is informed by the well-developed literature 
on executive and bureaucratic politics. Many scholars tend to elude this 
analytical distinction and give emphasis to the former type of preferences. 
This is probably a legacy of neofunctionalism and a result of the empirical 
relevance of the transfer of policy competence from the Member States to 
the Union in the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis will instead analyze the 
Commission's preferences from the latter perspective, as an
2 Other works include also industrial defence policy (Guay, 1997: 405, 411-4) competition 
policy (Bulmer, 1994: 433-6) and regional policy (Smyrl, 1998: 90).
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acknowledgment of the fact that the Union is a polity in formation and the 
Commission a maturing bureaucracy and executive.3
The Com m ission's bureaucratic preferences
Treating the Commission as a traditional bureaucracy is certainly not 
novel in the study of the Union. Both Scheinmann (1966) and Coombes 
(1970) have highlighted the importance of bureaucratic politics in the 
Union and there is an abundance of works that describe the bureaucratic 
structure of the Commission (Cini, 1996; Donnelly, 1993; Edwards and 
Spence, 1994; Peters, 1992: 85-92). Also contributions that have a more 
analytical cut emphasize the Commission's bureaucratic and executive 
functions in terms administrative capacity and political leadership 
(Christiansen, 1996,1997; Laffan, 1997; Nugent, 1995,1997).
Few, though, have an explicit rational choice perspective.4 Peters (1992: 
115-21) refers to Allison (1971) and Downs (1967) when he analyzes 
bureaucratic politics in the Union and he deals, although relatively 
indirectly, with the Commission's organizational goals (see also, partially, 
Christiansen, 1996, 1997). His contribution, however, falls short of an 
empirical test and remains introductory.
There are also some empirical works that consider the Commission's 
bureaucrats as Downsian zealots that narrowly pursue 'sacred' policies. 
For instance, differences across Directorates General in the regulation of 
media ownership reflect how public officials perceive their primary goal 
as the one of creating a single market, pursuing an industrial policy or 
guaranteeing plurality (Harcourt, 1998). Similarly, economic cohesion and
3 The Commission's preference ordering is likely to be: EU policy close to its preferences, 
EU policy different from its preferences, no EU policy. Thus, the Commission prefers 
any policy to no policy. Once ascertained the need of a policy, this thesis studies the 
Commission's attempts to shape it to its own liking.
4 There are instead relatively more studies that have a sociological perspective 
emphasizing the importance of culture, preference formation and socialization, see Cini 
(1996, 1997), Cram (1998), Edwards and Spence (1994: ch. 1, 3, 7), Esser and Noppe 
(1996), Harcourt (1998), Mazey and Richardson (1995), Wendon (1998). Empirical works 
have also studied the preferences of Commissioners and bureaucrats in terms of
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competition are other two policy objectives that have been the object of 
conflict across Directorates (Pollack, 1995: 379; see also Hooghe, 1997; 
Marks, 1992). However, these explanations of bureaucratic behavior tends 
to be tautological as bureaucrats pursue programs because they 
exogenously like them (see also critique in chapter 3).
Majone (1992, 1996) bases his observation about the Commission's utility 
function on Dunleavy's (1985, 1991) critique of Niskanen (1971). For 
Niskanen, the utility of public officials is correlated with the budget of 
their bureau, thus they adopt budget-maximizing strategies. Dunleavy 
conditions budget maximization on agency type and time (as stage of 
policy development). When conditions do not apply, officials have work- 
related preferences and adopt bureau-shaping strategies. Since Majone 
then emphasizes task expansion rather than bureau-shaping, he does not 
test directly Dunleavy's hypotheses, nor does he test the hypotheses of 
formal works that relax Niskanenian assumptions and specify the 
conditions under which bureaucrats reach their objectives. To my 
knowledge, there are no studies that specifically test the bureau-shaping 
and budget-maximizing behavior of the Commission. Smith (1998: 69-71; 
see also Smith, 1996) analyzes how the Commission has enhanced its 
autonomy to implement state aid policy by broadening the applicability of 
its regulations and emphasizing transparency in the public sector. 
However, his focus is on the Commission's ex-post attempts to increase 
such autonomy not on the Commission's preferences about budgetary 
appropriations and statutory discretion. Interestingly, empirical studies 
indicate contrasting behaviors. Pollack (1995: 383) notes the Commission's 
stronger opposition to the constraints on its executive discretion in 
regional policy rather than to the reduced budgetary appropriations to 
Community Initiatives. Conversely, in research policy, the Commission 
was 'happy to trade larger budgets for R&D for stricter comitology 
procedures' (Peterson, 1995b: 403).
balancing European, national and other political pressures (Egeberg, 1996; Hooghe,
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To conclude, chapter 3 explicitly tests the hypotheses proposed by 
Dunleavy and Niskanen.5 These are as follows:
H ypothesis 1: Public officials are m ore lik e ly  to have budget-related  
preferences in  the early stages o f developm ent o f delivery agencies and  
budget-m axim izing strategies tend  to focus on the program m e and  
bureau com ponents o f the budget
H ypothesis 2: Public officials are m ore lik e ly  to have w ork-related  
preferences and em ploy bureau-shaping strategies in  regulatory or control 
agencies or in  other agencies where there has been a substantial budget 
grow th over tim e.
The chapter develops also three operative corollaries derived from the 
literature relaxing Niskanenian assumptions and (partially) that on the 
Union legislative politics and bargaining theory. It uses as case studies the 
twenty-year development of the competition and regional policies of the 
Union.
The results show that 1) agency type is a relevant factor shaping 
bureaucratic preferences and strategies and 2) budgetary preferences 
selectively focus on the delivery component of an agency and on the 
bureau and programme components of the budget. More importantly, the 
chapter emphasizes that work-related preferences, consisting of 
innovative work tasks, managerial discretion and broad scope of 
activities, emerge as the most persistent over time and across policies.
Legislative politics and the Com m ission's sta tu tory  discretion 
Having established the importance of work-related preferences, chapter 4 
quantitatively tests the conditions that determine the degree of ex-ante
1999; Page and Wouters, 1994), however none takes a rational choice perspective.
5 See chapter 3 for Dunleavy's classification of agency and budget types.
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statutory discretion delegated by the Member States and the Parliament to 
the Commission in secondary legislation. In other words, I test the 
variables that assist the Commission in the achievement of its objectives. 
Four factors are selected using theories of executive politics and a formal 
model developed in the appendix of this chapter.
As discussed in chapter 1, there is an emerging formal literature that 
rigorously analyzes under which Union legislative procedures the 
Commission maximizes its utility (e.g. Crombez, 1996, 1997a, 1999). There 
are also few empirical contributions that test, tough not systematically, 
some of the predictions. Pollack (1994: 131), for instance, has observed 
how the switch from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council has 
been a major factor in the adoption of the Internal Market initiative 
proposed by the Commission.6 Eichener (1997) stressed how, under co­
operation and co-decision, preference convergence between the 
Parliament and the Commission had led to high regulatory standards for 
occupational safety and environmental protection. However, as 
mentioned above, these works see the Commission as primarily mission 
oriented, pursuing specific policies (e.g. the Single Market) and expanding 
the agenda of the Union.
Instead, I propose a model that is based on these formal contributions but 
operationalizes the work-related preferences of the Commission in terms 
of executive discretion. The model derives, from the institutional 
framework of the Union, additional factors that affect the ex-ante 
statutory discretion of the Commission.
The determ inants o f ex-ante sta tutory discretion
First, uncertainty about the choice of the best policy action leads 
legislators to delegate broader policy-making authority to the bureaucratic 
agent (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; 
McCubbins, 1985). Proposition 2 of the formal model confirms this
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relation but only in case of non-amending secondary legislation because 
of the Commission's monopoly power of initiation.
Second, convergence of pivotal legislator's and agent7s preferences 
increases the scope of delegated authority (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994, 
1996; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989). Proposition 2 of the model adds the 
same condition as above.
Third, according to Proposition 1 the discretion delegated to the 
Commission is larger in case of qualified majority than unanimity because 
in the former case the preferences of the pivotal legislator are, on average, 
closer to those of the Commission.
Fourth, less policy-making functions are generally delegated to the 
Commission in those types of policies that required extensive involvement 
of national administrations during implementation.
To conclude, chapter 4 tests the following hypothesis:
H ypothesis 3: The ex-ante statutory discretion delegated to the 
Comm ission in  secondary legislation increases w ith 1) the uncertainty 
facing Union legislators about the optim um  p o licy  actions/ 2) the 
convergence o f preferences betw een the Com m ission and the p ivo ta l 
legislator, 3) the use o f qualified m ajority in  the Council, and 4) policies 
that require lim ited  in  vol vem ent o f national adm inistrations.
The hypothesis is quantitatively tested on a stratified sample of non­
amending legislation. The chapter evaluates also the impact of the 
Parliament in the co-operation procedure and of the opinions issued by 
the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.
The results show that uncertainty and policy types are the most significant 
factors affecting the Commission's ex-ante discretion while informal 
decision rules play also a relevant role.
6 On how the shift from unanimity to qualified majority has impacted outcomes of
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Control of the C om m ission's executive functions
The literature on executive politics stresses that delegation is invariably 
linked with control. Legislators delegate policy-making functions to the 
administrative agent and establish control mechanisms to oversee its 
activities.
Chapter 5 focuses on questions of Commission accountability and 
mechanisms of Member States control, with particular emphasis on 
committee control. This is a system of control, termed comitology, 
whereby representatives of the Member States directly oversee, using 
various procedures, the implementation of the responsibilities delegated 
to the Commission.
Although no scholar entirely subscribes to one view, the literature offers 
two broad reasons to explain the establishment of these committees. First, 
committees provide information to coordinate, detail and standardize 
implementation across the Member States. For Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace (1997: 182), comitology 'is a rather normal tool of the policy 
maker and policy implementer, namely the convening of groups through 
which the Commission discusses ... the progress of policy 
implementation'. For Wessels (1998: 217), comitology allows close co­
operation between the Member States and the Union institutions. It serves 
'especially to ensure joint management7 (see also Siedentopf and Ziller, 
1988). For Joerges and Neyer (1997a: 295), these committees are set up for 
'the transposition of general normative commitments into concrete 
decisional practices'. The proposals discussed are 'the result of extensive 
consultations w ith individual national administrators and independent 
experts [and] the effectiveness of any measure adopted depends on 
member states transposing the measure adequately into their national 
legal systems w ithout leaving too m any opportunities fo r evasion ' 
(Joerges and Neyer, 1997b: 618, emphasis added). These committees are 
fora that generate trust across the Member States and use scientific
international negotiations see Jupille (1999).
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discourse to assess policy uncertainty (e.g. risk associated with food 
consumption) (Joerges and Neyer, 1997a: 295, 1997b: 619; Vos, 1997: 227, 
1999:136-8).
Operationally, the atmosphere is business like and centered on problem 
solving, there are few referrals and the agenda is dominated by the 
Commission. Therefore, comitology is a non-hierarchical form of 
governance (Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1989; Joerges and Neyer, 
1997a: 279; Wessels, 1998: 228). Some authors also prospect for the 
possibility of national delegates being captured by the Commission for its 
own policy goals, therefore emphasizing processes of socialization, 
persuasion and preference formation (Joerges and Neyer, 1997b: 618-20; 
van Schendelen, 1996).
We can reinterpret this literature more analytically by relating it to the 
core tenets of executive politics. When they refer to 'concrete decisional 
practices' or to the 'progress of policy implementation', these 
contributions recognize that Treaty provisions and secondary legislation 
are incomplete contracts that do not specify how states should behave 
under all possible circumstances. Similarly, when they refer to the 
generation of trust and to 'joint management7, they acknowledge that 
cooperative ventures are riddled by problems of 1) incomplete 
information about defection and 2) multiple equilibria that cannot be 
distinguished in Paretian terms (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 178-81).7 
Hence, institutions (i.e. comitology) provide information that limits the 
adverse effects of these problems. They reduce uncertainty by 1) 
producing detailed rules, 2) signaling defection and 3) coordinating 
equilibrium selection. The second function, which is more a controlling 
one, is however greatly underrated in the literature (but see Vos, 1999). 
Although chapter 5 will not negate the informational value of comitology, 
it will show that the likelihood of establishing some form of procedural
7 On incomplete information, incomplete contracts and multiple equilibria see also Kreps 
(1990), Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and 
Williamson (1975,1985).
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control and the stringency of such control are also a function of the level 
of conflict among Union legislators when they adopt the relevant 
secondary legislation. Their apparently innocuous operation cannot cover 
the fact that issue-specific tensions, which the Commission cannot 
disregard, have been at the source of their establishment. Neither will I 
take issue with the capture hypothesis because the chapter focuses on the 
Union legislators' decision to establish these committees rather than on 
the outcomes of their deliberations.
The second rationale for the establishment of these committees 
emphasizes the control function. For Docksey and Williams (1994: 121), 
'comitology constitutes an institutional compromise between the need of 
effective Community decision-making and Member States' desire to 
preserve national influence'. For Vos (1997: 214-5), comitology has been 
set up 'in  response to the dual need for flexible means effectively to carry 
out ever-increasing Community activities, and to ensure the continuing 
presence of the Member States within the Community decision-making 
process'. For Pollack (1997: 114), comitology is the most intrusive form of 
oversight of the Commission's executive powers (see more in the section 
below). These works are less concerned with the operational aspects and 
focus primarily on the inter-institutional balance and conflict on 
comitology, especially between the Council and the Parliament (Bradley, 
1992,1997; Vos, 1997).
More analytically, these authors emphasize the committees' control 
function over the implementation activity of the Commission. Comitology 
represents institutional arrangements that structurally induce equilibrium 
outcomes (Shepsle, 1979, 1989: 136) and limit the Commission's freedom 
to implement its ideal policies.8 By assessing these constraints on the 
Commission's executive discretion, formal works have evaluated the 
pattern of preferment of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament
8 The literature on the control of the bureaucracy is vast, some of the most important 
contributions include Banks (1992), Bawn (1995), Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 
(1989), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Weingast and Moran (1983).
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toward the different control procedures (Franchino, 2000; Steunenberg, 
1996; Steunenberg et alv 1996)
Chapter 5 will highlight that the general inter-institutional focus of these 
works only partially captures the issue of comitology. The establishment 
of control procedures is also the result of substantive issue-specific conflict 
among the Union institutions.
To sum up, this literature has three main weaknesses. First, it 
predominantly emphasizes the informational role of comitology (cf. 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997; Joerges and Neyer, 1997a,b; Wessels, 
1998). Second, it does not test its control function (cf. Bradley, 1997; 
Franchino, 2000; Steunenberg et al., 1996; Vos, 1997); the only exception 
being Vos (1999) who however limits her analysis to a case study of the 
foodstuffs sector. Thirdly, with few exceptions, the literature heavily 
relies on a su i generis characterization of the Union that is not amenable to 
comparative and cumulative research (see Joerges and Neyer7 s (1997a,b) 
deliberative supranationalism and Wessels' (1998) fusion theory). Instead, 
these works can be easily related to the core tenets of executive and 
bureaucratic politics, as I have shown in this section.
Thus, chapter 5 will take issue with the contributions emphasizing the 
informational role of comitology by reasserting the control function. It 
also limits the analysis to one theoretical framework, namely agency 
theory, therefore rejecting the su i generis paradigm.
The determ inants o f procedural control and correlation w ith ex-ante 
discretion
First, as uncertainty about the choice of the best policy action leads 
legislators to delegate broader discretion, it also leads them to establish 
more confining procedures (McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins and Page, 
1987).
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Second, the level of conflict among legislators has a similar impact on the 
establishment of control procedures (McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins and 
Page, 1987).
Third, the need of unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers 
should have a similar impact as unanimity measures the intensity of 
conflict at the level of the policy area and as result of decision rules.
Finally, chapter 5 also tests whether executive discretion and the 
stringency of procedural control are correlated (Bawn, 1997; Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1994; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins and Page, 1987).
To conclude, chapter 5 tests two hypotheses:
H ypothesis 4: The likelihood o f establishing control procedures and the 
stringency o f control are p o sitively  correlated w ith 1) the uncertainty 
facing Union legislators about the optim um  p o licy  actions, 2) the level o f 
conflict am ong legislators and 3) the need  fo r unanim ous agreem ent in  the 
Council o f M inisters.
H ypothesis 5: Ex-ante statutory discretion is  p o sitively  correlated w ith the 
stringency o f procedural control.
The results show that unanimity, level of conflict among the Union 
institutions and uncertainty are key determinants for the establishment of 
procedural control of the Commission's implementation activities. Level 
of conflict and uncertainty are also important factors affecting the degree 
of stringency in control. Finally, discretion is significantly correlated with 
the stringency of control.
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APPENDIX
The model: initial structure and assumptions
The model uses the following definitions and assumptions.9 1) Actors are 
the Member States and the Commission. Their ideal points on the policy 
space are Gi for i = a, b and C respectively. I will not consider the 
European Parliament in this appendix, its role is assessed more generally 
in Franchino (2000). 2) The policy space is unidimentional. It is 
represented by the real line R1 ranging from its minimum R- to its 
maximum R+ and crossing the value of zero. Initially, I will set R- = -1 and 
R+ = 1. This assumption will be relaxed later: 3) Actors have Euclidean 
preferences over the policy space. Their utility functions are quadratic in 
the final policy outcome x:
Ugi (x) = -  (x -  Gi)2 for the Governments and
Uc (x) = -  (x -  C)2 for the Commission.
4) Outcomes x depend on both the Commission's implemented policy p 
and the state of Nature w  so that x = p + w, where w  is the future state of 
Nature that the Member States cannot anticipate when they delegate 
policy authority to the Commission and it is the outcome in case there is 
no delegation. 5) Future states of Nature w  are uniformly distributed in 
the range R- to R+, that is w  ~ U[R-, R+]. Actors' expected utility EU is 
based on this prior distribution. 6) The degree of discretion d is a segment 
of the policy space. It limits the set of policies that the Commission can 
implement such that p e [-d, d] and d> 0. The Commission can implement 
a policy p whose distance from the state of Nature w  is not greater that
9 Some of these assumptions are not innocuous although they have been used in formal 
works on EU institutions. Germaneness rules and the lack of omnibus legislation in the 
EU can justify unidimentionality (cf. Crombez, 1996; Garrett, 1995; Steunenberg et al., 
1996). This also improves tractability, especially when information is incomplete, and 
allows us to focus on the determinants of executive discretion (Epstein and O'Halloran, 
1994: fn.6; Hammond and Miller, 1985). For McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989) and 
Steunenberg (1996), discretion is referred to those actions that no political coalition can
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discretion d. I assume that, if that was not the case (i.e. I p-w I > d), p will 
be struck down by the European Court of Justice and the outcome will 
remain w. 7) Finally, preferences, utility functions, the structure of the 
game and the probability distribution of w  are common knowledge.
The sequence of moves is depicted in Figure A2.1. The Commission 
proposes a degree of discretion d that has to be approved by the Council 
of Ministers according to the relevant legislative procedure. After the state 
of Nature w is revealed to all actors, the Commission sets the policy p 
within the discretionary limits ± d.10
< FIGURE A2.1 FIERE>
The strategic options available for each Member State are very simple. It 
either rejects or accepts the discretion proposed by the Commission. Its 
strategy is a function V(d) relating delegation proposals to voting 
decisions. V(d) equals 0 if the Government vote against the proposed 
discretion, it equals 1 if it supports it. The Commission has to take two 
decisions in two nodes of the game. First, it has to propose a degree of 
discretion that is acceptable to the pivotal Government in the relevant 
legislative procedure. Second, it sets the policy within these discretionary 
limits. Thus, its strategy is a pair {d, p(d,w)} where d is the proposed 
discretion and p is the implemented policy as a function of the degree of 
discretion granted d and the state of Nature w.
The subgame perfect equilibrium11 used for the results of the model 
consists of strategies V(d) for the Governments and {d, p(-)} for the
overturn, while here it is defined as an ex-ante limit imposed on the agent. Note that I 
disregard the issue of credible commitment (cf. Majone, 1996: Ch. 4; Rogoff, 1985).
10 One could object that EU legislators could enact new acts for any realization of w, so 
avoiding the delegation problem. This is highly unlikely because 1) the Council is under 
an obligation to delegate executive functions to the Commission according to Article 202.3 
(ex 145) EC and 2) the Council lacks time and expertise to micromanage policy decision.
11 In steps 2 and 3 below the pair of belief about w and strategies of each moving player is 
also sequentially rational, a more general concept of equilibrium than subgame 
perfection.
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Commission that satisfy the following conditions:12
1) The implemented policy p maximizes the Commission's utility given 
the degree of discretion granted d and the state of Nature w. Formally, 
let the set of available policies to implement Y determine the function 
8(d,w)={ YeR1 such that I Y-wI < d}, the condition becomes:
p(d,w) e argmax pe8(d,w) Uc(p+w).
2) In their delegation decision, the Member States want to maximize their 
expected utility EU after the state of Nature is revealed and the 
Commission sets the policy. Their expectation is taken with respect to 
the prior distribution of w. They will vote only for the degree of 
discretion that at least equals the expected utility attained in the status 
quo ante discretion d sq . Formally, the condition is:
V(d)=1 iff EUGi(p(d,w)) > EUGi(p(dsq,w)) otherwise V(d)=0 Vi,
where p(d,w) and p(dsq,w) are determined in the same way as p(d,w)
in point l .13
3) The Commission proposes that degree of discretion that maximizes its 
expected utility and is accepted by the Member States. Formally, this 
implies: d e argmaxdeR1 EUc(p(d,w)).
Introductory results: deriving preferences over discretion
In this section I derive, from the conditions listed above, the preferences 
over the discretion of legislators and the agent and, after combining the 
results, I set the scene for the next section.
The Governments' and the Commission's preferences over discretion 
The mathematical proof of actors' preferences over discretion is in Proof 1. 
Figure A2.2 illustrates the optimal degree of discretion as a function of a 
Government's ideal policy, given a Commission's ideal point, R+=l and R- 
= - 1.
121 do not use asterisks to denote optimal strategies to simplify the exposition.
13 Notice that this condition implies that if a Government is indifferent between d and dsq, 
it votes for d.
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< FIGURE A2.2 HERE>
The message of Figure A2.2 is straightforward. The more distant the ideal 
point of the Government is from the Commission's, the less discretion will 
be delegated to the agent. This is coherent with similar work on discretion 
preferences with a single principal (Calvert et al., 1989; Epstein and 
O'Halloran, 1994; Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994).
There are four sets of values that d can take to maximize the expected 
utility of a Government. If a Member State's ideal policy is more extreme 
than the Commission's but they both are on the same side on the policy 
spectrum, the Commission's activity always benefits the Member State. 
Discretion is therefore full. For any value that the state of Nature takes the 
agent can implement a policy p so that it reaches its optimum point C. In 
interval I, Gi is to the right of C and they are both greater than zero (i.e. Gi 
> C > 0) and the optimum discretion is d = 1 + C. As preferences diverge 
and the Member State's ideal policy moves toward the other side of the 
spectrum, discretion decreases because the Commission will implement a 
policy far from the Member State's optimum, reducing its utility. In 
intervals II and III, the Government's ideal policy is moving away from
c2 1the Commission's (i.e. C > Gi > 0 and — < Gi < 0 respectively). Here,
discretion gradually diminishes as a function of both C and Gi. It takes the 
following values: d = l  + 2 G i - C i n  interval II and d = 1 -  yjd  - 2Gic in 
interval III. Finally, the two actors' preferences may diverge so much that 
the Member State could prefer facing the vagaries of the states of Nature 
rather than delegating authority to an agent to adjust them. This is the 
case of interval IV. Here the Government's and the Commission's ideal
c2 1policies are at the opposite of the policy spectrum (i.e. Gi < —^ -)  and there 
is no delegation.
The Commission always prefers full discretion, that is for any C the 
discretion that maximizes the Commission's utility is d = 1 + | C | . When
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discretion takes this value, the agent can implement a policy p to adjust 
any state of Nature across the policy space and reach its optimum policy 
C. This is consistent with bureau-shaping behavior whereby the 
Commission's utility function is positively correlated with its executive 
discretion.
Preferences and the discretion space
From the structure of preferences described above we can construct a one­
dimensional discretion space. This space will take a minimum value of 
zero (by assumption 6 above) and a maximum value of 1+ IC | (full 
discretion). Actors' expected utility takes the following functional form 
across this discretion space (/(w) is the probability density function of w):
EUgi = J*UGi(min[w+d-Gi,C-Gi])/(w)dw + J 'U gi (maxjw-d-Gi, C-
-1 c
Gi])/(w)dw
C 1
EUc = j*Uc(min[w+d-C,0])/(w)dw + J'U c (max[w-d-C, 0])/(w)dw
- l
for the Government's and the Commission's ideal policy Gi and C 
respectively. As I have shown in Proof 1, the expected utility can take sets 
of different values according to the location of Gi relative to C and the 
value d. It is possible to show that actors have rightward skewed single­
peaked preferences over this discretion space.14
14 A way to show this is to design a map of indifference curves with a given 
Governmental preference Gi (an example is available from the author). It is possible to 
plot the map on a chart with, for instance, the X-axis being the discretion d and the Y-axis 
the Commission's ideal policy C. Each curve would represent the combination of 
discretion and the Commission's ideal policy that provides the same amount of expected 
utility to a Government. This map of indifference curves has an Euclidean-like shape 
whereby the expected utility increases the more we move toward the optimum point and, 
for a given C, preferences over discretion are single-peaked and rightward skewed. In 
general, given a certain location of Governmental preferences Gi=v, the optimum point is 
C=v, d =1 + | v | . Clearly, the interests of a Government are best protected when the 
Member State and the Commission have similar preferences, in which case discretion is 
full.
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Finally, actors' preferences over discretion are endogenously determined 
in this model. The optimum discretion of the Commission will always be 
located on the point of full discretion whatever the value C takes. The 
optimum discretion of the different Governments is a function of their 
preferred policies Gi. There are two cases. If, for example, Gi > C > 0 the 
ideal discretion is full and equals the Commission's. While if Gi < C, the 
ideal discretion diminishes and moves leftward in the discretion space, 
taking the values from interval II to IV shown in Figure A2.2. The 
reasoning is symmetric for negative values of C. As we will see, there is no 
need to set a specific preference configuration for our conclusions.
Equilibrium discretion under EU legislative procedures
In this section I use the following definitions and assumptions. 1) The 
optimum discretion of the actors are denoted dc for the Commission and 
dGi for i = a, b for Governments. The status quo ante discretion is denoted 
dsq. 2) Governments a and b (with ideal policies Ga and Gb) are the pivotal 
actors in the Council for an increase in discretion in unanimity and in 
qualified majority respectively. 3) The Commission's ideal policy C is 
located somewhere in between the Governments' ideal policies Gi.15 4) 
Although the indifference curves over the delegation space are rightward 
skewed (see fn. 14), they present the familiar single peaked Euclidean-like 
shape that allows us to formulate propositions. The skewness tells us that 
legislators are biased in favor of delegation. However, I will assume, 
without loss of generality, that indifference curves have the traditional 
circular shape.
In this section, I discuss the equilibrium discretion under qualified 
majority (or consultation) and unanimity. The other procedures (i.e. co­
operation, co-decision and assent) are analyzed in details in Franchino
15 This assumption can be justified on the basis that the Commission is appointed by the 
Member States, so it is unlikely that its preferences are more extreme than those of the 
Governments (see e.g. Crombez, 1997b). See Franchino (2000) for more details on the 
implications of this assumptions.
59
( 2 0 0 0 ) .  The Commission has the monopoly of legislative initiation while 
the Council has veto and amendment powers differing across procedures. 
For reasons of space, I will not describe these aspects in details (see e.g. 
Hix, 1999; Nugent, 1994) and, given the fact that this analysis partially 
relies on Crombez (1996), results are presented in a very concise way. 
Qualified majority. When the status quo discretion is zero, the equilibrium 
discretion in this procedure is 2d G b . When d G b > d sq > 0 , the equilibrium 
discretion equals 2 d G b -d sq . When d sq > d G b , the Commission and the pivotal 
Government b have conflicting preferences. The Commission does not 
initiate legislation and the status quo prevails.
Unanimity. The equilibrium discretion in this procedure, when the status 
quo is zero, is 2d G a . For d G a > d sq > 0 , the equilibrium discretion is 2 d G a -d sq .  
When d sq > d G a , the status quo prevails because a unanimous Council does 
not prefer a discretion larger than d sq  and the Commission refrains from 
initiating a proposal.
Our first proposition is, then, as follows (see Proof 2)
PROPOSITION 1
for most values of the Governments' optimum discretion, in non­
amending secondary legislation, the equilibrium discretion conferred 
upon the Commission is larger under qualified majority than under 
unanimity.16 The legislative procedures do not affect the degree of 
discretion in amending secondary legislation if the status quo discretion is 
sufficiently large.
Referring to Steunenberg's (1996) idea of structure-induced discretion, 
part of the discretion that is conferred upon the Commission is then a 
function of the structure of the legislative process of the Union. For a 
given degree of uncertainty and distribution of preferences, Proposition 1
16 Under relatively extreme circumstances, discretion under unanimity could equal 
discretion under qualified majority (see Proof 2). Anyway, we should expect, ceteris 
paribus, statistically significant differences of discretion across the two procedures under 
the conditions specified here.
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sets the conditions under which such structure determines the 
Commission's executive discretion.
Preference distribution and uncertainty as determinants of discretion
We have discussed discretion as function of the status quo and the 
legislative procedures, to complete the picture we briefly turn here to 
other two determinants of discretion.
Preference distribution. Discretion might change if an actor's ideal policy 
shifts as a result of, for instance, the appointment of a new Commissioner 
or a new Government. It is straightforward to see that a shift of the 
Commission's ideal policy toward the ideal policy of the pivotal actor in a 
procedure increases the equilibrium discretion in that procedure. In non­
amending legislation, this convergence can directly or indirectly affect the 
degree of discretion. Whilst it does not affect discretion in amending 
legislation if the status quo is large enough (see Proof 3).
Uncertainty. Uncertainty can be operationalized in this model as the range 
of values that the state of Nature w  can take. So far, we have assumed that 
this range is limited to [-1,1] (i.e. R+=l and R-= -1 from assumption 1). If 
we eliminate such restriction, we can analyze the effect of a change in 
uncertainty. This is partially what is referred by Steunenberg (1996) as 
information-induced discretion.
In Proof 3, I show that, if the negative and positive boundaries of w  
increase of the same amount,17 the relative position of legislators' 
preferences in the discretion space remains unchanged and the equilibria 
of the legislative procedures are determined in the same way. However, 
the absolute value of discretion is positively related to the degree of 
uncertainty in non-amending legislation. Whilst uncertainty does not
17 If the change in uncertainty is asymmetric (i.e. AR*AR+), discretion increases if the 
distribution of states of Nature is skewed in favor of the pivotal legislator (a proof is 
available from the author). This result is less relevant for the purposes of the chapter, see 
also Epstein and O'Halloran (1994).
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affect discretion in amending legislation because the equilibrium outcome 
remains the status quo.
There are then other two independent variables affecting the executive 
discretion of the Commission, that is preference distribution and 
uncertainty.
The second proposition is as follows (see Proof 3)
PROPOSITION 2
for any legislative procedure, in non-amending legislation, equilibrium 
discretion conferred upon the Commission is a positive function of the 
convergence between the Commission's and the pivotal legislator's 
preferences and of the degree of uncertainty. Preference convergence and 
uncertainty do not affect the degree of discretion in amending secondary 
legislation if the status quo discretion is sufficiently large.
PROOF 1
Proof o f the Governments' and the Commission's preferences over discretion 
Outcomes for w  ~ U[-l, 1] are as follows (cf. Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994; 
Romer and Rosenthal, 1978):
Range of w Outcome with discretion
-1 < w < C min [w + d, C]
C < w  < 1 max [ w  -  d, C ]
A Government will set the degree of discretion d to maximize the 
expected utility:
c  1
EUgi= J*UGi(min[w+d-Gi,C-Gi])/(w)dw +
-1 c
Gi])/(w)dw
In order to analyze in detail this integral, it is necessary to consider four 
cases. First, we should compute the expected utility in case the
Government decides not to delegate authority to the agent. This
participation threshold is the result the following integral whereby all
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outcomes equal w:
EUgi = - J (w - Gi)2/(w )dw  = - Gi2 = EUo
- l
Results in the following cases are acceptable only if the expected utility 
from discretion is higher that this participation threshold. The cases are18: 
Case 1: d > 1 + C and d > 1 - C
EUci = - J  (C-Gi)2/(w )dw  = - C2 - Gi2 + 2GiC = EUf
- l
This is the utility in case the agent has full discretion over the policy space, 
Governments would agree to impose discretionary limits only in case the 
expected utility is equal to or greater than EUf. Further, EUf > EUo for Gi >
3C2-1 
6C ‘
Case 2: d > 1 + C and d < 1 -  C
This case is inconsistent for C > 0 while case 3 is inconsistent for C<0. The 
two cases are symmetrical, so I will consider only case 3.
Case 3: d < 1 + C and d > 1 -  C
C-d 1
EUgi= -  J* (w+d-Gi)2/(w )dw  - J  (C-Gi) 2/(w )dw
-1 C-d
The Member State will choose the degree of discretion that maximizes the 
expected utility. The derivative for d is
= y - d - G i d  + l + G i - y + G i C
It equals zero for d+ = 1 + 2Gi -  C and d- = 1 + C 
Consistency check for d+:
d  < 1 + C => 1 + 2Gi -  C < 1 + C => Gi < C
d  > 1 -  C => 1 + 2Gi -  C > 1 - C => Gi > 0
Consistency check for d-: 
d  < 1 + C => 1 + C < 1 + C
d  > 1 -  C => 1 + C > 1 - C  C > 0
18 I use the signs plus and minus to distinguish different solutions of d within a case, 
while EUd is the expected utility in the specific case for a discretion value d.
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The solution for this case is:
d = 1 + 2Gi -  C for C > Gi > 0 because EUd+ > EUd- = EUf and EUd+ > EUo. 
Case 4: d < 1 + C and d < 1 -  C
C-d C+d 1
EUGi = - J  (w+d-Gi)2/(w )dw  - j*(C-Gi)2/(w )dw  - J* (w-d-Gi) 2/(w )dw
-1 C-d C+d
H2 1 C25EUGi_ j  , ± ^  ^  ^
dd 2 2 “ 2
The derivative is zero for d+ = 1 + -\jc2 - 2GiC and d- = 1 - -\/C2 - 2GiC 
d can be determined either for C > 2Gi and C>0 or for C < 2Gi and C<0. 
Results are symmetrical, so I will consider only the former constraints. 
Consistency check for d+:
d < l  -C  => l + \ j C -  2QC <1 -C  => \]C 2- 2GiC < -C
d+ is inconsistent, such disequation never applies for C>0.
Consistency check for d-:
d < l  + C => 1 - VC 2- 2GiC <1 + C => -a /C 2- 2GiC < C
d < l  - C  => 1 - a/C2- 2GiC < 1 - C  => Gi < 0
d- is consistent with the assumptions, however it is positive only when Gi
> —^ r-. The solution is:
d = 1 - a/c2- 2Gic for Gi < 0 because EUd- > EUf and EUd- > EUo 
d = 0 for Gi < because EUo > EUf
Finally, combining the results in the four cases for C > 0, we have: d= 1 + 
C for Gi > C > 0, d = 1 + 2Gi -  C for C > Gi > 0, d= 1 -  yjd  - 2Gic for <
Gi < 0 and d = 0 for Gi < -^r-.
The same procedure applies for the Commission maximizing its expected 
utility EUc (see text). The solution is straightforward. QED
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PROOF2
Proof o f proposition 1
For d s q = 0 , equilibrium discretion in qualified majority and unanimity 
respectively is 2dGb>2dGa. For d G a > d sq > 0 , it is 2 d G b -d s q > 2 d G a -d s q . For 
d G b > d sq > d G a , it is 2 d G b -d s q > d s q . Finally, equilibrium discretion is d sq  in 
both procedures if d sq > d G b . These relations apply also if the optimum
1
discretion of the pivotal legislator is greater than ^ (1+ | C | ).
If dGa>^ (1+ | C | ) and dGb>| (1+ | C | ) and, of course, if dGa=dGb, discretion 
under unanimity equals discretion under qualified majority. QED
PROOF3
Proof o f proposition 2
If AR+= AR-, we can analyze the impact of uncertainty considering R+= -R-. 
Let V and dv be the ideal policy and ideal discretion of the pivotal 
legislator in a procedure. In non-amending legislation (i.e. d sq  = 0), the 
equilibria are19 d = R + C in interval I of Figure A2.2, d = 2(R + 2V -  C) in 
interval II and d  = 2(R -  ^jc2 -2v c ) in interval III. Discretion is a positive 
function of the convergence between V and C and the degree of 
uncertainty R. In interval IV, there is no discretion but, as either C 
approaches V or R increases, discretion will take a positive value when C 
> V - yjw2+r (i.e. we move to interval III). For small values of the status quo 
(i.e. d sq  < dv), the same reasoning applies, we have only to subtract dsq  
from the equilibrium discretion in interval II and III. For larger values of 
the status quo (i.e. d sq  > dv), the equilibrium is the status quo. A 
convergence of preferences or an increase in uncertainty do not affect 
discretion. QED
19 For clarity, I omit+ in R+.
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Figure A2.1. Sequence of moves
The Council of Minister accepts d 
according to different procedures
Commission proposes State of Nature
a degree of discretion d w is revealed
Commission sets 
policy p within d limits
Note: Final outcome x = w + p
Figure A2.2. Optimum discretion as a function of a Government's ideal point
Discretion d
IV
0,4
0,2
1 - 0,6 -0,4 - 0,2 0 0,2- 0,8 0,4 C 0,6 0,8 1
Government's ideal policy Gi
Notes:
C = 0,5 Ideal policy of the Commission, results are symmetric for C < 0 
w ~U [-l,l]
Chapter 3.
The Bureaucratic Preferences and Strategies of the 
Commission: Choosing Budget and Bureau
Introduction
In order to answer why the Commission affects the path of integration, we 
first need to investigate its motivations. The aim of this chapter is to test 
the budget- and work-related preferences and strategies of the 
Commission and its officials across the twenty-year development of the 
Union regional and competition policies.
The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, it specifies two 
hypotheses derived from the works of Niskanen (1971, 1973, 1975) and 
Dunleavy (1985,1986,1989a,b, 1991) on the conditions under which public 
officials have budget- and work-related preferences and strategies. Since 
preferences are revealed strategically, as function of the likelihood of 
reaching bureaucratic objectives, the chapter uses theories of bargaining 
and agenda setting and the literature relaxing Niskanenian assumptions to 
develop three operative corollaries.
The second section tests these hypotheses on the initial attempts of the 
Commission's bureaucrats in shaping the regional and competition 
bureaus and on the later defense of their prerogatives. The hypothesis on 
budgetary preferences is tested reclassifying the 1980-98 budgets.
The conclusion emphasizes 1) the selective nature of budgetary 
preferences in terms of both functions and budget components and 2) the 
persistence of work-related preferences and bureau-shaping strategies 
across the twenty-year period. It also delineates the conditions that favor 
public officials in the pursuit of their objectives and relates the results to 
the literature on bureaucratic behavior and on European integration.
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The preferences of public officials 
Budget-related u tility
Niskanen's (1971) work breaks away from the Weberian tradition that sees 
bureaucrats as specialized actors implementing policies impersonally, 
routinely and efficiently. He conceives officials as essentially self- 
interested, pursuing their objectives via the manipulation of information 
on policy choices and production functions. The preferences and 
motivations that direct bureaucrats' objectives are 'salary, perquisites of 
the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease 
of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau' (Niskanen, 1971: 
38). For Niskanen budget m axim ization  is an adequate approximation for 
bureaucratic behavior because 'all of these variables except the last two ... 
are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau during 
the bureaucrat7s tenure in office' (Niskanen, 1971: 38). He later fine-tuned 
the argument by suggesting that the object of maximization is the portion 
of the budget whose allocation is at the discretion of the officials 
(Niskanen, 1975).
However, the empirical evidence of budget maximizing behavior is still 
contradictory. Some studies observe how officials systematically prefer 
larger budgets (Blais and Dion, 1991; Leloup and Moreland, 1978), others 
stress that results are also consistent with the maximization of other 
components of the utility function (Orzechowski, 1977). Further, budget 
maximization is not correlated with the bureaucrats' salary (Hood et al., 
1984; Peters, 1989, 1991). More damaging is the evidence of bureaucrats' 
acceptance of budget cuts, privatization and deinstitutionalization 
(Dunleavy, 1986,1991: 210-48; Dunsire et al., 1989).
Doubts about the success of the budget-maximizing hypothesis has 
diverted the attention to the factors that hinder or enhance this behavior. 
Dunleavy (1985, 1991: 174-209) introduces two intervening variables1 
(agency type and time -  as stage of policy development -) that better
1 A third one, rank is not subject to test in this chapter.
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qualify the relation between the budget and the other components of 
bureaucrats' utility function. He contends that the production function of 
each agency determines the overall size of the budget, the proportions of 
the budget components and the preferences of the bureau members. His 
analysis starts with a classification of agencies by 1) the type of budget 
they manage and 2) the type of activity they perform (Dunleavy, 1985, 
1989a).
An agency budget is made up of three components.2 The program m e 
budget consists of all expenditure over which an agency exercises 
supervision and control, even if large parts of it are passed on to other 
public sector agencies for final implementation. The bureau budget 
consists of those parts of the programme budget for which the agency is 
solely responsible to the governmental sponsor. The core budget consists 
of all those parts of the bureau budget that are spent on maintaining 
agency operations, but excluding those that are transferred to clients, 
citizens or private firms.
The activities of agencies can be classified into at least five types. We need 
to consider only three for our purposes.3 A delivery agency directly 
undertakes the production of goods and services. These agencies are likely 
to manage large programme budgets, with the bureau and core budgets 
taking up a large proportion. A control agency allocates budgets to and 
supervises the activities of other sector organizations with few or no 
responsibilities for implementation. It, too, has a large programme budget, 
but the bureau and core budgets are a small share of i t  Finally, a 
regulatory agency controls the operations of other agencies, private sector
2 The introduction of a fourth component (i.e. super-program budget) to apply his theory 
to the British administrative system (Dunleavy, 1991: 182) is not relevant for the 
institutional framework of the Union and for the purposes of our chapter.
3 The remaining two are contracts and transfer agencies (Dunleavy, 1985: 310). In later 
works Dunleavy (1991:183-8) considers also taxing, trading and servicing agencies. Some 
of these types do not exist at the EU level; other types have budgetary preferences similar 
to those analyzed in this chapter. Those selected are a fair representation of the EU 
administrative structure.
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firms or the public. The programme budget is small with a large part of it 
consisting of bureau and core budgets.
Agency type and time determine bureaucrats' budgetary utility as follows. 
First, public officials are more likely to have intense budgetary preferences 
when the overall size of their agency's budget is large, and when bureau 
and core budgets are a large proportion of the programme budget. 
Delivery agencies are more budget maximizers than control and 
regulatory agencies. Second, similar to Niskanen's concept of 
discretionary budget, the utilities of top officials are more associated with 
the programme and bureau budget than the core budget (Dunleavy, 1985: 
307-9). Ceteris paribus, enlarging the programme budget is a useful tool to 
build up slack resources to cope with crises and to increase patronage 
powers. Increasing bureau budgets creates slack resources too, but at the 
same time it boosts prestige and improves relations with 'clients' and 
other organizations (Dunleavy, 1985: 308). Finally, bureaucrats have a 
diminishing marginal utility in budgetary increments because budgetary 
growth runs into diseconomies of scale (due to the increasing cost of 
making changes and of managing the bureau) and increases the risks of 
cuts and transfers of functions (Dunleavy, 1991: 166-7, 195-7). When the 
costs from a budget increment outweigh the benefits, the budget has 
reached an optimal size (Dunleavy, 1985: 315-20).
To sum up,
H ypothesis 1: pub lic officials are m ore lik e ly  to have budget-related  
preferences in  the early stages o f developm ent o f delivery agencies and  
budget-m axim izing strategies tend to focus on the program m e and bureau 
com ponents o f the budget.
W ork-related u tility
A second contribution from Dunleavy is the reformulation of 1) the 
bureaucratic preferences when the two above mentioned variables reduce
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the role of the budgetary component of bureaucrats' utility function and 2) 
the strategies adopted by bureaucrats in pursuit of the new objectives.
For officials operating in regulatory or control agencies or in other 
agencies where there has been substantial budget growth over time, work- 
related components of the utility function predominate over the pecuniary 
ones, especially for top ranks. These bureau-shaping bureaucrats/ similar 
to Downsian advocates,
'do not value routine, conflictual work in large organizations staffed 
mainly by non-elite personnel, exposed to public criticism and risks from 
mistakes and situated a long way from political power centres. Instead, 
they value individually innovative work with a developmental rhythm, a 
broad scope of concerns, low exposure to public criticism, collegial and 
elite work units, restricted hierarchy, congenial personal relations, high- 
status organizational and social contacts especially professional ones, and 
proximity to political power centres' (Dunleavy, 1991: 237).
Officials in these agencies prefer innovative, strategic and policy-related 
work. Thus, they will try to shape the work-related characteristics of their 
bureau. The budgetary strategy is secondary and complementary to the 
bureau-shaping one. Typical bureau-shaping strategies consist of internal 
reorganizations, transformation of work practices, redefinition of 
relationships with external partners, competition for policy scope with 
other bureaus, load-shedding, hiving-off and contracting out (Dunleavy, 
1991: 203-4). The aim is to shape their agency to conform to their elite
4 Another alternative to the budget maximizing type is the mission oriented bureaucrat 
(Bendor et al., 1987; Calvert et al., 1989; Halpeiin, 1974; Hill, 1985; Huntington, 1961). This 
public official is a zealot, in Downsian terms, that narrowly pursues specific (sacred) 
policies and seeks power and influence to shape programs of action to their own liking. 
The problem with this approach is its applicability across policy domains for comparative 
analysis. Mission orientation risks becoming a narrow and ad hoc explanation of 
bureaucratic behavior that limits generalization. Explanation tends also to be tautological 
as bureaucrats pursue programs because they exogenously like them. The same applies 
to the literature on regulatory capture of public officials (Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976; 
Stigler, 1971), since it simply adds that the content of these sacred policies is shaped by 
interest groups.
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policy-making ideal consisting of innovative work tasks, long time 
horizons, managerial discretion and broad scope of activities.
We have then,
H ypothesis 2: pub lic officials are m ore like ly  to have w ork-related 
preferences and em ploy bureau-shaping strategies in  regulatory or control 
agencies or in  other agencies where there has been a substantial budget 
grow th over tim e.
The Commission's strategic behavior: searching, initiating, designing and 
bargaining
Preferences are revealed by the behavior of an actor rather than by 
interviews. In the latter case there is no incentive of truthful revelation. 
Also, preferences are revealed strategically as a function of the likelihood 
of achieving desired goals. For instance, a Niskanenian public official 
always succeeds in maximizing her budget because 1) she enjoys an 
informational advantage about the bureaus' true production function and
2) she can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the politicians (Bendor, 1990: 
374). Both assumptions have been relaxed and there is now a substantial 
body of literature on the factors determining a successful pursuit of 
bureaucratic objectives.
The bureaucratic preferences of the Commission are revealed by its search, 
initiation, design and bargaining behavior. Although the focus of the 
chapter is not on the policy outcomes, we need some operative corollaries, 
related to the policy outcomes, that inform us on the behavior of the 
Commission that maximizes the probability of its achieving its objectives.5
Finally, agency models of organization applied to public bureaucracies characterize 
public officials as risk-avoiding and effort-minimizing actors (e.g. Horn, 1995; Moe, 1984). 
This is the falsifying benchmark of budget-maximizing and bureau-shaping behavior.
5 These behavioral patterns are not intrinsically linked to an underlying bureaucratic 
type. An effort-minimizing official searches, designs, initiates and bargains differently 
from a bureau-shaping or budget-maximizing one. The conditions operate as incentives 
for the disclosure of the true bureaucratic nature.
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Search behavior
Given their superior knowledge about specific policies, bureaucrats are 
frequently charged with designing alternatives. Hence, they are likely to 
exploit this informational advantage and bias their search in pursuit of 
their own objectives. The Commission's officials are in an even more 
privileged position because the Treaty has assigned to them the monopoly 
of legislative initiation.
The first step of a search strategy is the selection of a policy proposal. Such 
a proposal is likely to be based on ideas that provide the best guides on 
how to achieve budget-maximizing or bureau-shaping objectives. 
Bureaucratic motivations bias the search for ideas and public officials will 
try to rig the agenda by incorporating them into policy proposals and by 
revealing information strategically (Bendor et al., 1987).
Scholars have considered three factors that affect bureaucrats' 
opportunities to bias the search and rig the agenda. First, Bendor, Taylor 
and Van Gaalen (1987: 887) assert that mission-oriented bureaucrats are 
more likely to bias the search than budget-oriented ones. If the bureaucrat 
is budget-oriented, the politician can design a budget scheme that ensures 
unbiased search. Second, asymmetry in the distribution of information 
across bureaucrats, governmental sponsors and private actors is positively 
correlated with the search bias. The reasoning is as follows. If the cost for 
politicians and interest groups to retrieve information about bureaucratic 
behavior or alternative policy proposals is high relative to its perceived 
benefit, there will be poor auditing and outside competition. This is the 
case, for instance, of policies that are either very complex, or at their early 
stages of development. Poor auditing and competition will provide the 
bureau with an informational advantage. The bureau can then bias its 
search to design the policy that maximizes its utility (Banks, 1989; Banks 
and Weingast, 1992; Bendor et al., 1987: 880-2). Third, if the legislators are 
relatively more impatient than the public officials, the bureau will bias its 
search. In this case politicians are willing to pay the cost of a biased
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proposal to reap the benefits of a prompt decision (Bendor et al., 1987: 
878).
Summing up,
Corollary 1: public officials are m ore lik e ly  to reach their objectives i f  a) 
they have w ork-related preferences, b) they enjoy ideational or 
inform ational advantages as a resu lt o f poor auditing and com petition and  
c) they are relatively m ore p a tien t than legislators.
Initiation, design and bargaining behavior
The Commission is required to make a proposal if the Council or the 
Parliament request one. Therefore, it does not have a gate-keeping power. 
In other cases, legislative acts contain a revision clause and an expiration 
date that creates a default condition of no legislation. However, the 
Commission will initiate a proposal on its own initiative if it prefers 
legislative reform to the status quo or the default condition (Romer and 
Rosenthal, 1978).
Once there has been initiation, budgetary and legislative rules determine 
the minimum winning coalition. The proposal will be designed in such a 
way to gain support from the pivotal legislator in the coalition whose 
budget-related or work-related preferences are closest to the 
Commission's (Crombez, 1996; Ordeshook and Schwartz, 1987). The 
impact of different rules is not considered in this chapter because the 
issues studied in the empirical section required unanimity in the Council. 
Traditional bargaining theory stipulates two other relevant factors that 
shape the set of possible equilibrium outcomes (Harsanyi, 1977; Raiffa, 
1982). Coalition members can adopt strategies to 1) link differences in 
preference intensities across issues and 2) increase the cost of no­
agreement for pivotal actors.
If the Commission prefers the status quo or default condition to new 
legislation, it will have no incentive to initiate a reform. Here, it is likely to 
adopt relatively marginal measures to please pivotal legislators so that to
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avoid initiation and reform. In this case, the Commission might enjoy a 
negative agenda power, that is 'the ability of the Commission to maintain 
the status quo even though a qualified majority in the Council prefers to 
change it7 (Crombez, 1996: 213).
Concluding,
Corollary 2: i f  the Com m ission prefers legislative reform  to the status quo 
or default condition, i t  w ill design a proposal that reflects its  relevant 
budget- or w ork-related preferences and elicits support from  the p ivo ta l 
legislators. I t w ill also adopt m easures to increase the cost o f no-agreem ent 
and lin k  issues to ease comprom ise.
Moreover,
Corollary 3: i f  the Com m ission prefers the status quo or default condition  
to legislative reform , i t  w ill adopt m arginal m easures to please p ivo ta l 
legislators in  order to avoid initiation and reform .
Research design and methodology
The two hypotheses are tested across the twenty-year development of the 
competition and regional policies of the European Union. Corollaries are 
used as both indicators of the Commission's preferences and to assess 
policy outcomes. Outcomes inform the Commission's preferences and 
behavior. For instance, if the outcome is a budget increase, we should 
expect a diminishing marginal utility from further budget increments and 
a relatively more important utility contribution from the work-related 
components.
The research design is guided by the principle of 'm ost different systems' 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 34-9) to have variability across independent 
and (some) intervening variables (i.e. coalition and time preferences, 
information asymmetry, default condition and issue linkages). It also 
allows us to 'control' for other factors (e.g. decision rules, the 
Commission's personnel policy, economic cycle, general international
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setting, public support). The two policy areas have also been chosen 
because they are relatively well known and representative of EU policies.
Competition policy
The D irectorate on com petition and the hypotheses
In Dunleavy's terms, the Directorate General (DGIV) on competition is a 
typical regulatory agency. It has powers to investigate and sanction 
restrictive practices and abuses of dominant positions by public and 
private undertakings (Arts. 37, 85-6, 89-90 EC, Regulation 17/62). It is also 
in charge of monitoring the systems of state aid operating within the 
Member States (Arts. 92-4 EC).
The Directorate budget has barely exceeded 0.001 percent of the Union 
budget over the last twenty years. The programme, bureau and core 
components coincide. Public officials in the DGIV probably approximate 
most the ideal of a bureau-shaping bureaucrat. We should expect work- 
related utilities to dominate budget-related ones. Issues about innovation, 
time horizons, managerial discretion, scope of concern should 
predominate over budgetary ones (hypothesis 2). The search, initiation, 
design and bargaining behavior of the DGIV staff and of the 
Commissioner should be directed predominantly towards shaping and 
defending the boundaries and scope of their work.
These hypotheses are tested on two issues that have been object of debate 
in the last two decades: merger control in the eighties and the European 
Cartel Office proposal in the nineties.
P ursuing the idea l com petition bureau: the m erger control regulation  
Search. We need to take a small step backwards to the seventies to see 
how the Commission's officials came to realize the need to expand the 
scope of their actions to include the regulation of mergers. As early as June 
1971, during a parliamentary debate on competition rules,6 the competition
6 European Parliament Resolution, OJ C 66,1-7-1971, p .ll.
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Commissioner reversed an earlier decision and expressed his intention to 
propose a regulation for the control of mergers. Although the Court of 
Justice ruled in favor of the Commission on the applicability of Article 82 
(ex 86) EC to mergers,7 the scope and the instruments of this article were 
considered insufficient. The scope was limited because the article applies 
only if the merger strengthens an existing dominant position and if there 
has been an abuse of such position. The instruments were limited because 
the Commission could only react a fortiori, rather than prevent mergers.
In order to prepare the ground for the new legislation, the Directorate 
launched a study on concentration, with the aim of describing the level 
and development of mergers, and assessing the effects of market 
concentration (Commission of the EC, 1972: 158). The aim was clearly to 
raise awareness among the Member States to the risks of uncontrolled 
merger activity distorting competition, with the consequential failure to 
pursue one of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3g EC. 
Design. The first legislative proposal to control mergers is dated July 
1973.8 We need to analyze this because it has been the subject of negotiation 
throughout most of the eighties. The proposal relied, to a certain extent, on 
Regulation 17/62 implementing Articles 81-2 (ex 85-6) EC, but the 
Commission took the opportunity to extend its influence further. Under 
the proposed Articles 3 and 7 the Commission could issue decisions to 
forestall, suspend or terminate concentrations, to re-establish conditions of 
effective competition, and to declare concentrations compatible with the 
common market. Fines and periodic penalty payments were generally 
higher than those in Regulation 17 (Arts. 10, 12-14). The Commission 
could also, but at its own discretion, delegate investigations to the 
competent authorities of the Member States (A rt 11). The scope of the 
regulation was defined by a turnover criterion, which mirrored the one in 
Regulation 17, and by a slightly higher market share criterion (Art. 1). The
7 See the Continental Can Case 6/72 (European Court Reports, 1973).
8 See OJ C 92, 31-10-1973, p. 1.
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important issue of prior notification, which would have considerably 
increased the efficacy of controlling mergers, was also limited in its scope 
by a turnover criterion (A rt 4).
The bureau-shaping strategy of the Directorate is clear in this first 
proposal. Its ambitious provisions were also sign that officials were 
counting on the fact that a merger regulation was absent in most of the 
Member States and that, at least relative to the eighties, there was limited 
debate on the issue.
Bargaining. In the early eighties, the prospects for adoption were slim. 
Results from the study on concentration were not promising. It showed 
that from 1973 to 1981, there were no takeovers or mergers of international 
relevance in the Union (Commission of the EC, 1979:179,1982: 160, 1983b: 
158). Publication stopped in 1983. Instead, the Directorate adopted another 
informational strategy and tried to increase the cost of no-agreement It 
published the result of the scrutiny of mergers for their compatibility with 
Article 82 EC with the aim of showing the inadequacy of the current 
provisions and the legal uncertainty that they generated (Commission of 
the EC, 1979:103-6). However, this scrutiny covered too limited a number of 
cases to shape company behavior.
Notwithstanding these impediments, the initial proposal was amended in 
1982,1984 and 1986.9 The amendments showed the price in terms of scope 
and discretion that the Commission would have to pay for legislative 
intervention. First, the turnover criterion determining the scope of the 
legislation was raised, first to 500, then to 750 million ECUs (A rt 1 of 1982 
and 1984 amendments). Second, an advisory committee of Member States' 
representatives had clearer powers of delay and influence over the 
Commission's decisions (Art. 19 of 1982 amendment).
The final round of the negotiation took place in the late eighties. Outside 
competition had increased as both Germany and Britain had by then well- 
oiled domestic merger regimes. However, two further developments
9 See OJ C 36,12-2-1982, p. 3, OJ C 51, 23-2-1984, p. 8, and OJ C 324,17-12-1986, p. 5.
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increased the cost of no-agreement, especially for these two pivotal 
Member States.10 First, the number of Union and international mergers 
and acquisitions started to increase considerably. It rose from 81 and 39 
respectively in 1984-5, to 206 and 160 in 1987-88 (Commission of the EC, 
1985: 211, 1989b: 234). In the year of adoption 1989, 225 mergers and 76 
minority holding acquisitions took place amongst firms from different 
Member States, and 89 mergers and 46 acquisitions which impacted on the 
Union market involved third countries' firms (Commission of the EC, 
1990a: 214). Industries were anticipating the impact of the Single Market 
Programme and restructuring. British companies, especially, were the target 
of acquisitions by American and Japanese corporations, while German and 
French companies were mainly active in the intra-European market 
(Tsoukalis, 1993: 104-5). The linkage between the maintenance of a 
competitive single market and the need to control merger activities grew 
stronger. In its reports, the Commission stressed the predominance of very 
large mergers and the risk that such concentration would pose to 
competition. Second, in November 1987, the European Court of Justice 
ruled that Article 81 EC could be applied to the acquisition of a 
shareholding where the investing company gained legal or de facto 
control of the other company and such control led to anticompetitive 
consequences.11 The effect of this judgement was to create legal 
uncertainty with regards to the type of agreement to be notified, and the 
impact in cases of the Commission's prohibition. The Commission seized 
the opportunity to increase the cost of no-agreement by actively pursuing 
the Court7 s line and encouraging legal uncertainty.12 Companies started to 
notify mergers to the Commission even if there were no clear rules 
requiring them to do so (Bulmer, 1994: 431).
10 The legislation needed unanimous approval in the Council of Ministers as from Art.308 
(ex 235) EC.
11 BA Tand Reynolds Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 (European Court Reports, 1987).
12 See for instance the British Airways/British Caledonian case and the 
Camaud/Schmalbach case where the Commission prohibited a majority holding 
acquisition but allowed the full merger.
80
Outcome. It was now clear that the lack of a regulation could jeopardize 
the working of the Single Market. However, the further limited scope and 
efficacy of the merger control bureau reflected the preferences of Britain 
and Germany and the tougher outside competition. The turnover 
threshold for the applicability of the legislation rose, first to 1000 million, 
then finally, to 5000 million ECUs. The scope was further limited by the 
need of at least two companies having more than 250 million turnover 
each (up from 100 million) and a geographical criterion (Art. 1 of May 
1998 proposal and adopted regulation13). Fines and penalty payments 
were also lowered from the 1988 proposal.
Latest developm ents. Since the adoption, the competition Commissioner 
and his staff have managed to both defend their competencies and to 
further shape their bureau by exploiting some provisions in the regulation. 
Under the adopted legislation, the Commission may investigate below- 
threshold mergers if so requested by a Member State (A rt 22), whereas 
National authorities may only investigate Union-dimension mergers if so 
allowed by the Commission (A rt 9). This system has been used 
strategically. First, the exceptional nature and the strict application of the 
referral of Union dimension mergers to national authorities were clearly 
signaled by the Commission (Commission of the EC, 1991: 35, 1993: 24; 
Van Miert, 1995: 2). Up to 1997, there has been some partial referrals, but 
only one case has been referred in its entirety14 (Commission of the EC, 
1997b). Second, requests from the Member States for Union investigation 
below the threshold (one in 1993 and two in 1997) gave the Commission 
the opportunity to extend the scope of the legislation. In November 1996, 
an amendment was proposed which considered mergers of Union 
dimension those with an aggregate turnover exceeding 2500 million ECUs 
and which fulfilled additional turnover criteria in at least three Member 
States. This amendment was adopted in June 1997 to the applause of the
13 See OJ C 130,19-5-1988, p. 4, and OJ L 257, 21-9-1990, p. 13.
14 This was the SEHB/ VIA G/PE-BEWA G Case.
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competition Commissioner.15 Finally, the Commission used case law to 
extend the reach of the regulation to prevent the creation or strengthening 
of oligopolistic dominance, especially duopoly, and dominance at world 
level16 (Commission of the EC, 1993:23,1997b: 64,1998b: 63-1).
D efending the com petition bureau: the European Cartel O ffice proposal 
The attack on the Com m ission's prerogatives. The nineties saw the most 
assiduous, persistent and widespread attack on the competition 
prerogatives of the Commission. It involved public officials, businesses, 
lawyers and opinion leaders especially in Britain and Germany, but the 
debate spread also to France and Italy.
There were two thrusts of criticism. The radicals advocated the 
establishment of a European Cartel Office (ECO), independent of the 
Commission. The idea was first proposed in a book edited by Peter 
Montagnon, the world trade editor of the Financial Times, and Heinrich 
Holzer (1990) of the German BDI employers' association.17 
Pressure started to build when the Commission controversially permitted 
Air France to acquire UTA and Air Inter, and KLM to take control of 
Transavia, while vetoing the Aerospatiale/Alenia takeover of De 
Havilland (A irline Business, Editorial, 1 November 1991). In 1994, when 
the Commission failed to back a proposal by Van Miert to block a three- 
way steel tube merger, a leading article in the Financial Tim es observed 
that 'the case for an independent European cartel office now seems 
unanswerable' (Financial Times, leading article, 28 January 1994: 53). A 
second article later suggested that even responsibilities for state aid 
control should be hived-off (Financial Times, leading article, 19 October 
1994: 60).
15 See Council Regulation 1310/97, OJ L 180, 9-7-1997, p. 1 and Van Miert (1997b).
16 See cases Nestle/Perrier, Gencor/Lonrho and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas.
17 Some of these ideas can however be traced back to late 1960s German proposals. I 
thank Giandomenico Majone for pointing this out to me.
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Support for this reform came from predictable vested interests, such as Rolf 
Geberth, director of the German Federal Ministry of Economics (Tieman, 
1992), Dieter Wolf, president of the German Federal Cartel Office 
(Com m ission Press Releases, 19 December 1994: 1) and the German 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce (R euter N ew s Service, 21 July 1995). 
Also, and less predictably, in 1996 Giuliano Amato, president of the Italian 
Cartel Office, lent his support (Com m ission Press Releases, 30 April 1996: 
19).
Students of the Union competition policy predicted the establishment of 
an independent agency as the likely result of the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC), especially after Germany signaled her intention of 
putting forward just such a proposal18 (Allen, 1996b; Wilks and McGown, 
1995).
The German initiative was radical, reflecting the seriousness of the 
situation. The rules on competition were the subject of negotiation in an 
IGC for the first time since the Treaty of Rome (Van Miert, 1997a). The 
proposal consisted of transferring the Commission's executive powers 
under Articles 81-2 EC and, together with the merger control regulation, to 
an independent ECO. The Commission would retain legislative powers 
(i.e. the issuance of guidelines, notices and directives) and could overrule 
office decisions if such a move was deemed to be in the public interest. 
Johannes Ludewig, state secretary at the German Federal Economics 
Ministry, observed that this reform would improve the efficiency and 
transparency of the Union competition policy and limit the 'politicization' 
of decisions (Financial Times, 23 June 1995: 50). This proposal required an 
enabling provision to be inserted into the Treaty in order to empower the 
Council to create the agency.
The second, and more moderate, thrust came when Sidney Lipworth, head 
of the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission, expressed his
18 The intention was first signaled in a governmental document on 'Securing Germany's 
future as an economic location', Rexrodt Report {Reuter News Service, 26 August 1993).
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concerns about the accumulation of powers and lack of transparency 
within the system.19 He criticized the fact that competition decisions were 
taken by the College of Commissioners. He suggested the creation of a 
tribunal, independent of the Commission, to carry out investigation and 
adjudication. This idea was watered further by the EC Select Committee of 
the House of Lords (1993) that recommended some procedural changes 
concerning the right of defense and to be heard and the speed of decision­
making.
The C om m ission's reaction. The reaction of the competition Commissioner 
and DGIV officials was in line with hypothesis 2 and corollary 3. First, they 
conceded those (British) proposals that threatened their prerogatives and 
discretion the least Second, they fiercely attacked the most radical 
(German) proposals that would weaken their power and limit their scope 
of action more seriously.
The Commission's public officials warmly welcomed the report of the 
House of Lords. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Director-General for 
competition, observed: 'I find the Report both helpful and constructive. 
Indeed, almost without exception the recommendations mirror my 
aspirations regarding procedure' (1994: 2). The role of deciding on 
complaints, request of information and granting extensions of time for 
reply from the parties was conferred to the Hearing Officer in the 
Directorate-General. Other measures to more efficiently use resources were 
undertaken (e.g. a wider use of comfort letters, liaison with national 
courts, internal deadlines, see Ehlermann, 1994: 5-6).
The reaction to the German and the other, more radical, criticisms matched 
the severity of the attack. Competition Commissioner Van Miert bluntly 
replied: 'on behalf of the Commission. I say we are going to fight this idea' 
(R euter N ew s Service, 3 June 1996: 53). Ehlermann (1993, 1995) first 
seemed to toy with the concept, but then convincingly rejected it. He
19 He observed that the Commission 'is simultaneously detective, prosecutor, judge and 
executioner' (quoted in Tieman, 1992:41).
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defended the current system, pointing out the drawbacks and risks of 
creating an independent agency. These include changes to the substantive 
competition law, longer proceedings and inefficiencies. Ehlermann (1995: 
480) clearly opposed the Directorate's loss of influence and power vis-a-vis 
both the agency and the other Commission Directorates. Contrarily, he 
suggested that the competition Commissioner should be given additional 
powers, and that the Treaty should be amended in such a way that the 
College of Commissioners could delegate more authority to a single 
Commissioner. He also dismissed as 'totally unrealistic' the idea of 
delegating the control of state aid to such an agency (Reuter N ew s Service, 
18 January 1995: 40).
Van Miert was even more sanguine in defending its prerogatives. He 
reiterated Ehlermann's analysis, stressing that competition policy must 
remain closely interlinked with other common policies and that the 
Commission, given its legitimacy and accountability, was the appropriate 
authority to execute such policy (Europe Info Service, 1 June 1996: 157; 
Van Miert, 1996). He also rejected the (minimal) IGC proposal to add a 
provision in the Treaty to enable the future establishment of the agency on 
grounds that it would increase political interference in the current system 
(Van Miert, 1996). He accused Germany of relying too heavily on 
government subsidies and of interfering with the Commission decision­
making process, his aim being to de-legitimize the German proposal 
(Reuter News Service, 20 November 1995: 27; Van Miert, 1998). On state 
aid, he warned that 'any attempt to dilute the Commission's sole 
competence to control the award for state aids would meet with very stiff 
resistance from the Commission' (Europe Info Service, 13 May 1995: 67). 
IGC Outcome. The IGC was a success for the Directorate (see Van Miert, 
1997a). The threat of an independent agency was avoided and the new 
Treaty amendment did not contain enabling provisions. In line with 
bureau-shaping behavior and with corollary 3, the Commissioner and his 
staff, preferring the status quo, were unwilling to initiate a reform. They
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adopted marginal measures to please the (mostly British) calls for 
transparency and efficiency, thus frustrating the formation of a large 
coalition that would have supported a more radical reform.
Regional policy
The Directorate on regional po licy  and the hypotheses 
In the early eighties the Directorate on regional policy (DGXVI) was a 
mixed control/ delivery agency. The predominant activity was control, but 
neither function was well developed. The main instrument at its disposal 
was the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) established in 
1975.20 The Directorate's task was to allocate, according to national quotas, 
the resources of the fund to regions and areas established by the Member 
States (Arts. 2-3). Following a national request, and after its approval by a 
fund management committee, the Commission decided on the amount of 
fund assistance (Arts. 5, 7,11,12). Resources were very limited (1.2 billion 
unit of account in 1980, 0.05% of the Union GDP, Commission of the EC, 
1981: 147). The only real control power vested in the Directorate was the 
discretion to carry out on-the-spot checks and to sanction errors or 
irregularities (A rt 9).
The Directorate also had some delivery functions. The 1979 amendment to 
the ERDF regulation21 allocated 5 percent of the fund to specific Union 
regional development measures outside the areas designated by the 
Member States (Arts. 2, 3). In coordination with the Member States, the 
Commission could propose and partially implement, measures 
unanimously approved by the Council and financed jointly by the Union 
and the Member States concerned (Art. 13).
Yet, this Directorate was in charge of the second largest budget item of the 
Union, although in the early eighties this was less than 10 percent of the 
whole budget. In 1980 the bureau and core components of its budget were
20 See OJ L 073, 21-3-1975, p. 1.
21 See OJ L 035, 9-2-1979, p. 1.
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respectively less than two and five percent of the programme budget. We 
should expect that both budget- and work-related utilities are relevant for 
this agency. The budget-maximizing strategy should predominate in the 
early stages of policy development and focus on the programme and 
bureau components of the budget (hypothesis 1). If budget growth takes 
place, the requests for budget increments should diminish over time as the 
marginal utility diminishes. Hypothesis 1 is tested by reclassifying the 
1980-98 draft and final budgets.
Bureau-shaping behavior should focus on the control and innovative 
activities of the Directorate. We should expect the Directorate to search for 
policy options that 1) enhance the developmental character of the policy,
2) extend the time horizon and 3) increase managerial discretion and 
operational scope (hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 2 is tested against three 
issues: the 1984 reform and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
(IMPs) first, then the 1993 reform.
Budgetary preferences in  regional po licy
Although the financial transfers of the Union primarily serve as side- 
payments to further the process of European integration (Allen, 1996a; 
Carrubba, 1997), the Commission's budgetary preferences are revealed by 
the fact that it devises the medium-term financial perspectives and 
initiates the annual budgetary circle. From hypothesis 1, we should expect 
greater budgetary demands, year on year, in the early stages of policy 
development. These increases should be focused on the programme and 
bureau components of the budget
< FIGURE 3.1 HERE >
Figure 3.1 confirms both predictions. The increases in the draft 
programme budgets over the final budgets of the previous years throughout 
the eighties have been, on average, 51 percent a figure that fell to 17 percent
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in the first eight years of the nineties. As predicted by Dunleavy, the 
marginal utility from budget increments shows clear signs of 
deterioration. For the 2000-2006 financial perspective, the Commission has 
proposed to freeze spending on structural operations at 0.46 percent of 
GDP. The resources allocated amount to 247bn ECU over seven years,22 an 
annual decrease of 2.4 percent (Commission of the EC, 1999: 349). This 
statistic is startling considering that more than 7bn ECU of the whole 
package is made available as pre-accession funding for Eastern European 
applicant countries. Enlargement has not been used as an excuse to 
increase the budget
The bureau component of the budget has followed a more sinuous course. 
In the first half of the eighties, the Commission demanded substantial 
budgetary increases to finance innovative Union measures and integrated 
operations. After consolidation in the late eighties, it launched another 
series of budgetary demands in the early nineties to finance Community 
Initiatives. Consolidation followed again.
The Commission's budgetary strategy has especially focused on the 
bureau component of the regional policy budget. The share of bureau over 
programme budget has increased from more than 6 percent in the early 
eighties to about 13 percent in the early nineties, reaching a peak of 18 
percent in 1996 and 1997. The share of core over programme budget has 
instead decreased over the period from less than 1 percent in the early 
eighties to 0.3 percent in the late nineties. The average increase of the draft 
core budget over the previous year allocation has been a half and a sixth of 
those of the programme and bureau budget respectively.
P ursuing the ideal regional po licy bureau: the 1984reform  and the IMPs. 
Search The search strategy explored two routes. The first involved the 
financing of studies to evaluate the regional impact of Union policies and 
the implementation of regional policy. Under Article 10, the Directorate
22 About half of the whole package is earmarked for the ERDF.
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was allowed to use fund resources to finance such studies and it seized the 
opportunity. Of the seven studies ordered in 1980, three explored the 
regional impact of agriculture, trade and fisheries, two studied feasibility 
and the remaining two looked at the distributive impact of the Iberian 
enlargement on the Mediterranean regions (Commission of the EC, 1981: 
145). In the second route, the Directorate took advantage of the non-quota 
section giving them room for innovative work focusing on multiannual 
development programmes, rather than national projects. Here, they 
injected a developmental rhythm in the policy area.
The studies rigged the agenda by strategically documenting 1) the 
worsening of regional disparities, 2) the structural underemployment of 
some areas, and 3) the regional impact of some Union policies and of the 
enlargements. For instance, the regressive dynamics of the agricultural 
policy penalizing Mediterranean products led to the design of the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) (Commission of the EC, 
1980). The search for a (biased) solution was based on pilot projects that 
emphasized integrated multiannual programmes. The intention was to put 
on the agenda problems generated by Union policies and to propose 
innovative and, preferably, Commission-led solutions.
Design. The aim of the 1981 ERDF proposal23 was to loosen the Member 
States' grip over the policy. First, the Directorate wanted to build cases for 
Union programmes and innovative approaches on the basis of 1) stronger 
coordination of national regional policies (Arts. 1-2) and 2) exchange of 
information about results of states' regional policies and of Union financed 
projects (A rt 26). Second, the proposal foresaw a gradual shift of financing 
from individual projects to innovative multiannual programmes in the 
quota section (Arts. 7-11). Further, it introduced the more lenient 
management committee procedure, in place of unanimity, for the adoption 
of programmes in the non-quota section (A rt 27). Third, the proposal 
stressed that fund resources should be additional to national aids in order
23 See OJ C 336, 23-12-1981, p. 60.
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to avoid simple replacement of national investment plans (Art. 12). Fourth, 
all the innovative provisions of the policy were to be allocated more 
resources [i.e. multiannual programmes (Art. 11), Union programmes of 
the non-quota section (A rt 4), and other innovative measures (Arts. 17, 
29)].
The first two IMPs proposals, concomitant with the ERDF proposal, were 
similarly ambitious.24 The programmes, proposed by the states but 
approved by the Commission, were integrated, multiannual and could 
have involved subnational authorities (Arts. 1-4 of the 1984 proposal). 
There were no quotas.
Bureau-shaping preferences are clear in these proposals. These reforms 
would have substantially increased the Commission's managerial 
discretion and lengthened the policy time horizon. They contained several 
provisions to enhance innovative work and broaden the scope of concerns. 
Innovative Commission-led measures received preferential treatment both 
financially and procedurally. As Mawson et al. (1985: 40-1) pu t it, 'the 
Commission regarded itself as being in the forefront of developing new 
approaches to regional development7. The Directorate also had a clear 
informational advantage in documenting disparities as no other 
institutions had the incentive to disprove the data and auditing of pilot 
projects was costly and unsystematic.
Bargaining. The ERDF proposal generated bitter confrontation in the 
Council of Ministers. The bone of contention was the financial provisions, 
both in terms of distribution across the Member States, between projects 
and programmes, and between quota and non-quota sections 
(Commission of the EC, 1983a: 139-40). The Commission was in a 
relatively weak position. The veto players were those north European 
Member States who opposed the Commission's discretion and would lose 
most from the proposal tabled. As the legal validity of the fund would end 
in 1985 in the case of no agreement, these states could afford to be more
24 See OJ C 251,19-9-1983, p. 1, and OJ C 280,19-10-1984, p. 1.
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patient Being net contributors, the default condition (i.e. no fund) was 
preferred to the policy proposed. The Commission, preferring any policy 
to no policy, accommodated most of their requests in a completely revised 
proposal in 1983.
Similarly, the IMPs proposals received a rather cold welcome from the 
Member States. However, their introduction allowed a compromise in the 
negotiations for the Iberian enlargement Since 1982, the Greek 
government had been demanding 1) a special status in the application of 
Union rules on state aid and competition, and 2) a substantial increase in 
financial aid. In 1983, Richard Burke, the Commissioner in charge of the 
issue, struck a deal with the Greek premier Andreas Papandreu. His 
financial demands were linked to the Union programmes, rather than the 
ERDF projects. In exchange, Greece was granted a lengthening of the time 
period to implement the acquis com m unitaire (Financial Times, 6 May 
1983: 2).
Greece credibly threatened in 1984 that it would veto the enlargement if 
the Council did not approve the IMPs (Financial Times, 28 September 
1984: 3). January 1986 was considered the non-deferrable date for 
enlargement Thus, when in January 1985 the Council asked Jacques 
Delors to draw up a new IMPs proposal, the Commission was placed in a 
highly advantageous position vis-a-vis very impatient Member States. 
Outcome. The new ERDF regulation25 of June 1984 predominantly defeated 
a Commission that had to please relatively more patient pivotal Member 
States and had no ways to increase the cost of no-agreement or to link 
issues (corollaries 1 and 2). The reform contained guaranteed lower limits 
of flexible 'quantitative guidelines', but the difference from the quota 
system was minimal.
However, the bureau-shaping strategy of the Commission had some 
success, especially in those issues where it enjoyed an informational
25 See revised proposal in OJ C 360, 31-12-1983, p.l, and Council Regulation 1787/84 in OJ 
L 169, 28-6-1984, p. 1.
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advantage (corollary 1). Despite the financial resources and assistance 
levels of programmes and innovative measures being reduced and more 
conditions being attached (Arts. 5-7, 9, 11, 16, 24), the integrated 
developmental operations gained legal status (Art. 34) and two procedural 
improvements allowed the Commission slightly more room of maneuver 
(Arts. 7 ,40).26
The IMPs regulation27 was a success. It consisted of 1) the clear 
introduction in the acqui of the innovative integrated approach based on 
m ultiannual programmes without national quotas (except for Greece), 2) 
the limitation of control of the Commission's powers to a 'reinforced' 
advisory committee (Art. 7) and 3) the involvement of subnational 
authorities in the design and implementation of the programmes (Arts. 5,
9).
Smyrl (1998) maintains that this result stemmed from the Commission’s 
persuading of the Greek government Instead, I contend that this was the 
outcome of 1) an accurate search strategy that manipulated ideas and 
information whose validity was difficult to disprove because of there 
being few competing sources and limited auditing and 2) a shrewd 
bargaining strategy that exploited issue linkages and time preferences.
D efending the regional po licy  bureau: the 1993reform  
The attack on the Com m ission's prerogatives. In the 1988 reform, the core 
principles of the early 1980s proposals and of the IMPs regulation were 
reorganized and extended to the three Union structural funds.28 By the 
late 80s, the operation of the policy has been called into question by almost
26 These were 1) qualified majority to adopt Union programmes (Art. 7) and 2) the more 
lenient version a of the management committee procedure (Art. 40).
27 See proposal in OJ C 179,17-7-1985, p. 5, and Council Regulation 2088/85 in OJ L 197, 
27-7-1985, p. 1.
28 For details see Allen (1996a), the other two funds were the Guidance Section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the European Social Fund. 
The new functions of the Directorate were 1) the joint selection with the Council of the 
regions eligible for aid, according to five priority objectives, 2) the design of Community 
Support Frameworks and operational programs on submission of regional development 
plans by the Member States, and 3) a stronger monitoring and coordinating role.
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every institution of the Union. Now an important policy and budget item, 
the perceived benefit from verifying the Commission's information 
increased relatively to the cost of auditing (Banks, 1989). The Court of 
Auditors began to pay increasingly more attention to the Commission's 
initiative and started to question more consistently the substantive efficacy 
of the most innovative measures such as the integrated approach (Court of 
Auditors, 1988). The Parliament and the Member States voiced a number 
of complaints about the efficiency of the policy and the prerogatives of the 
Commission (Yuill et al., 1993). The process of design and adoption of 
development plans, Community Support Frameworks and operational 
programs was considered too onerous. Both the Parliament and some 
Member States called for a more effective ex-ante and ex-post monitoring. 
Two complaints were directed at the Commission's prerogatives. First, the 
process of selecting regions eligible for aid was criticized for lack of 
coordination with competition policy (see also Assemblee Nationale, 
1993). Second, the management of Community Initiatives was criticized 
for being ineffective, inefficient and, critically, for lacking consultation 
w ith the Member States (Pollack, 1995; Yuill et al., 1993). Clearly, the 
Commission had lost its informational advantage in regional policy. 
In itiation and Design. Unlike the case of the Cartel Office, the Commission 
had little option other than to initiate reform because regional policy 
regulations had expiration dates that made the Commission relatively 
worse off with the default condition. However, it was content with the 
shape of the regional policy bureau. Therefore, in line with corollary 2, the 
set of proposals of March 1993 was primarily an exercise in fine-tuning 
and incorporated the less radical criticisms (see Commission of the EC, 
1989a: 9 ,1990b: 27-9).
In the proposal on the tasks of the funds,29 there were provisions for 1) 
streamlining the adoption procedure for regional development plans and 
operational programmes and 2) specifying the information included in the
29 See proposal in OJ C 118, 28-4-1993, p. 21.
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plans to facilitate ex-ante assessment (Arts. 8-9, 11). Similarly, the 
implementing legislation30 contained provisions to 1) streamline the 
approval of operational programmes and support frameworks (Arts. 5, 
10), 2) improve the assessment and monitoring (Arts. 8, 23, 25-6) and 3) 
reinforce the consultation and information exchange in the management of 
Community Initiatives (Arts. 30- 1). The time span and the eligibility 
thresholds of projects were also increased to improve efficiency (Arts. 6, 8, 
16). However, the Commission's prerogatives remained largely 
untouched.
Bargaining and outcome. Practically all the Member States considered the 
new oversight and assessment provisions insufficient (Agence Europe, 23 
June 1993; Financial Times, 2 July 1993: 2) and the Parliament tabled many 
amendments to increase its own supervisory role.31 The Commission was 
disadvantaged by the default condition and could not increase the cost of 
no-agreement In line with corollary 2, its bureau-shaping strategy had to 
concede the pivotal legislators' demands to limit the Commission's 
informational advantage and managerial discretion.
In the adopted regulations,32 the general reporting requirements to the 
Parliament were reinforced (Art. 16 tasks, Art. 31 coordination). Specific 
informational requirements on the implementation of operations (Art. 6 
tasks, Arts. 10, 11, 23, 32 coordination regulation) and on the selection of 
areas eligible for aid (Art. 9, 11a tasks) were also inserted. Managerial 
discretion was further limited. The role of the Member States in selecting 
the areas eligible for aid was strengthened (Art. 9, 11a tasks). Further 
conditions were added to Union assistance (A rt 13 tasks) and to the role 
of the monitoring committee (Art. 25 coordination). The more restrictive 
management committee procedure to control Community Initiatives was 
introduced (Art. 17 tasks). Finally, the Member States linked the EMU
30 See proposal in OJ C 118, 28-4-1993, p. 33.
31 See amendments 4, 8 and 11 to Regulation 2081/93 and amendments 6,10,13,15,19, 26 
to Regulation 2082/93.
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fiscal constraints to a loosening of the additionality criterion (Art. 9 
coordination). This time issue-linking operated to the Commission's 
disadvantage.
Latest developm ents. Notwithstanding this setback, the Directorate's 
bureau-shaping strategy persists. The proposal33 for the 1999 reform 
contains a new Chapter IV on innovative measures and technical 
assistance to preserve the developmental rhythm of the policy. It also 
contains the first attempt of strategic 'hiving-off of routine functions. 
Within the context of partnership, it delegates the more routine 
programming and monitoring activities to the Member States and other 
regional and social partners, whilst at the same time strengthening the 
Commission's role in strategic programming (Arts.15-18 and Title IV). 
Similarly, in the attempt to maintain an ideational advantage, the 
Directorate has 1) set up new initiatives to assist small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the regions (e.g. Europarnetariat and Euroleader, 
Commission of the EC, 1994c: 166), 2) developed new policy ideas, such as 
spatial development planning (Commission of the EC, 1994b, 1998a: 139) 
and 3) explored linkages with other policies (e.g. territorial pacts for 
employment and communications on the relationship between cohesion, 
culture, environment and information society, Commission of the EC, 
1997a, 1998a: 139).
Conclusion
This chapter has used regional and competition policy to assess the 
budget- and work-related preferences and strategies of the Commission 
and its Directorates as functions of agency type and time. It has also tested 
three corollaries on the conditions that help the Commission's bureaucrats 
to reach their goals.
32 See Council Regulations 2081/93 on the tasks of the funds, 2082/93 on the coordination 
and 2083/93 on the ERDF in OJ L 193, 31-7-1993, p.5, 20 and 34 respectively.
33 See the Web Site of DGXVI for the new proposals.
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The results suggest the following:
a) Agency type is a relevant factor in shaping bureaucratic preferences and 
strategies. As predicted, bureau-shaping strategies dominate in pure 
regulatory agencies (e.g. DGIV), while mixed control/delivery agencies 
(e.g. DGXVI) show a mixture of budget- and bureau-related preferences.
b) Also as predicted, budgetary preferences selectively focus both on the 
delivery component of the agency and on the bureau and programme 
components of the budget. They are more intense at the early stages of 
development of a policy. This suggests that 1) the marginal utility from 
budgetary increments decreases with budget growth and 2) agencies reach 
an optimum budget size. There is however no sign of budget-related 
preferences dominating work-related ones in these early days. Instead, 
work-related preferences persist over time.
c) The type of preferences held by officials does not appear to affect the 
likelihood of reaching bureaucratic objectives. Whilst the combination of 
long time horizons and informational advantages substantially increase 
this probability (compare IMPs, merger control, the 1984 and 1993 
reforms). Also, bureaucrats keep pursuing bureau-shaping strategies to 
maintain an ideational and informational advantage.
d) Finally, the Commission's bureaucrats do not anticipate perfectly the 
preferences of Union legislators even after twenty years of policy history 
(which makes preference revelation more truthful) and only later adapt 
proposals to the preferences of pivotal legislators. Apart from information 
incompleteness, this can be a sign that officials hope to rely on measures 
that increase the cost of no-agreement and link issues (see IMPs and 
merger regulation). Both are however double-edged measures. Expiration 
clauses make no-agreement more unpalatable and issue linking could 
work to bureaucrats' disadvantage (see the 1984 and 1993 reforms). 
Defending the bureau's prerogatives is easier when the bureau is better off 
with the status quo (compare ECO and the 1993 reform).
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This chapter leads us to two general observations. First, the domestic focus 
of the literature on the bureaucracy can be successfully shifted to the 
European level. Future research should compare how different 
institutional frameworks affect the probability of bureaucrats reaching 
their objectives. Second, this literature adds value to the institutionalist 
school of European integration by better specifying bureaucratic 
preferences and using bargaining theory to explain outcomes. The 
bureaucratic supranational input into the process of integration is 
contingent upon a set of favorable conditions but it is neither rare nor easy 
to 'roll back'.
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Figure 3.1. Programme, bureau and core budgets of the Directorate on regional policy
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Note: Programme budget includes all items committed to DGXVI. Bureau budget includes core budget, ERDF Community Initiatives, 
Special Community Measures, anti-fraud funds, innovative measures(e.g. BICs, integrated operations), studies, IMPs (preparation and 
technical assistance), preparation and assessment o f CSFs. Core budget includes salaries, other personnel costs, equipment and running 
costs, accommodation costs.
Source: SYSPER-Carrieres database; Bulletin o f  the European Communities, annual;
Budget o f  the European Communities, Official Journal Series L, annual
Chapter 4.
The Commission's Statutory Discretion: 
Uncertainty, Preferences, Decision Rules and Policy Types
Introduction
Chapter 3 has concluded that the Commission has persistently shown 
work-related preferences across the twenty-year development of the 
competition and regional policy. But, this is only the first step to answer 
the core question of the thesis. We need to know not only the 
Commission's objectives but also the conditions that hinder or support 
their achievement.
This chapter uses theories of executive and bureaucratic politics and the 
model developed in chapter 2 to quantitatively test the factors that affect 
the degree of ex-ante statutory discretion delegated by the Member States 
and the Parliament to the Commission in secondary legislation. It suggests 
that this discretion increases with 1) the uncertainty facing Union 
legislators about optimum policies, 2) the convergence of preferences 
between the Commission and the pivotal legislator, 3) the use of qualified 
majority in the Council, and 4) policies that require limited involvement of 
national administrations (i.e. policy type).
The chapter is organized in five parts. First, I discuss the differences 
between delegation of policy-making functions by Treaty provision and 
by secondary legislation and the rationales for delegation. In the second 
and third part I describe the operationalization of statutory discretion and 
of the independent variables. Results are analyzed in the fourth section 
after presenting the methodology. The last section tests the impact of the 
Parliament in the cooperation procedure and of the opinions issued by the 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Commission.
The chapter concludes that uncertainty and policy type are the most 
important explanatory variables of the Commission's statutory discretion. 
Informal decision rules play also a relevant role. Preference distribution,
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the Parliament's role in the cooperation procedure and opinions are 
instead substantively insignificant
The delegation of policy-making functions to the Commission 
D elegation b y  Treaty provision and b y  secondary legislation  
Much of the literature on European integration, including the grand 
theories of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, deals with the 
transfer of policy-making functions from the Member States to the EU 
institutions. Being it the result of Intergovernmental Conferences or 
political entrepreneurship of supranational institutions, the dependent 
variable is the vertical shift of policy authority to a higher tier of 
governm ent
The main focus of this chapter is the delegation of policy-making functions 
by secondary legislation from the legislative to the administrative branch 
of the Union, namely from the Council of Ministers and the Parliament to 
the Commission. The dependent variable is the horizontal shift of policy 
authority across branches of government that is informed by theories of 
executive and bureaucratic politics. Horizontal and vertical shifts are not 
always easily separable as the delegation of functions to the Commission 
via a new Treaty provision falls under both categories. However, the 
horizontal logic is relevant also in this case because the decision is still one 
of delegation from Union legislators (the Member States) to a 
supranational bureaucracy.
Delegation by secondary legislation differs from that by a new Treaty 
provision in at least three aspects: relevant dimension of conflict, decision 
rules and complexity. First, the debate in Intergovernmental Conferences 
is more on whether to have a common policy rather than on the 
substantive details of the policy. Second, delegation by secondary 
legislation can be by qualified majority and the Parliament can be a pivotal 
legislator while Treaty reform is only by unanimous Member States
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agreement. Finally, the technical complexity increases in secondary 
legislation.
Treaty delegation is certainly a precondition of secondary law delegation 
because the Union cannot operate without a Treaty base. There are 
however differences that allow us to treat the two decisions separately.
D elegation and the literature on executive politics
The literature on executive politics identifies various rationales for the 
delegation of functions to a bureaucratic agent.1 Many of these insights 
characterize also Keohane's (1984) functional theory of international 
regimes, although his emphasis is on vertical delegation. For our purposes 
we need to examine only two of such rationales. For a more extensive 
overview see Pollack (1997:102-7).
First, a supranational agent is likely to be in charge of monitoring 
compliance of Treaty obligations by the Member States. This is an essential 
function that lowers the transaction costs of international cooperation with 
the result of overcoming one of the many obstacles to collective action. As 
a bare minimum, the agent can act as a secretariat that circulates 
information and ensures coordination amongst states and then let 
sanctioning to take place in a decentralized fashion.2 However, if this 
monitoring is insufficient because of, for instance, the complexity or 
incompleteness of treaty obligations, supranational agents might be asked 
to give unbiased recommendations and to actively oversee and sanction 
the Member States' behavior. These functions are generally specified in 
Article 226 (ex 169) EC, according to which the Commission operate as the 
guardian of the Treaty and can initiate legal proceedings against non- 
compliant states. However, monitoring functions are explicitly conferred
1 The most recent contributions include Epstein and CyHalloran (1999), Horn (1995), 
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991). For delegation within legislatures see Shepsle (1979) and 
Weingast and Marshall (1988).
2 See Keohane (1984) and Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) on decentralized 
sanctioning.
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in secondary legislation in some cases as in more than 15 percent of the 
legislative acts sampled for this chapter.
The second rationale for delegation is related to the fact that Treaty 
provisions and secondary legislation are incomplete contracts that do not 
specify how actors should behave under all possible circumstances 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Williamson, 1985). At a minimum, the 
Commission might me responsible for specifying conditions attached to 
certain Union acts, such as safeguard measures in commercial policy. 
However, secondary legislation might confer upon the Commission more 
extensive regulatory and administrative functions that extend also to the 
financial management of Union programmes.
The gains accruing to Union legislators from delegation are of two types. 
First, there are informational gains as agent's specialization leads to 
technically sounder decisions (Bawn, 1995; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; 
McCubbins, 1985). Second, there might be credibility gains as an 
independent supranational agent has less incentive than a given state to 
concede to pressures from politically powerful national groups (Gatsios 
and Seabright, 1989; Majone, 1996: ch. 4). The Commission has been 
delegated these functions in about half of the legislative acts sampled for 
this chapter.
The dependent variable: ex-ante statutory discretion 
I have generated eight categories of activities that the Member States and 
the Parliament delegate to the Commission as suggested by the functional 
theory of regimes and the literature on executive and bureaucratic politics. 
I have then created an index of executive discretion from this list.
In categories 1 to 3 the Commission acts as an international secretariat that 
circulates information and ensures coordination amongst states. 
Categories 4 and 5 are a reinforcement of its monitoring role. Finally, the 
last three groups of activities are more easily associated with the 
conventional administrative role of bureaucracies. The Commission
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carries out the traditional regulatory, administrative (categories 6-7) and 
redistributive (category 8) functions.3 Below I describe in more detail these 
activities and provide examples from actual legislation.
1-2) R eceiving/providing inform ation fro m /to  the M em ber States and  
other institutions. The Commission can be simply the depositary of 
information when the Member States and other institutions must notify it 
of, for example, the adoption of specific national laws or administrative 
acts. Conversely, the Commission is the provider of information when it 
must give notice of its activities to the other Union institutions or to the 
public at large. The large majority of Union legislation provides for this 
exchange of information, except in the simplest acts such as agricultural 
price-fixing legislation and commercial policy legislation suspending 
import levies or setting tariff quotas.
3) Ensuring coordination and consultation am ongst the M em ber States. 
Some legislation contains a general provision for the Commission to be 
consulted about certain administrative acts taken by national 
administrations or for the Commission to consult interest groups and 
other bodies. A typical example is when a regulation provides for the 
administration of tariff quotas. Here, there is frequently a general call for 
coordination between the Commission and national administrations and 
for the Commission to ensure cooperation amongst the Member States.
4) G iving opinions and recom m endations. The Commission might be 
formally asked to give an opinion or recommendation on a certain matter. 
For example, some directives on the approximation of laws ask for the 
Commission's opinion when a Member State temporarily suspends or 
restricts their application for health and safety reasons. In this case the 
Commission produces a formal, but not legally binding, act and national
3 Categories 6, 7 and 8 are based on the works of Majone (1996) and (more loosely) of 
Pollack (1994). Majone (p. 54), borrowing from Wicksell (1967 [1896]), uses a functional 
classification of policies (stabilization, regulation and redistribution). Categories 6-7 and 
category 8 overlap with the latter two. Pollack uses Lowi's (1964) classification of 
regulatory, distributive and redistributive policy types to explain task expansion in the 
Union. Categories 6-7 are similar to the first one, category 8 to the last two.
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courts must refer to the European Court of Justice questions concerning its 
interpretation (Weatherill and Beaumont, 1995:139).
5) M onitoring, exam ining review ing and investigating. These are more 
intrusive monitoring and controlling functions, common in environmental 
legislation but also in transport, agriculture, commercial policy and 
approximation of laws. An example is Regulation 1602/92 temporarily 
derogating from implementation of some anti-dumping measures. The 
Commission is requested to monitor and periodically review the import 
into the Canary Islands of products that are exempted from anti-dumping 
duties. A second example is Directive 271/91 on urban waste-water 
treatment where the Commission has to monitor the Member States 
compliance and examine whether the technical difficulties encountered in 
the implementation warrant an extension of the compliance period.
6) Taking decisions. The Commission could be asked to take legally 
binding decisions on matters such as safeguard measures in commercial 
policy and the suspension of financial support in environmental or 
transport programmes. Decisions also include authorizations to the 
Member States to perform certain activities, such as the use of statistical 
units for the analysis of the production system in the Union (Regulation 
696/93).
7) A dm inistering  im plem enting and regulating. The Commission could 
be directly involved in the administration of a certain policy and have 
regulatory powers to specify principles and criteria. Legislative acts that 
delegate this type of activity include Council regulations providing for the 
administration of tariff quotas under Articles 28 or 113 (EC) and for the 
establishment of support systems for farmers. Power to make regulations 
is conferred on the Commission especially in Council directives on the 
freedom of movement and approximation of laws, but also in import 
regulations of, for instance, wild species.
8) M anaging and financing program m es. Finally, the Commission could 
be granted the power to directly manage the allocation of financial
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resources of action programmes. The Commission is first asked to select 
projects pursuing the programme objectives (e.g. the protection of the 
environment in coastal areas as in Regulation 3908/91, or the 
development of transport infrastructure as in Regulation 3359/90). Then, 
it has to decide the form of financing (e.g. capital grants, interest rebates or 
repayable advances). These activities are also delegated by a large set of 
legislation establishing support systems for farmers.
An index of ex-ante statutory discretion is then created from this 
classification. A sample of directives and regulations (see appendix) has 
been checked against this set of activities and a value of 1 has been 
assigned to the act for each function that is clearly conferred on the 
Commission.4 The sum of these values is a measure of the degree of 
discretion the Commission enjoys in implementing the legislation. This 
index ranges from minimum of zero (no discretion) to maximum of eight 
(extensive discretion). In other words, I have used the observable variable, 
number of delegated activities, to measure the latent variable, degree of 
executive discretion.5
4 Only the part that includes the articles of the legislation has been considered for this 
purpose. Recitals, tables and annexes have been disregarded.
5 There are two problems with this procedure. The first concerns whether the number of 
delegated activities actually measures the degree of executive discretion. One could 
object that the delegation of such activities is frequently accompanied by a list of 
implementation criteria that limits the room of manoeuvre of the Commission. This is 
certainly correct, but a measure of the stringency of these criteria as an intervening 
variable fails the test of cross-policy comparability mainly because of the technical 
complexity of secondary legislation. Is, for instance, a criterion that sets the quantities of 
head of bovine quotas stricter than a purity criterion of foodstuffs flavourings? It is my 
opinion that researcher's measurement bias plays a too great a role here to assure 
objectivity. Moreover, the effect of these criteria on discretion loses at least some of its 
significance if we see EU laws as incomplete contracts that do not specify what each 
institution is to do in all possible circumstances. To solve this contractual incompleteness, 
legislators rely on 'relational contracts' (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; see also Majone, 
1996) where they specify only general goals and establish ex-post control procedures, 
while specific criteria tend to play a lesser role. In fact, a long list of criteria can easily 
present inherent contradictions (see e.g. Article 33 [ex 39] EC) and then impose no 
effective control on the empowered institution, especially in highly complex policy 
environment. Here, it is more likely to have general objectives (e.g. price stability in 
monetary policy) and either control mechanisms such as implementation committees or
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The independent variables: uncertainty, preferences, decision rules and 
policy types
The literature on executive politics suggests two factors that explain the 
ex-ante scope of activity of an agent, namely uncertainty and distribution 
of preferences. Their relevance has also been proven in the formal model 
in the appendix of chapter 2. Such model adds a third variable, namely 
decision rules, and I will include a fourth one derived for the institutional 
framework of the Union, namely policy types. Below I discuss the relation 
that these variables bear upon executive discretion and their 
operationalization.
U ncertainty and inform ation asym m etries
All things equal, the scope of delegated authority is broader if uncertainty 
about the choice of the best policy alternative is high because of the 
complexity of the issue and the lack of information. As McCubbins and 
Page (1987: 417) put it, 'w ith little or no information with which to
an institutional framework where reputational factors are effective constraints on 
behavior (on reputation see Kreps, 1990; on control mechanisms see e.g. Moe, 1987).
A second possible objection to the construction of this index is that the different activities 
should be weighted for the degree of discretion they bestow upon the Commission. If in 
one regulation the Commission is asked to provide information on a certain matter while 
in a second regulation it is asked to regulate the matter, surely more discretionary 
authority has been delegated in the latter case. Although it raises the issue of appropriate 
weighting, this is another correct point but it turned out to be of less relevance 
empirically. To test this, I have assigned an increasing value from one to eight starting 
from the top activity listed above and computed a weighted index of discretion in a 
similar way. I then applied the statistical analysis described below and found no 
appreciable difference in the results of the study. This is because a law that delegates only 
regulatory powers (and for that matter, activities at the bottom of the list) is a very rare 
occurrence. Normally the act asks the Commission also to collect and provide 
information from and to the Member States and, probably, to give opinions (that is, 
activities at the top of the list). Hence, there is not substantial difference between the two 
indexes. For instance, Council Directive 92/80/EEC on the approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco requires the Commission to simply receive and provide 
information. This makes a discretion index of two and a weighted index of three. A 
regulation providing for the administration of tariff quotas (e.g. Regulation 786/88) 
delegates administrative functions but asks also for the exchange of information. In this 
case, the discretion index would be four and the weighted one nine. Both indexes gauge 
the actual difference in discretion. Since this is the way the index is constructed and laws 
are drafted, I have decided not to use weights rather than assigning arbitrary ones. 
Weights, without a specific justification, may introduce a bias by making inappropriate 
assumptions.
106
evaluate the possible alternatives, and with conceivably large political 
risks associated with uncertain choices, legislators would prefer to 
delegate an increasingly large domain of alternative regulatory targets to 
the agency'. Legislators need to reduce the information asymmetry that 
they face about their optimum policy (or even about their ultimate 
interest), so they delegate policy-making functions to allow better 
information to be obtained about policy options (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 
1987; McCubbins, 1985). Put simply, the sequence is as follows: higher 
policy complexity -► larger information asymmetries facing legislators -*■ 
higher uncertainty about optimum policies -*■ broader ex-ante executive 
discretion delegated to the agent (cf. Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994). 
Proposition 2 in the formal model in chapter 2 confirms this relation. 
O perationalization. The operationalization of uncertainty (and of the other 
independent variables) can be less than ideal, especially if the researcher 
does not want to forgo quantitative analysis and needs variables that 
assure objective cross-policy and cross-issue comparability.
As discussed, the delegation of policy-making functions broadens with the 
complexity of an issue. In commercial policy for instance, it is relatively 
easier for a Member State to discern the costs and benefits accruing to it 
when it has to set import duties or agricultural prices, as compared to 
when it has to establish an anti-dumping regime or a support system for 
farmers. The complexity in managing the latter issues increases the 
uncertainty about policy developments and requires broader delegation of 
executive functions. The legislators' uncertainty that is related to 
regulatory complexity is, in turn, related to specific issues within a policy 
rather than to the policy as a whole. This means that we need to focus the 
operationalization to the characteristics of the specific act of secondary 
legislation. To my knowledge, the literature does not provide a helpful 
guide, so I have based my selection on the observation of the acts of the 
sample. These range from relatively simple legislation such as setting 
duties, prices and import quotas to more complex acts on import
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surveillance or technical directives on environmental policies. It seems 
that the length of the legislative act is positively related to the complexity 
of (hence to the uncertainty arising from) the policy issue. The word count 
of the legislation setting duties and quotas amounts to less than one 
hundred words, while acts on import surveillance and other technical 
directives may require from five hundred to over a thousand words. 
Hence, I contend that an acceptable way to quantitatively operationalize 
uncertainty (UNCE) is to use the word count of the specific legislation.6 To 
conclude, we should expect an increase in the length of the legal text to 
increase the ex-ante executive discretion of the Commission.
D istribution o f preferences
All else equal, the scope of delegated authority is broader if the 
preferences of the pivotal legislator and of the agent converge (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1994, 1996; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989). This is also 
confirmed by Proposition 2 in the formal model in chapter 2. If a principal 
delegates authority to an agent with similar preferences, the agent will 
enjoy broad executive discretion because there would be no shirking. On 
the contrary, conflicting interests lead the principal to reduce the agent7 s 
room of maneuver. In short, convergence of preferences leads to broader 
ex-ante discretion.
O perationalization. Measuring distance of policy preferences among 
actors in all procedures, years and policy areas is a task that is seriously 
jeopardized by the lack of objective and comparable data across these
6 The part of the legislative act, which is counted for the number of words, covers the text 
from the first article to the name of the President of the Council of Ministers included. 
Annexes, tables and recitals are excluded. An objection to this operationalization could be
that word count is more a proxy for the substantive involvement in a policy. However, 
there is no contradiction. The more a politician wants to intervene in a policy issue, the 
more she is likely to regulate all the different aspects of the issue, the more complex 
becomes the management of the policy, the stronger the need of delegation. Krehbiel's 
(1991) operationalization (the number of laws cited in a given act) cannot be used because 
non-amending EU legislation cites few laws even in informationally intense issue areas.
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three dimensions.7 There is however a survey published annually in the 
Eurobarometer on the general public attitude toward the EU that can be 
used for our purposes. Citizens of all Member States are asked, generally 
twice a year, the following question: "Generally speaking, do you think 
that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common 
Market) is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" 
(Commission of the EC, 1994a). I have derived from this survey a measure 
of convergence of governmental preferences toward the Commission's as 
follows
PREFy = mean (wi * su p p o rt) for i = 1 ...  12 and y = 1987.. .1993,
where support is the percentage of those who answered that EU 
membership is good for them in country i and year y, while wi is the 
voting weight as in Article 205 (ex 148) EC. I imply that this support can 
be interpreted as a convergence toward the Commission's preferences. 
The higher the mean, the higher the support for EU level activities, the 
more policymaking functions are delegated to the Commission. The 
weights measure the relative importance of the countries in the decision 
making process. In other words, they measure the relative probability of 
each country to be the pivotal actor.
In the period under study, this index has fluctuated considerably (data are 
available from the author). In the years up to 1992, popular support for EU 
level activities increased by approximately 14 percent. The index increased 
from 401 in 1987, to 413 in 1989, reaching its maximum of 456 in 1991. This 
increase was linked to the Single Market initiative, although there was still
7 For instance, Eurobarometer surveys of the Commission do sometimes focus on public 
opinion attitudes toward certain policies such as agriculture, the single market or 
monetary union. However, they are not comparable because of the different questions 
being asked and they are discontinued throughout the period under analysis. Opinions 
and statements issued by various institutions provide valuable information about the 
interinstitutional dynamics of legislative policymaking, but the Member States7 officials 
seldom make their concern public and opinions are issued by less relevant institutions in 
the decision-making process such as the Economic and Social Committee.
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rather limited response in traditionally laggard states such as Great Britain 
and Denmark (Commission of the EC, 1994a). The crisis of the European 
Monetary System was instead the culprit of the subsequent fall, in total by 
more that 15 percent, to 403 in 1992 and to its minimum of 386 in 1993.
I acknowledge that this is a less than perfect measure of preference 
convergence. For instance, it disregards policy areas and assumes an 
efficient mechanism of transmission of preferences from citizens to state 
officials.8 I can only urge researchers to develop statistics about the 
Member States' revealed preferences in a similar way as, for instance, the 
ADA liberal support scores of the US Senate.
Legislative procedures
Following Proposition 1 of the formal model, we should expect the ex-ante 
executive discretion of the Commission to be larger under qualified 
majority than under unanimity {ceteris paribus). The gist of the 
Proposition is essentially related to the distribution of preferences of 
Union legislators and of the Commission. The preferences of the pivotal 
Member State under qualified majority are, on average, closer to the 
preferences of the Commission than in case of unanimity. This means that, 
on average, we should expect more ex-ante discretion from an act adopted 
under qualified majority than from one adopted under unanimity.9 
O perationalization. I have used a dichotomous variable PROC taking the 
value of 0 for unanimity and 1 for qualified majority vote. However, the 
fact that the Treaty provides for qualified majority does not necessarily 
mean that the Council operates accordingly. In the period under study, 
analysts have repeatedly noted the use of unanimity in the Common
8 I thank an anonymous referee from European Integration online Papers, Francesca 
Longo and Claudio Radaelli for pointing this out.
9 A related argument is that the permanence of unanimity in the Treaty is a sign of 
unwillingness of the Member States to delegate policy-making functions to the 
Commission. Qualified majority has been introduced in areas where the Commission's 
involvement is tolerated (e.g. for the free provision of services and the liberalization of 
capital movements). Where it is not the case (e.g. in social security and tax 
harmonization), unanimity still applies.
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Agricultural Policy, even if the relevant Treaty articles assign qualified 
majority voting (see Fennel, 1987: 73; Keeler, 1996: 136; Patterson, 1997: 
144; Peterson, 1989: 468; Runge and von Witzke, 1987; Scharpf, 1988: 251, 
257; for an opposing view see Wallace, 1989: 200).10 Accordingly, I will 
compare two models. Model 1 operationalizes decision rules as laid down 
by the Treaty; model 2 considers instead the informal use of unanimity in 
agriculture.
Policy types and legislative instrum ents
Although the Council is under an obligation to delegate most of the 
executive functions to the Commission (A rt 202.3 [ex 145] EC), policies 
differ in the distribution of functions between the Commission and 
national administrations. In some cases the Commission is the main 
administrator, as in the management of quotas, or policy-making 
functions are replicated at the European level and there is a clear-cut 
criterion defining the policy scope, as in the merger regulation 4064/89. In 
other cases, implementation requires the extensive involvement of 
national administrations as in directive 88/609/EEC on pollutants 
emissions, while the Commission is mainly relegated to a supervisory 
role. The implication is that the ex-ante executive discretion of the 
Commission (as related to the number of policy-making functions 
exercised) is negatively correlated with the policies that require extensive 
involvement of national administrations.
O perationalization. Generally speaking, the two most important 
legislative instruments of the Union, regulations and directives, mirror the 
distribution of policy-making functions between the European and 
national levels. Regulations are directly applicable in their entirety in all 
Member States. They are used predominantly for policies administered
10 Unanimity in agriculture seems also to withstand Legro's (1997: 34) criteria of 
robustness of norms more that in other EU policies. It was a clear rule, it was long­
standing (since, at least, the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, many new policy areas
111
directly by the Commission. National administrators are either marginally 
involved or perform similar functions at a lower lever of governance. 
Directives are not directly applicable and are binding on the Member 
States as to the result to be achieved. A Member State can choose the form 
and method of implementation in its national system. Directives are used 
in policies where national administrations perform the main policy­
making functions, while the Commission supervises implementation.
The legislative instrument, as an operationalization of these policy types, 
has an independent effect on the Commission's ex-ante executive 
discretion. Regulations are for policies where discretionary powers are 
relatively extensive, while directives for policies with functions delegated 
to national administrations at the expense of the Commission. A dummy 
variable TYPE taking the value of 0 for directives and 1 for regulations 
should hence have a relevant positive effect on ex-ante statutory 
discretion.
Models, population and methodology 
The main hypothesis is:
H ypothesis 3: The ex-ante sta tutory discretion delegated to the 
Com m ission in  secondary legislation increases w ith 1) the uncertainty 
facing Union legislators about optim um  policies, 2) the convergence o f 
preferences betw een the Com m ission and the p ivo ta l legislator, 3) the use 
o f qualified m ajority in  the Council, and 4) policies that require lim ited  
in  vol vem ent o f national adm inistrations.
The general model with the expected signs is:
DISCR = a  + pi UNCE + P2 PREF + p3 PROC + P4 TYPE + e 
(+) (+) (+) (+)
were only inserted in the 1986 Single European Act) and there was a general acceptance 
of its use by the Member States (see Swinbank, 1989: 309).
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The extent of ex-ante statutory discretion (DISCR) delegated to the 
Commission in secondary legislation is a positive function of degree of 
uncertainty (UNCE), preference convergence (PREF), legislative procedure 
(PROC) and policy type (TYPE). The residual e illustrates that the model is 
probabilistic, not deterministic.
Models 1 and 2 have been tested on a stratified sample of non-amending 
secondary legislation approved between the first of July 1987 and the first 
of November 1993. A search in the CELEX database and in the EU Official 
Journal has generated a population of 1033 directives and regulations (see 
appendix for details). Figure 4.1 shows the legislative production in 
different policy areas and according to the three main legislative 
procedures: unanimity, qualified majority and cooperation.
< FIGURE 4.1 HERE >
Unsurprisingly, the large majority of non-amending legislation has been in 
the areas of customs union, agriculture and commercial policy. However, 
important legislation has also been produced in the areas of environment, 
transport and, especially, approximation of laws. Qualified majority has 
been the predominant procedural rule although, as discussed, it might not 
be the Council's norm in some policies.
The legislation is non-amending for two reasons. First, the two 
propositions in the appendix of chapter 2 formally prove that legislative 
procedures, preferences and uncertainty do not affect the degree of ex- 
ante discretion in amending secondary legislation. Second, we need to 
control for the position of the status quo ante. The impact of the 
independent variables on executive discretion should be measured for a 
given level of discretion ex-ante. I would contend that an appropriate and 
efficient control strategy is the selecting of only the first legislative act in a 
policy issue. In this case, there is no discretion ex-ante.
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The standard procedure would be to run an ordinary least squared (OLS) 
regression and compare the statistical results of the two models. However, 
this type of parametric inference requires a set of assumptions to ensure 
that regression coefficients are the best linear and unbiased estimators.11 
More specifically for our case, OLS inferential statements assume that the 
random error in the model is normally distributed. If that was not the case, 
'our confidence intervals and hypothesis tests could have a greater than 
nominal probability of error. Bootstrapping may be a way of overcoming 
this problem' (Mooney and Duval, 1993: 55).
In our context, while the traditional assumptions of linearity, 
homoscedasticity and low collinearity are generally satisfied,12 the error 
structure of the model is not normal. A Jarque-Bera omnibus test for 
normality has rejected the null hypothesis that the distribution of residuals 
is normal. This is probably because the dependent variable is bounded by 
zero and has a bimodal distribution.13 As suggested by Mooney and 
Duval, I have used bootstrapping to solve this problem (see appendix).
Analysis of the results
The results are shown in Table 4.1. The first column lists the mean 
bootstrapped values of the regression coefficients. The other columns 
show the endpoints of the confidence intervals of the null hypothesis 
calculated using different techniques (see appendix). A coefficient outside
11 There might also be the risk of a measurement error with OLS because executive 
discretion (DISCR) is an ordinal index. However, this is likely to affect only the residuals 
of the equation and bootstrapping (see below) has been specifically adopted in this case 
in order to deal with the distribution of the error structure.
12 There is no evidence of heteroscedasticity, while there is a certain degree of collinearity 
between legislative procedure (PROC) and policy type (TYPE) and between preference 
convergence (PREF) and uncertainty (UNCE). The condition index is however well below 
30 in both cases, so it is not a serious problem.
13 I have carried out one-sided Jarque-Bera tests using the GAUSS code suggested by 
Mooney (1997). The null hypothesis of normality has been rejected at 5 per cent 
significance level for model 1 and at 10 per cent for model 2. The dependent variable 
distribution approximates a highly right skewed Pareto distribution [Par(0,0.1)] mixed 
with a Chi squared distribution [%2 (4)] at a factor of 0.7.
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these endpoint values is significantly different from zero at 95 percent 
level of confidence.
< TABLE 4.1 HERE >
The results show that model 2 is the most accurate. It explains, on average, 
about 53 percent of the variation in ex-ante statutory discretion compared 
to 45 percent of model 1. This difference is statistically relevant because we 
can reject at 95 percent confidence level the null hypothesis that a R2 of .53 
is generated by model l .14 We should also point out that a large portion of 
the variance still remains unexplained, thus inviting researchers to put 
forward better specified models.
Results also indicate that uncertainty (UNCE) is consistently the most 
important variable exerting a strong influence on ex-ante discretion. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in length of five hundred words from an act 
suspending import levies to one setting up the administration of a tariff 
quota leads to an increase of the discretion index by more than one point. 
Moving from tariff quota legislation (approximately 700 words) to acts on 
environmental policy or on the approximation of technical standards 
(approximately 3000 words) increases the discretion index by almost five 
points. The more technical the policy issue, the more uncertain the 
legislators about the optimum policy action, the more functions will be 
delegated to the Commission.
Policy type (TYPE) is another important determinant. All else equal, the 
use of regulations rather than directives increases the discretion index by 
one point. The executive discretion of the Commission is constrained 
when national administrations play an important role in the
14 Note that this test is different from the standard F-test on model specification because 
the operationalization of PROC differs in the two cases.
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implementation of a policy. Conversely, the Commission enjoys more ex- 
ante discretion when execution is limited to the EU level.
The substantive and statistical significance of the index of preference 
convergence (PREF) tells us different stories. The regressor of this index is 
significantly different from zero according to all methods. Its substantive 
significance is however rather limited. An increase from its lowest value of 
386 in 1993 to its highest of 456 in 1991 barely increases the discretion 
index by half a point (ceteris paribus).
Finally, the Commission's executive discretion is likely to be larger under 
qualified majority rather than under unanimity only if we take into 
account the norm of using unanimity in agriculture. The legislative 
procedure (PROC) in model 1 is significantly different from zero 
according to almost all methods of computation. Substantively, however, 
the use of qualified majority instead of unanimity increase the discretion 
index by only a tenth of a point.
In model 2 the legislative procedure is substantially and statistically 
significant Ceteris paribus, unanimity decreases the index of discretion by 
more than one point. When unanimity is (formally or informally) needed 
to approve a Union act, less policy-making functions are delegated to the 
Commission because the preferences of the pivotal legislator are, on 
average, farther away from those of the Commission than in case of 
qualified majority.15
The role of the European Parliament in the cooperation procedure 
Does the Parliament have an impact in the cooperation procedure on the 
ex-ante statutory discretion delegated to the Commission? Tsebelis (1994)
15 This result also confirms that clear, long-standing and agreed upon norms have 
explanatory power. The critical reader may point out that the re-coding of legislative 
procedure (PROC) to account for informal behavior could have merely increased its 
variance and, consequently, its significance. I have re-coded in a similar way all the other 
policy areas in the sample, even though there is less evidence of long-standing and 
concordant use of unanimity. Legislative procedure is not substantively significant in 
these tests.
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asserts that the Parliament enjoys a conditional agenda setting power in 
cooperation. His result differs from those of Crombez (1996) and 
Steunenberg (1994), that deny the existence of such power, because he 
uses a multidimensional policy space. I (2000) show that the Parliament is 
pivotal in three procedures but only to the extent of reducing the 
equilibrium discretion.
There are however no acts approved under co-decision or assent in the 
sample and there are no parliamentary amendments that cut back 
functions conferred on the Commission in the sampled legislation 
approved under cooperation. We should therefore expect no impact on the 
discretion delegated to the Commission.
O perationalization and results
The role of the Parliament is first operationalized by converting legislative 
procedure (PROC) into a multichotomous variable taking the value of 2 
for legislation approved under cooperation.16 The results of this test are 
shown in the upper part of Table 4.2 (model 3); they take as benchmark for 
comparison model 2 because of its higher explanatory power. 
Unfortunately, the model explains a lower percentage of the variance of 
the dependent variable and we can only just reject the null hypothesis that 
it can be randomly generated from model 2.
The improvement in explanatory power of policy type (TYPE) and 
uncertainty (UNCE) is generally at the expense of the importance of 
convergence of preferences (PREF) and legislative procedure (PROC) as 
collinearity diagnostics has already told us. Ceteris paribus, the use of 
regulations increases the discretion index by one and an half point and an 
increase of one thousand words leads to a rise of the index by more than 
two points. Convergence of preferences is still substantively insignificant.
16 In this way we test whether the Parliament has a positive effect on discretion. 
Alternatively, I have tested a model with legislative procedure (PROC) taking the value 
of 0 for cooperation, 1 for unanimity and 2 for qualified majority to see whether the
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Most importantly, a unit increase of the new variant of legislative 
procedure causes a rise of the discretion index by less than 0.8 (ceteris 
paribus). This value is lower than in the model without the Parliament. 
Before stating that this institution has a substantive effect on executive 
discretion, we need to run a second test because the conversion of 
legislative procedure into a multichotomous variable could have increased 
the measurement error of its regressor.
< TABLE 4.2 HERE >
The second operationalization consists in adding a dummy cooperation 
variable (PARL) to model 2. This new variable takes the value of 1 when 
the Parliam ents vote is needed to adopt legislation under the cooperation 
procedure. The new model 3 becomes:
DISCR = a  + Pi UNCE + P2 PREF + Ps PROC + p4 TYPE + Ps PARL + e 
(+> (+) (+> (+) (+)
The inclusion of the new variable is not statistically relevant With an F(i,94) 
statistics of 1.28 we cannot reject the null hypothesis of significantly 
improved explanatory power. Moreover, the cooperation variable has 
practically no substantive meaning. All else equal, it determines less than 
a fifth of a point of executive discretion (its mean bootstrapped regression 
coefficient is 0.19).
Parliament has a negative effect on discretion. Its explanatory power is even lower than 
the one of model 1.
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The impact of parliamentary and ESC opinions
Do the opinions issued by the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee (ESC) have an impact on the ex-ante statutory discretion 
delegated to the Commission? Formal theorists disregard the role of 
opinions because they are not legally binding and the institutions issuing 
them have no real power in affecting the equilibrium outcome (cf. 
Crombez, 1996; Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994). Actors do not condition 
their strategies on the signals sent with the opinions especially when the 
sender has no role in determining the final payoffs of the game.17 
Consequently, we should expect no significant impact.
O perationalization and results
I have added to model 2 two dummies for when the Parliament and the 
ESC have issued opinions. The new model 4, then, is:
DISCR = a  + piUNCE + p2PREF + psPROC + p4TYPE + psEPO + p6ESCO, 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
where Parliament opinion (EPO) and ESC opinion (ESCO) take the value 
of 1 when an opinion is issued by the Parliament and the Committee 
respectively. The lower part of Table 4.2 shows the results; they also take 
model 2 as benchmark for comparison.
The inclusion of opinions does not relevantly improve the explanatory 
power of the model. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the new 
model can be randomly generated from model 2. This is because the 
adjusted R* (.5493) falls within the 95 percent confidence intervals of the R* 
of model 2. This is according to all three methods of computation of the 
intervals. Also the F-test on variable addition (F&gs) = 0.07) fails to reject the 
null hypothesis. The substantive and statistical significance of the original
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four variables (PREF, PROC, TYPE and UNCE) is not affected by the 
introduction of the opinion of the Parliament and the Committee. The new 
variables (EPO and ESCO), while significantly different from zero, have a 
very marginal effect on executive discretion. Ceteris paribus, they 
determine around a fifth of a point of the discretion index each.
Conclusion
The chapter has shown that the Commission enjoys broader ex-ante 
statutory discretion in case of policy uncertainty, of qualified majority and 
for some policy types (the impact of decision rules is however more 
debatable). When Member States are uncertain about the best course of 
action that protects their interest, they delegate more policy-making 
functions to the Commission to reap the informational benefits of 
delegation. Further, the less levels of bureaucratic governance are 
involved, the more discretion the top tier (i.e. the Commission) enjoys.
The evidence from the other variables is relatively less convincing. The 
impact that the distribution of preferences has on the Commission's 
discretion seems marginal, although this has probably more to do with the 
operationalization of the variable. We need a more accurate issue-specific 
quantification than what has been the case in this chapter. We have 
however some indirect confirmation of the importance of preferences. The 
formal or informal use of unanimity diminishes ex-ante discretion relative 
to qualified majority. The pivotal legislator under unanimity tends to 
restrain more the Commission than under qualified majority because its 
preferences are likely to be more distant from those of the Commission. 
The equilibrium discretion is however structurally rather that preference 
induced. This result highlights also the need to develop a better 
understanding by the rational choice literature of the causal relevance of 
norms.
17 This is the so-called babbling equilibrium in signaling games. Opinions can, on the 
contrary, enhance coordination if actors' moves are interdependent (e.g. in cooperation)
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Being there no clear evidence of parliamentary opposition to delegation, 
variables on parliamentary role do not have explanatory power and 
models incorporating parliamentary preferences have lower coefficients of 
determination. We can also reject the idea that opinions have an effect on 
delegated powers.
These results have broader implications. First, the literature on executive 
politics provides valuable insights on the factors that affect the room of 
policy maneuver of an agent and can be successfully extended to the 
European Union. Second, formalization helps us to clearly distill the 
factors that affect executive discretion of the Commission. More work is 
needed both in the operationalization of variables for quantitative analysis 
and in the development of formal modeling relaxing my assumptions. 
Finally, for European integration scholars, the process of integration is 
ultimately driven by the implementation of the policies of the Union. The 
literature on executive politics helps us identifying the conditions under 
which the supranational bureaucratic input (or drift) into such process is 
greater. Thus far, such conditions are 1) high policy uncertainty, 2) the 
Commission only is in charge of implementation and 3) the legal act of 
delegation is approved by qualified majority. However, Union legislators 
can set control procedures to oversee the Commission's behavior. It is this 
decision that will be the focus of chapter 5.
and preferences are similar.
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APPENDIX
Population characteristics
The population includes 1033 non-amending directives and regulations 
based on a Treaty article. Those acts that are based on a prior directive or 
regulation are not included because it is unclear whether they are 
amending. Directives and regulations amending decisions, protocols and 
conventions have been included if they have a Treaty base. I have 
disregarded decisions because of their administrative and addressee- 
related nature, and opinions and recommendations because they are not 
legally binding. The 25 acts (i.e. less that 2.5 percent) that have more than 
one Treaty base have been assigned first to the more stringent procedure 
then to the policy so that to ensure the widest distribution across policies 
and procedures. This is in order to maximize the efficiency of the sampling 
strategy (see below).
The CELEX database and the Official Journal have been the main sources 
used. Unfortunately, both are slightly deficient. CELEX has some 
regulations whose reference cannot be found in the Official Journal. Given 
the legal requirements of publication, this seems to be a flaw of the 
database. Conversely, there is not a requirement of publication of 
directives in the Official Journal, which is then incomplete in this respect.
Sampling strategy
A sampling procedure needs to trade off feasibility and representation. A 
feasible sample minimizes sampling costs and analytical complexity. A 
representative sample mirrors the key characteristics of the population 
and minimizes the sampling error.
The population shows highly skewed frequency distributions across two 
key variables of policy area and legislative procedure. Around 70 percent 
of the acts are approved in the agricultural and commercial fields and by 
qualified majority (see Figure 4.1). A simple random sample could easily 
under-represent a policy area or a legislative procedure. For instance, in a
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simple random sample with repetition of 100 cases drawn by the author, 
only one regulation has been approved under unanimity and five 
directives were approved using cooperation. Both procedures were 
heavily underrepresented. Conversely, customs union, agricultural and 
commercial legislation amounted to slightly more than 85 percent.
In order to decrease such sampling error without increasing the sample 
size, I have instead draw n a stratified random sample of 100 cases. Each 
stratum is characterized by a different Treaty base and legislative 
procedure to ensure internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity. The 
sample size of each stratum is proportional to the stratum population. This 
procedure is termed stratified random sampling with proportional 
allocation or constant sampling fraction. In this way, first and second 
order probabilities of inclusion of a case in a stratum equal simple random 
sampling probabilities and variance and total formulae are similar. There 
is no need to modify values of observations (Frosini et al., 1994: 87-8). 
Further, bootstrapping (see below) obviates eventual problems of 
probability distribution. Although only simple random sampling 
generates samples with independently and identically distributed cases, 
this proportionate stratified sampling improves representation without 
complicating too much the analysis (Frosini et al., 1994: 41-5).
Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is a computationally intensive non-parametric approach to 
statistical inference. It is of particular utility in our case when traditional 
distributional assumptions of parametric inference are violated (Mooney 
and Duval, 1993; Mooney and Krause, 1997). Moreover, bootstrapping 
allows the researcher to make clearer inferential statements about the 
goodness-of-fit of the models because it constructs an estimate of the 
sampling distribution of statistics with weak statistical theory such as the 
adjusted R2.
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In regression models, its basic procedure is to take 1000 re-samples with 
replacement of the residuals of the original regression model, to calculate 
the bootstrapped dependent variables, regression coefficients and R2 and 
to develop bootstrap confidence intervals. Statisticians point out that this 
is the most appropriate procedure to bootstrap a regression model. An 
alternative could be to resample cases of data but this ignores the error 
structure of the model (Mooney and Duval, 1993:17).
Since bootstrapping is primarily a tool for inferential statistics, I have used 
as point estimator of the population variables the mean bootstrapped 
values. This is based on principles similar to those of the estimates of the 
jackknife technique (Mooney and Duval, 1993: 22-7). To test whether these 
observed values were in the critical region, I have computed the a / 2 and 
l - a /2  double-tailed endpoints of the null hypothesis (e.g. p=0 for 
regressors). The techniques used to compute the confidence intervals were 
the percentile, bias corrected and percentile-t ones. I have disregarded the 
normal approximation method because it fails to use the entire 
bootstrapped estimate of the sampling distribution and requires 
parametric assumptions about the empirical probability distribution. 
Further, normal approximation is probably also less appropriate in case of 
regression coefficients because they are likely to have a ^-distribution. 
Statisticians tend to agree that the BC and percentile-t methods are the 
most accurate while the percentile method assumes an unbiased 
bootstrapped estimate of the sampling distribution (see Mooney and 
Duval, 1993: 33-42).
I have also computed the 'bootstrapped t(or z)-statistics' using the 
standard error estimated with the bootstrapped sampling distribution 
(Mooney and Duval, 1993: 35). I have developed my own GAUSS code to 
carry out the computations, for alternatives see Mooney (1994a,b).
Contact the author for more details on operationalization, statistics, 
population and sampling strategy used in chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 4.1. Non-amending secondary legislation 1987-93
Number 
o f acts
ITU Unanimity ^  Cooperation [=^ QM
130 232 479
1001
/ /
Policy area
Table 4.1. Regression coefficients and 95 % endpoints of the
null hypothesis (p = 0) of models 1 and 2
Model 1
Parameter Regression Percentile Bias Corrected Percentile-t c
Coefficientsb a/2, 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
Constant -1.07 -.18 .18 * -.17 .19 * -.18 .19 *
Preference PREF .0031 -.00034 .00059 * -.00039 .00043 * -.00039 .00057 *
Procedure PROC .1073 -.0565 .0401 * -.0476 .0486 * -.0569 .044 *
Policy Type TYPE .96 -.04 .04 * -.03 .04 * -.04 .04 ♦
Uncertainty UNCE .0021 -.00002 .00001 * -.00002 .00001 * -.00002 .00002 *
Adjusted R2 45.09b 44.70 45.58 44.72 45.64 45.03 45.16
Model 2»
Parameter Regression Percentile Bias Corrected Percentile-t c
Coefficientsb
a/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
Constant -2.46 -.08 .16 * -.11 .15 * -.09 .17 *
Preference PREF .0045 -.00036 .00045 * -.0037 .00042 * -.00035 .00046 *
Procedure PROC 1.1395 -.011 .0166 * -.0087 .0184 * -.0101 .0171 *
Policy Type TYPE .94 -.02 .03 * -.02 .03 * -.02 .03 *
Uncertainty UNCE .0021 -.00001 .00001 * -.00001 .00001 * -.00001 .00002 *
Adjusted R2 53.29» 52.95 53.70 53.03 53.78 53.24 53.33
Number of cases 100
Note: * a  < .05 double tailed significance level of the regressors.
‘Bootstrapped t-statistics’ (see Appendix) are not reported to simplify the table. 
Endpoints for the adjusted R2 are computed around the mean bootstrapped R2 value 
1 It substitutes unanimity for qualified majority in agricultural policy 
b Mean bootstrapped values
c This interval has been computed taking 50 resamples per each resample
Table 4.2. Regression coefficients and 95 % endpoints
of the null hypothesis (P = 0) of models 3 and 4
Model 3
Parameter Regression Percentile Bias Corrected Percentile-tb
Coefficients» a/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
Constant -2.39 -.06 .07 * -.06 .07 * -.05 .07 *
Preference PREF .0013 -.00005 .00005 * -.00006 .00005 * -.00005 .00006 *
Procedure PROC .79 -.02 .01 * -.01 .02 * -.02 .02 *
Policy Type TYPE 1.44 -.02 .03 * -.02 .04 * -.02 .03 *
Uncertainty UNCE .0022 -.00002 .00002 * -.00001 .00002 * -.00002: .00002 *
Adjusted R2 54.40 •
Model 4
Parameter Regression Percentile Bias Corrected Percentile-tb
Coefficients * a/2 1 - a/2 siga o/2 1 - a/2 sign. a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
Constant -1.91 -.04 .07 * -.04 .08 * -.04 .07 *
Preference PREF .00136 -.00003 .00004 * -.00003 .00004 * -.00003 .00005 *
Procedure PROC .91 -.03 .02 * -.02 .02 * -.03 .02 *
Policy Type TYPE .93 -.03 .03 * -.02 .05 * -.03 .04 *
Uncertainty UNCE .0021 -.00002 .00002 * -.00001 .00002 * -.00002 .00002 *
EP opinion EPO -.21 -.03 .03 * -.03 .03 * -.03 .03 *
ECS opinion ESCO .20 -.02 .03 * -.02 .03 ♦ -.03 .03 *
Adjusted R2 54.93 *
Number of cases 100
Note: * a  < .05 double tailed significance level of the regressors.
‘Bootstrapped t-statistics’ (see Appendix) are not reported to simplify the table. 
Endpoints for the adjusted R2 are computed around the mean bootstrapped R2 value 
1 Mean bootstrapped values
b This interval has been computed taking 50 resamples per each resample
Chapter 5.
Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: 
Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules
Introduction
Chapter 4 has analyzed the factors that lead Union legislators to delegate 
policy-making functions to the Commission. However, the literature on 
executive politics stresses the link between delegation and control, and 
some studies, as analyzed in chapter 2, emphasizes the importance of 
control committees in the Union. This is a system of control, termed 
comitology, whereby representatives of the Member States directly 
oversee, using various procedures, the implementation of the 
responsibilities delegated to the Commission. We need to assess the 
importance of these committees if we w ant to gain a more fine-grained 
view of the Commission's role in the process of integration.
Hence, this chapter focuses on issues of Commission accountability and 
mechanisms of Member States control. It uses theories of executive politics 
to quantitatively test the factors that determine the likelihood of 
establishing control procedures and the stringency of such control. These 
are 1) the uncertainty facing legislators about the optimum policy actions, 
2) the level of conflict among legislators and 3) the need of unanimous 
agreement in the Council of Ministers. It also examines the correlation 
between control stringency and executive discretion.
The chapter is divided in four sections. In the first one, I apply the control 
side of agency theory to the activities of the Commission. This part relies 
on Kiewiet and McCubbins' (1991) work on delegation in the US Congress 
and Pollack's (1997) application to the Union institutions. In the second 
section, I describe the committee system and analyze the incidence of 
control procedures across policy areas. Finally, I test a hypothesis about 
the determinants of legislators' control of executive functions as suggested 
by McCubbins and Page (1987; see also McCubbins, 1985) and the
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correlation between discretion and control in the third and fourth parts of 
the chapter (after explaining operationalization and methodology).
The results show that 1) unanimity, level of conflict among the Union 
institutions and uncertainty are key determinants for the establishment of 
procedural control of the Commission's implementation activities, 2) level 
of conflict and uncertainty are also important factors affecting the degree 
of stringency in control and 3) ex-ante statutory discretion is positively 
correlated with procedural control.
The conclusion relates these results to those in chapter 4, to the European 
integration literature in general and, more specifically, to the literature on 
political control of the bureaucracy.
Accountability and control of the Commission: theory and practice 
The reasons for delegating policy-making responsibilities to an agent have 
been discussed in chapter 4. Delegation however creates a control problem 
for legislators because
'there is always some conflict between the interests of those who delegate 
authority (principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it. Agents 
behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interest subject only to the 
constraints imposed by the relationship with the principal. The 
opportunism that generates agency losses is a ubiquitous feature of the 
human experience' (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 5).
The cost of this opportunism, termed shirking or bureaucratic drift, is 
coupled with a second process, known as slippage, when the agency 
design itself is an incentive for the agent to behave in ways that are costly 
for the principals (McCubbins and Page, 1987: 411). In the institutional 
framework of the Union, agency losses can be generated not only when 
the Commission's preferences differ from the Member States' or the 
Parliament7 s (shirking) but also because the Commission has the 
monopoly of legislative initiation that can be used to pursue its interest 
(slippage).
129
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) list four classes of measures that principals 
can adopt to contain these potential losses. First, principals determine the 
ex-ante design o f the agency (i.e. scope and domain of regulatory targets, 
legal instruments and administrative procedures). In case of the Union, 
the scope of functions delegated to the Commission by the Treaty has been 
relatively broad. The Commission has to ensure the proper functioning of 
the common m arket and the application of Treaty provisions (Art. 211 [ex 
155] EC). The Council is under an obligation to delegate most of the 
executive functions to the Commission (A rt 202.3 [ex 145] EC), which also 
enjoys a relatively broad range of instruments such the power to initiate 
legislation and infringement proceedings. Only in the Maastricht Treaty 
the Commission's powers have been heavily curtailed in the new fields of 
foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs.
Second, principals can control the agent using screening and selection 
m echanism s. This concerns with the appointment procedures and the 
signaling process to avoid adverse selection and to eliminate information 
asymmetries about abilities and preferences that exist between potential 
principals and agents. According to Article 214 (ex 158) EC, the possibility 
of selecting their preferred agents varies across the Member States and the 
Parliament. The latter is more likely to affect the nomination of the 
President rather than that of a single Commissioner. Commission 
members m ust comply with general requirements of competence and 
independence (Art. 213 [ex 157] EC), but these barely control their 
preferences. The Commission is effectively in office for five years because 
censure and dismissal are costly and scarcely credible sanctioning 
mechanisms.1 Each Member State can only use, at the end of the term,
1 The Court will dismiss a Commissioner only if she no longer fulfills the conditions 
required for holding the post and in case of serious misconduct (Art. 216 [ex 160] EC). 
The Parliament has to approve a motion to censure the whole Commission (Art. 201 [ex 
144] EC). The collective resignation of Commissioners in March 1999 shows that 1) the 
Council is unlikely to use Article 216 to refer Commissioners to the Court for misconduct, 
2) the threat of parliamentary censure is credible only if the Commission (mis)behaves in 
such a way that the cost of lost credibility exceeds other costs for the Parliament and 3)
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their reappointment power of one or two commissioners and (shared with 
the Parliament) of the President.
Third, principals can monitor and influence agent's behavior ex-post by 
establishing m onitoring and reporting requirem ents. Union legislators 
have inserted similar requirements and provisions for policy assessment 
in the majority of primary and secondary legislation. In the legislation 
analyzed for this chapter, about 60 percent of the sampled acts require 
some sort of exchange of information between the Commission and other 
actors. The problem with reporting is that the agent is tempted to reveal 
information strategically so that his or her activity is seen under a 
favorable light by the principals. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) point 
out that principals might want to offset this problem by supplementing 
reporting requirements with three oversight mechanism s. These are 'fire- 
alarms', institutional checks and 'police-patrols'. 'Fire-alarms' operate via 
the establishment of rules and procedures that enable third parties to 
monitor and redress administrative decisions. Institutional checks rely on 
third parties that are explicitly established by the principals (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins, 1991: 34). Pollack (1997: 116) observes that 'almost every EC 
institution besides the Commission plays a role in monitoring and 
checking the Commission's behavior'. These include the Court of Justice 
(Arts. 230-2 [ex 173-5] EC), the Court of Auditors (Art. 248 [ex 188c] EC) 
and the Ombudsman (EP decision, 9 March 1994). 'Fire-alarm' oversight 
can be enacted by natural and legal persons via both the Court (Arts. 
230,241 [ex 173,184] EC) and the Ombudsman.
However, the majority of the Commission's acts are likely to be 
administratively sound. The great bulk of the Commission's legitimate 
areas of intervention has a regulatory character and financial 
considerations play a considerably lesser role. Decentralized control is 
likely to be biased in favor of resourceful groups; furthermore the Court
the procedure has a very limited scope, it is similar to the presidential impeachment in 
the US Congress rather than to a parliamentary vote of no confidence.
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has radically restricted the circumstances under which individuals can 
proceed against Union actions (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 62).
Facing an agency with a broad mandate and limited or ineffective control 
mechanisms, the Member States have to resort to a much more intrusive 
and costly oversight that directly focuses on the regulatory activity of the 
Commission. The next sections of the chapter focus on the more direct 
'police-patrol' oversight that takes the form of comitology in the Union 
(Pollack, 1997:114-6)
Control procedures in the European Union
Origin and operation o f com itology
Control of the Commission's delegated activities by committees has been 
essentially carried out since the establishment of the Union. Initially, 
though, it was on a rather ad-hoc  basis and generally predominant in the 
agricultural policy. The first price support policies and legislation of 
Union preference also established the first oversight committees in the 
form of a management committee procedure. As the areas of intervention 
of Union legislation expanded, so did the variety of control procedures 
(Bradley, 1992; Demmke et al., 1996; Vos, 1997). It was however the Single 
Market initiative that gave the impetus to the Council to reorganize the 
procedures.
Council Decision 87/373/EEC rationalized this system of control and 
specified four main types of committee procedures: advisory,
management, regulatory and safeguard. The total number of distinct 
procedures amounts to seven since the latter three each have two variants. 
With two exceptions that we will see below, the control of the 
Commission's implementing legislation is two-tiered: the relevant 
committee oversees the act in question first, then it might refer it to the 
Council of Ministers. Committees are composed of permanent 
representatives of the Member States, usually officials from national 
technical ministries (Docksey and Williams, 1994:121-5). They are chaired
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by a senior Commission official who controls the agenda, submits the 
implementing measures for consideration and sets deadlines. The 
chairperson has no vote in the deliberation of the committee.
< TABLE 5.1 HERE>
The procedures can be arrayed along three dimensions with respect to the 
role that the Council plays in controlling the Commission's activities (see 
Table 5.1). These are 1) the decision rule in the committee to refer 
measures to the Council, 2) the timing of Council control and 3) the 
default condition if the Council does not act. This classification will be 
used in the following sections to develop an index of stringency of 
implementation control.
In the advisory committee procedure I, national experts issue an opinion 
before the Commission implements the measure. The Commission is 
requested to take the utmost account of such opinion but, if it chooses to 
disregard it, there is no referral to the Council. There are other ways the 
Member States use to influence the Commission's activity such as forcing 
a vote or requesting to have their minority position recorded. However, 
this procedure provides the Commission with the greatest autonomy and 
the Member States' influence over its decision-making powers is relatively 
limited. For this procedure only, the dimensions in Table 5.1 are with 
reference to the role of the committee.
In the following four procedures, national experts act as gatekeepers. In 
the management committee procedures Ha and Db, the committee decides 
by qualified majority whether or not to submit the draft measure to the 
Council. In case of inaction or favorable opinion, the Commission may 
adopt the measure with immediate effect. If the committee decides to refer 
the measure to the Council, there are two procedural variants that differ 
on the timing of Council control. In variant a, the Council deliberates after 
the measure is applied, although the Commission may decide to defer
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implementation for a maximum period of one month. In variant b, Council 
control takes place before adoption because the Commission must defer 
implementation for a maximum of three months. In both variants, if the 
Council does not act the default is the measure proposed by the 
Commission.
In the regulatory committee procedures Eta and fflb, the committee 
decides by qualified majority whether n o t to submit the implementing act 
to the Council. If such majority is not reached or the committee does not 
deliver an opinion, the measure is deferred and submitted to the Council. 
The two variants that follow differ with regard to the default condition. In 
variant a, if the Council does not act the proposed measure shall be 
adopted by the Commission. In variant b, inaction leads to a similar 
outcome only if a simple majority in the Council does not object. In such 
case, the status quo ante prevails.
Finally, the safeguard committee procedures IVa and IVb do not require 
the establishment of a committee of national experts. The Commission 
must notify directly the Council prior to the adoption of a safeguard 
measure and any Member State may refer the Commission's decision to 
the Council. The Council can revoke, modify or confirm the measure 
within a set time limit. Similarly to the regulatory procedures, the two 
variants differ with regard to the default condition. In variant a, if the 
Council does not act the proposed measure is adopted by the Commission. 
In variant b, inaction revokes the measure. Secondary legislation may 
amend these procedural requirements especially with respect to variant a. 
Frequently, enabling legislation provides for Council control to take place 
after the Commission adopts the implementing measure.
C om itology and com m on policies: descriptive statistics 
As mentioned in chapter 2, there are few studies on the incidence of 
comitology in the Union policies. To my knowledge, the report by the 
Institut fur Europaische Politik (1989), the book edited by Pedler and
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Schaefer (1996) and an article by Dogan (1997) are the first quantitative 
works that have been carried out in this field. In this section I compare 
Dogan's results with those that emerge from my data set. This comparison 
is partial because the criteria of data selection differ,2 nonetheless it 
provides interesting confirming and discontinuing evidence, at least on a 
descriptive basis. More rigorous inferential analysis will follow.
Dogan observes that comitology procedures have been used in about 20 
percent of all Council legislation enacted since 1987 and points out a 
consistent longitudinal trend towards more control. He found out high 
incidence in company law, financial services, justice and home affairs, 
veterinary control, followed by customs, transport, health, food and 
development aid, while lower incidence in welfare, regional and 
competition policy, industrial adjustment, education and employment, 
taxation and procurement.
Figure 5.1 shows the incidence of comitology procedures in the different 
common policies in non-amending secondary legislation adopted since 
1987.
<FIGURE 5.1 HERE>
More than 30 percent of this legislation has some sort of procedural 
control, lending some credit to the thesis of increasing use of comitology. 
In some policy areas there are too few new legislative acts, thus making 
interpretation inadvisable.3 By contrast, in four areas more than 50 percent 
of new legislation has comitology procedures. These are social policy, 
environment, approximation of laws and transport. Further, these areas 
also show a higher incidence of more restrictive procedures, 100, 60, 57 
and 79 percent respectively of all procedures are of the most restrictive
2 Dogan's data set includes all legislation enacted from 1987 until 1995 (4601 acts), see 
appendix for my data set.
3 These are areas where less than 20 new acts have been adopted, that is competition, tax 
provisions, economic policy, euro networks, cohesion and development.
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types (i.e. regulatory and safeguard). At least for non-amending 
legislation, this seems to disconfirm Dogan's (1997: 41) conclusion that 
high level of comitology is associated with low levels of restrictive 
comitology. In effect, in areas where the incidence of control is medium 
(agriculture and free movement) or low (commercial policy and customs 
unions), the percentage of restrictive procedures are also relatively low 
(28, 50, 33 and 30 percent respectively). The fact that Dogan focuses on 
longitudinal trends probably explains this discrepancy. However, the 
sectoral patterns that he has identified are confirmed, with social policy 
and customs union the only exceptions probably due to the different 
classifications used. Environment, approximation of laws, transport, 
agriculture and free movement are the areas where committee control is 
used more extensively.
Procedural control of the Commission: hypothesis and independent 
variables
The determ inants o f control
McCubbins and Page (1987; see also McCubbins, 1985) formulate two 
general factors that explain the establishment of control procedures, 
namely uncertainty and level of conflict. Uncertainty affects the 
distribution of information at the expenses of legislators who find it 
difficult to discern the optimum policy actions and, probably, also their 
ultimate interests. Uncertainty increases the need for information and also 
the cost to retrieve and process it. In these circumstances the legislators 
would prefer to delegate regulatory choices and instruments to the agent, 
with the attached information costs, and 'sit back in an oversight role 
awaiting clarification of the issue' (McCubbins and Page, 1987: 417). The 
procedural requirements then become more restrictive for two reasons. 
First, the need for legislative control increases as scope and instruments 
delegated to the agent broaden. Second, the political risks attached to 
different regulatory alternatives increase with uncertainty. It is less clear
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which policy strategy is the most appropriate and the preservation of the 
status quo becomes relatively more important. Thus, the legislators 
establish more stringent procedures to make this choice more difficult. 
Increased conflict among legislators leads also to more confining 
procedures. McCubbins and Page's line of reasoning is as follows. Conflict 
makes it harder for a decisive coalition of legislators to narrow down the 
range of policy making functions to be delegated to the agent because the 
exclusion of some issues may lead to the break down of the coalition. 
Controversial aspects about implementation are hence deferred after the 
writing of the legislation and the agent7 s mandate remains rather large. 
There is then incentive to control agent's behavior ex-post Further, the 
political risks of taking alternative decisions increase with the level of 
conflict, therefore generating more need to direct the agent through 
procedural requirements.
To sum up, McCubbins and Page emphasize how implementation 
procedures 1) provide information to legislators in case of policy 
uncertainty and 2) control agent7s behavior when conflict among 
legislators produces a large mandate.
O perationalization
U ncertainty. The operationalization of uncertainty is the same as in 
chapter 4. A legislator is uncertain about an optimum policy action 
especially when she deals with a very complex issue. Or, alternatively, the 
complexity increases legislator's uncertainty about the policy that best 
serves her interests. Uncertainty and complexity are, in turn, related to 
specific issues within a policy rather than to the policy as a whole. Hence, 
they are operationalized using the word count of the specific act of 
secondary legislation. We should expect an increase in the length of the 
legal text to increase the likelihood of having some sort of procedural 
control as well as to increase the stringency of control.
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Level o f conflict Of the three institutions involved in the legislative 
process of the Union, one would like to measure the level of conflict 
within the most powerful one, the Council. An appropriate 
operationalization could have been the number of amendments proposed 
and rejected by the Member States. Rejection is a sign of a conflict that 
cannot be accommodated within the Council. Unfortunately, the secrecy 
surrounding the activity of this institution severely limits data availability. 
Press releases or insider views provide more information than the Official 
Journal. However, these data are unsystematic and inadequate for 
quantitative analysis. Instead, it is possible to quantify the level of conflict 
among institutions.
I have used the number of amendments that the Council approves over 
the Commission's proposals as a measure of the level of conflict between 
the Council and the Commission.4 In formulating their hypotheses, 
McCubbins and Page disregard the role and the preferences of the agent 
because of the flexibility with which American legislators can establish 
and dismantle agencies and because the latter have no legislative role. 
Since the EC pillar of the European Union confers to the agent (i.e. the 
Commission) the monopoly of initiation power, this inter-institutional 
dimension of conflict has to be considered. Further, recent works have 
shown that conflict between the legislative and the executive branch of 
government increases the political control of the agency (Epstein and 
O'Halloran, 1996; Huber et al., 1998; Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994).
4 The number of adopted amendments has been computed by comparing the final act 
published in the Official Journal with the Commission's initial or revised proposal. 
Parliamentary amendments that have been adopted by the Council have not been 
included; the role of the Parliament will be discussed in more details below. Council 
amendments that have been adopted in revised proposals have been included. 
Amendments can be classified into four categories: 1) spelling or grammar, 2) 
substantive, 3) related to policy-making functions, and 4) related to procedural 
requirements. Substantive amendments concern the change of technical details such as 
the number of tons in a tariff quota or the selection criteria for the structural funds. The 
third type of amendments concerns the delegation of policy-making functions to the 
Commission (e.g. provision of information or regulation), while the last is about the 
establishment of, for example, control procedures. I have disregarded the first type of
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The operationalization is based on the assumption that the Commission 
correctly anticipates states' preferences but it will not include in the act 
provisions of which it disapproves. It will be the Council's turn either to 
directly insert amendments or to demand amendments to be inserted in a 
revised proposal. The more conflicting the policy preferences between the 
pivotal Member State and the Commission, the larger the number of 
amendments the state will insert in the Commission's proposal. An 
increase of this number, as a measure of increased conflict, should increase 
the likelihood and stringency of control. There are on average two Council 
amendments per act in the sampled legislation, but the variance (twelve) 
is relatively large. This is because the Council has introduced more than 
ten amendments in a few cases.
The level of conflict between the Parliament on the one side and the 
Commission and the Council on the other is measured by the number of 
rejected parliamentary amendments. There is no need to assume the 
Parliament's perfect anticipation of other institutions' preferences for this 
variable. However, even in case of perfect information, failed amendments 
might be made for purposes of position taking and to signal disagreement 
(Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999). The relevance of this variable has been 
tested on a subset of cases where the Treaty provides for either a 
parliamentary opinion or a vote. About 45 percent of the sampled 
legislation fall under this category. The more conflicting the policy 
preferences between the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, the 
larger the number of parliamentary amendments that the Commission and 
the Council will reject, the more likely the legislation will contain control 
procedures. Note that this implies that the Parliament should also be 
interested in some form of procedural control especially if controversial 
aspects of the legislation have been deferred and remain at the 
Commission's discretion. This however does not mean that legislators
amendments to compute this variable. As for the other types, they are qualitatively 
different but relevant to measure the level of conflict.
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have the same preferences on the type of procedural control. Empirical 
studies emphasize the strong opposition of the Parliament to restrictive 
control procedures (Bradley, 1997; Dogan, 1997), probably because it is not 
involved in such committees. Thus, it is not appropriate to predict a 
specific direction of effect for a high level of stringency of control.5 On 
average, less than two parliamentary amendments per act have been 
rejected in the sampled legislation, but the variance (fourteen) is even 
larger than that of Council amendments.
Legislative procedures. A third categorical variable, namely legislative 
procedures, has also been used in the analysis. This is coded as a dummy 
variable using qualified majority as the reference category, while 
unanimity and the procedures where there is a parliamentary vote (i.e. co­
operation and co-decision) are the comparing categories. Although Dogan 
(1997) observes that there is a positive correlation between control 
procedures and qualified majority, my contention is that we should expect 
unanimity to be positively related to control and control stringency. This is 
because, following McCubbins and Page's argument, unanimity is more 
related to conflict than qualified majority, for two reasons. First, the 
permanence of unanimity in the Treaty is a sign of conflict among the 
Member States about the substantive content of common policies.6 In the 
Single European Act for example, the Member States switched from 
unanimity to qualified majority in those less controversial policy areas 
where they expected to benefit from future substantive decisions. 
Examples include Articles 16.3 and 16.4 SEA amending Articles 49 (ex 59) 
and 70.1 (now repealed) EC. These articles introduced qualified majority 
for the free provision of services and of establishment of third country
5 The Parliament might want control if a rejected substantive amendment gives too much 
discretion to the Commission but a rejected control amendment is certainly a sign that the 
Parliament wants less control. However, this is less of a problem in our sample since only 
1 percent of the rejected parliamentary amendments is about control procedures.
6 Note that substantive policy differences generate agreement between states about the 
permanence of unanimity or, if an act is approved, limited delegation and procedural 
control.
140
nationals and for the liberalization of capital movements. Conversely, 
unanimity still remains in contentious areas such as social security (Art. 42 
[ex 51] EC), harmonization of tax provisions (Art. 93 [ex 99] EC) and the 
general rules of the Structural Funds (A rt 161 [ex 130d] EC). Second, the 
preferences of the pivotal Member State under unanimity are, on average, 
more distant from the preferences of the Commission and other legislators 
than in case of qualified majority (cf. Crombez, 1996: 221). This means that, 
on average, we should expect more conflict from an act adopted under 
unanimity than from one adopted under qualified majority. Coalitions 
formed under qualified majority are generally more cohesive so the 
adopted legislation shows lower levels of conflict. Even in contentious 
areas such as agriculture, regulations setting guidance prices are on 
average less controversial than those reforming the Structural Funds. To 
conclude, the amendment variables described earlier measure the 
intensity of conflict at the level of the specific policy instrument, while this 
procedural variable measures the intensity of conflict at the level of the 
policy area and as result of decision rules.
When the Parliament is involved in a legislative procedure, we cannot 
predict, in principle, a clear direction of its impact on control because it 
depends on its preferences vis-a-vis the other Union institutions and on 
whether the resources provided by the procedures allow it to affect the 
policy outcome. The issue will be dealt in greater details in the section 
below.
Alternative methods of operationalization have also been used7 but those 
selected have a relatively clear theoretical basis, allow analytical
7 These include number of the Commission's proposals, number of changes and of pages 
in the Commission's proposals, number of months passed between the initial proposal 
and the publication of the act in the Official Journal, number of pages of parliamentary 
amendments, number of specific comments and of pages in European and Social 
Committee and Committee of the Regions opinions. Some these variables have been 
dropped because theoretically less relevant (e.g. ESC opinions), other because they do not 
allow a clear analytical separation between conflict and uncertainty (e.g. longer time of 
adoption may be due either to the complexity of the measure or to the conflict between
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separation between level of conflict and uncertainty and minimize, though 
insufficiently, the problem of collinearity.
Analysis of results
The hypothesis is as follows
H ypothesis 4: The likelihood o f establishing control procedures and the 
stringency o f control8 are positively  correlated w ith 1) the uncertainty 
facing Union legislators about the optim um  po licy  actions, 2) the level o f 
conflict am ong legislators and 3) the need fo r unanim ous agreem ent in  the 
Council o f M inisters.
It has been tested on a stratified sample of non-amending secondary 
legislation passed between the first of July 1987 and the first of October 
1998 (see appendix for more details). The legislation is non-amending for 
the similar reasons explained in chapter 4. Here too we need to control for 
the position of the status quo ante. The impact of conflict and uncertainty 
on the odds of procedural control should be measured for a given level of 
control ex-ante. Thus, there is no control ex-ante if we select only the first 
legislative act in a policy issue.
I employ two complementary strategies to test the hypothesis. The first 
consists of running a series of binomial logistic regressions to compute the 
odds that a specific procedure is introduced in an act, using as baseline the 
cases where there are no control procedures. The second develops an 
index of stringency of implementation control from the committee 
procedures and employs cumulative logits to estimate a general model of 
procedural control of the Commission.
Although I consider the selected measures of conflict and uncertainty the 
most appropriate to test the hypotheses, problems of collinearity are still 
present There seems to be a positive association between uncertainty and
legislators), and others (e.g. number of proposals, number of pages in opinions) because 
of strong multicollinearity.
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the level of conflict among legislators.9 A way to deal with this problem is 
to estimate models that include different independent variables. Table 5.2 
shows the coefficients in a series of binomial regressions in two models. 
The first focuses mainly on the level of conflict, operationalized with 
legislative procedures and number of Council amendments. The second 
retains the procedural variable and substitutes Council amendments with 
uncertainty.
< TABLE 5.2 HERE >
Interpreting the models with the advisory procedure is inadvisable. The 
improvement over the model fit with only the constant term is not 
significant. The models with the safeguard procedure should be 
interpreted with caution because the introduction of the procedural 
variable does not significantly increase the fit (the Goodness-of-Fit 
Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic provides similar results). There are two 
reasons for these results. First, there are few cases with safeguard and 
advisory procedures in the sample. Second, since Member States exercise 
very limited control through the advisory procedure, independent 
variables have less explanatory power in this case. The models perform 
better for the management and regulatory procedures. The variables 
significantly increase the model fit and more than 90 percent of cases are 
correctly predicted.
Level of conflict, operationalized as number of Council amendments, is 
consistently the most significant determinant in affecting the probability of 
some kind of procedural control. When the number of Council 
amendments increases from zero to two, the odds of procedural control
8 Stringency of control is operationalized and analyzed in the section below.
9 Pearson's correlation coefficient between uncertainty and Council amendments is .67 
(significant at 5 percent). It drops to .45, but it is still significant, if we eliminate five 
extreme cases. A similar result applies to the other models discussed in the chapter. 
Conversely, plots and casewise listing of residuals have shown no evidence of 
heteroscedaticity.
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increases, on average, by a factor of two (ceteris paribus). That is, the 
probability of procedural control increases by more than two percent 
(more than four in case of the regulatory procedure). If we move along the 
whole spectrum of values that this variable takes, it is almost certain that 
we will have some sort of procedural control. With an increase from zero 
to 16, we have an increase of a hefty 93 percent in the probability of having 
a regulatory committee, 84 percent a safeguard and 66 percent a 
management committee.10
The model incorporating uncertainty performs well; though somewhat 
less convincingly, at least in term of statistical significance. When the 
length of the act increases by five hundred words (say, from an act setting 
a customs tariff to one administrating a quota), the odds of procedural 
control increases by a factor of three (ceteris paribus). The probability that 
there will be some sort of procedural control increases by more than three 
percent (almost five in case of the regulatory procedure). If there is a need 
to adopt complex environmental legislation (say, with an increase of two 
thousand words), the probability of having control to no control increases 
by 22 percent for the management committee, 66 for regulatory and 75 for 
safeguard.11
Finally, at least for the management procedure and, partially, for the 
regulatory one, the proposition that unanimity leads to more control 
seems validated. Ceteris paribus, the use of unanimity compared to 
qualified majority increases by more than 40 percent the chance of 
procedural control in the form of a management committee (more than 
twenty percent for regulatory).12 More difficult to interpret is the result
10 These are estimated probabilities using as baseline no control, that is they reflect the 
odds as the ratio of probability of the existence of the specific type of committee control 
to the probability that there will be no control. Moving from 0 to 16, the odds are 61 for 
management, 665 for regulatory and 290 for safeguard.
11 With an increase of two thousand words, the odds are 11 for management, 81 for 
regulatory and 330 for safeguard.
12 This result is also confirmed if we use a dichotomous variable for qualified majority 
and unanimity, leaving aside the role of the Parliament. For the management committee,
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from the second variable of legislative procedures. Although only for the 
regulatory committee, the presence of a parliamentary vote increases the 
probability of this type of control by more than 35 compared to qualified 
majority (ceteris paribus). This result seems to be at odds with the 
empirical evidence on the control preferences of the Parliament (Bradley, 
1992, 1997; Dogan, 1997). However, this is not necessarily the case. There 
is evidence demonstrating that the relation between control and 
parliamentary vote is spurious because this institution votes on legislation 
where the average word count and number of Council amendments are 
more than double the respective averages, in the subset of cases used for 
this regression.13
In effect, the hypothesis is validated if we look at the subset of cases where 
the Treaty provides for a parliamentary opinion or vote. Table 5.3 shows 
the coefficients of the binomial regressions for the management and 
regulatory committees. Here, the number of rejected parliamentary 
amendments substitutes, as a measure of the level of conflict, Council 
amendments. While the procedural variable is a dummy taking 1 for 
unanimity and 0 for qualified majority.
<TABLE 5.3 HERE>
The model performs well too. The log-likelihood and the goodness-of-fit 
ratios show significant improvement of the model fit. Further, 79 and 93 
percent of the cases are correctly predicted.
At least for the management committee, unanimity still remains a relevant 
determinant of control. Ceteris paribus, it increases the chance of the
the coefficients for unanimity are 2.9491 and 3.0428 for models 1 and 2 respectively. Both 
are significant at 5 percent level.
13 The correlation coefficients between Parliament and level of conflict and between 
Parliament and uncertainty are .35 and .30, both significant at 1 percent. To confirm this 
spurious relation, Dogan (1997) observes that 50 percent of all legislation enacted under 
co-operation and co-decision have committee control but the Parliament still objects to it. 
Same considerations apply for the analysis of the models in Table 5.4.
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establishment of a management committee, compared to qualified 
majority, by more than 45 percent. The variable measuring the level of 
conflict between the Parliament and the other Union institutions performs 
well, especially in case of the regulatory committee. Ceteris paribus, an 
increase of two rejected parliamentary amendments increases the 
probability of management control by 2 percent and the probability of 
regulatory control by 14 percent. An increase across the whole range of 
values for this variable (i.e. from zero to 20) improves the chance of 
management and regulatory control by 77 and 85 percent respectively.
To conclude, the relation between conflict and control is confirmed. Any 
type of operationalization we have used (procedural, Council and 
Parliament amendments) substantially increases the chance of some sort of 
procedural control in the majority of models studied. Uncertainty also has 
a relevant impact on control, though somewhat less convincingly. As a 
matter of fact, if we substitute uncertainty for Parliament conflict in Table 
5.3, this variable is statistically relevant only for the management 
committee. Thus, the constraining function of comitology is at least as 
important as the informational one.
So far we used the cases where there is no control as the baseline category 
and formulated statements in comparison with this category. We cannot 
say, for instance, that an increase of conflict and uncertainty leads to an 
increase in the stringency of control. However, since the dependent 
variable can be operationalized as an ordinal index it is possible to test 
whether there is a monotonically positive relation between control 
stringency on the one side and conflict and uncertainty on the other.
Stringency of procedural control: operationalization and results
O perationalization
An index of stringency of implementation control has been created 
according to two criteria of diminishing importance: 1) rank of political
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actors exercising control and 2) decision rule for referral to the Council.14 
First, the higher the rank of the political actor exercising control, the more 
constrained is the Commission. An implementation measure that has to be 
approved by the Council, without the intercession of a committee of 
national experts, becomes politically more visible. It is more likely to be 
put under scrutiny by the actors involved. Consequently the Commission 
is more careful in exercising its delegated powers. In a sense, I assume that 
visibility decreases the Commission's autonomy in implementation. It is 
for this reason that I assign to the advisory committee procedure a higher 
value than that in the case of no control, reserving the highest value for the 
safeguard committee procedure. For the latter case, this can also be 
justified by the different nature of the game. The traditional gatekeeping 
role played by the national experts is absent in safeguard procedures. 
Steunenberg (1996) has shown that the discretion enjoyed by the agent is 
largest when a gatekeeper is involved in the game, as opposed to when 
only veto players are present.
The second criterion to generate the stringency index is the decision rule 
used in the committee to refer the measure to the Council (see second 
column in Table 5.1). The more demanding this rule, the less likely a 
measure is referred to the Council, and the less likely is to become visible 
and to be scrutinized strictly by ministers. For this reason, control by the 
management committee is less stringent than control by the regulatory 
committee because in the former a qualified majority is needed for referral 
to the Council, while in the latter, a blocking minority suffices. Similarly, 
there is no possibility of referral in the advisory committee, so very limited 
procedural control is granted to other actors. The advisory committee 
procedure is the least strict.
14 A more sophisticated index that differentiates among procedural variants using the 
other two criteria (i.e. timing of control and default condition in case of Council inaction, 
the last two columns in Table 5.1) has also been used. I have kept the simpler version 
because it produces similar results.
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Following these criteria, the index takes the value of one if a legislative act 
contains no implementation procedures, two if there is an advisory 
committee procedure, three, four and five for the management, regulatory 
and safeguard procedures respectively. The degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by the Commission is inversely related to this index.
M ethodology and results
As suggested by Agresti (1990), I have employed a cumulative logit model 
that uses ordered dependent variables (control stringency) and forms 
logits of cumulative probabilities (see appendix for more details). Table 5.4 
illustrates the results for the three models including a) the level of conflict 
with the Council, b) uncertainty and c) the level of conflict with the 
Parliament (in the subset of cases where there is a parliamentary vote or 
opinion). The models have been separated for problems of collinearity„ 
The coefficients determine the cumulative probability of increasing 
stringency of procedural control in the J -  1 categories of the index (J is 
number of ordered categories).
< TABLE 5.4 HERE>
The models perform well in terms of goodness-of-fit, likelihood ratio and 
percentage of cases correctly predicted (between 84 and 90 percent). Only 
the last step of the models, which measure the cumulative probability of 
safeguard control over the other types of control procedure, does not 
significantly improve the model fit. This is due to the limited number of 
cases in the sample and to the fact that safeguard procedures are 
predominantly used in specific circumstances, such as market disruptions 
and health and safety risks, that may make them independent from 
conflict and uncertainty.
Step 1 of the models predicts the formation of any control committee, 
disregarding the type of control. I will interpret this step conjointly with
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the others because there is not much difference. The most important 
discrepancy between these models and the previous ones is that 
unanimity loses a certain degree of statistical significance for the benefit of 
conflict and uncertainty, which are significant at 1 percent confidence level 
in almost all steps. Substantively, unanimity still tends to increase, ceteris 
paribus, the chance of increasing control by more than 40 percent but this 
is limited to lower degrees of control stringency. At step 3 of the models, 
this value is insignificant.
The level of conflict, in the form of Council amendments, and uncertainty 
perform statistically and substantively better than in Table 5.2, especially 
for medium to low variations. Ceteris paribus, an increase of two Council 
amendments increases the chance of more confining control by more than 
7 percent (more than 4 in step 3) and an increase of five hundred words 
augments it by 8 percent (more than 6 in step 3). Two rejected 
parliamentary amendments lead to an almost 15 percent increase in the 
probability of stricter control (more than 6 in step 3). Given the 
Parliament's aversion to very restrictive procedures, the lower significance 
of the coefficient at step 3 can be a sign that the acceptance of 
parliamentary amendments is traded for stricter control.
A way to interpret these results more generally could be as follows. 
Unanimity increases the chance of some sort of procedural control. Thus, 
it more likely determines w hether there will be control. The level of 
conflict and uncertainty are more important determinants of how  m uch 
control there should be, since they show a clearer monotonically positive 
relation with stringency of control. Taken separately, the impact of conflict 
and uncertainty is confirmed. The likelihood that a restrictive committee is 
preferred to a permissive one increases as either uncertainty of, or the 
level of conflict among, Union legislators deepens. To the extent that 
unanimity measures conflict, the stringency of procedural control is 
positively correlated to the level of conflict and  uncertainty. Again, this
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conclusion reinforces the control function of comitology vis-a-vis the mere 
informational one.
A final tes t ex-ante discretion and procedural control
The instruments of political control of the bureaucracy are numerous.
They include political appointments, changing budgets, ex-ante statutory
control and ex-post monitoring. They vary in term of efficacy and cost
Little we know however about the interaction between these tools and
how different institutional contexts affect the choice of instruments of
control.15
The literature does however suggest that ex-ante statutory constraint and 
ex-post control are substitutes. The assertion emerges from the works of 
McCubbins and Page, but it has been better formalised by Bawn (1997; see 
also Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994). Whatever the institutional and 
political factors that induce politicians to choose different levels of 
statutory control and ex-post oversight, the two choices are related. For 
Bawn (1997: 112), 'an increase in any exogenous factor that increases 
marginal benefits of oversight or a decrease in any exogenous factor that 
decreases marginal costs of oversight will lead to a lower ideal level of 
statutory control' and viceversa. I (2000) suggest that the institutional 
framework of the Union leads to extensive ex-ante discretion and stringent 
control procedures because of the monopoly power of legislative initiation 
of the Commission.
To sum up, this section tests the following hypothesis:
H ypothesis 5: Ex-ante sta tutory discretion is  p o sitively  correlated w ith the 
stringency o f procedural control.
15 Exceptions include Wood and Waterman (1991) that compared the efficacy of the 
different instruments and Spulber and Besanko (1992) that formally analyse the 
interaction between appointment, statutory constraints and oversight. However, both 
focus on the American institutional system. The first attempts to extend the analysis 
outside the US are by Huber and Shipan (forthcoming) and by Huber and Shipan and 
Pfahler (1998).
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A nalysis o f results
We use the operationalization of stringency of control developed in this 
chapter and that of ex-ante statutory discretion developed in chapter 4. I 
have run both Spearman and Kendall bootstrapped rank correlation tests16 
and results are shown in Table 5.5.
They confirm the positive correlation between the degree of ex-ante 
executive discretion and the severity of procedural control. Both statistics 
convincingly reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. The Kendall S has 
no substantive meaning, while the Spearman test shows a strong 
increasing monotonic relation between discretion and control. The mean 
bootstrapped value of r9 is 0.99, in case of perfect relation r9 equals one.
< TABLE 5.5 HERE >
To conclude, the substitution effect suggested by Bawn is confirmed. 
When the Member States decide to delegate extensive statutory autonomy 
to the Commission, they also establish rather confining procedures of 
oversight.
Conclusion
As reviewed in chapter 2, the majority of the studies on the subject 
supports the thesis that comitology committees are established to reduce 
the uncertainty facing Union legislators. This chapter partially confirms i t  
Committees provide information with the production of detailed rules 
and the coordination of equilibrium selection. They essentially perform an 
efficiency-enhancing role by reducing the many information asymmetries 
that legislators encounter when drafting legislation.
However, this seems to be a prevailing view in some cases. In its report on 
the comitology system, the Institut fur Europaische Politik observes that 
'Commission officials generally do not think that their committee
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significantly reduced the Commission's freedom, and even less that it has 
been set up to assure the member states' control' (quoted from Majone, 
1996: 73). Joerges and Neyer (1997a: 279) add that 'the agenda of 
committees is dominated by the Commission. Its room for maneuver is by 
no means substantially constrained by the shadow of majority voting 
which the Council included in its legislative acts'. If committees are 
operationally innocuous, why is it that more conflictual policy issues are 
invariably linked to their establishment? Although we cannot incorporate 
the level of conflict based on amendments and uncertainty in the same 
model, to the extent that unanimity measures conflict we have certainly to 
reject the hypothesis that they perform only an informational role. 
Moreover, the level of conflict seems to have a clearer impact than 
uncertainty on the likelihood of establishing some sort of procedural 
control. Thus, these committees are also established to structurally induce 
specific policy outcomes and, as a result, to constrain the Commission's 
executive discretion. The few referrals are probably a sign of the 
Commission's ability to anticipate the Member States' preferences. 
Further, the preference of the Union institutions towards these procedures 
is not only the result of the general inter-institutional balance, but also of 
the substantive issue-specific conflict among legislators.
These results have other three broader implications. First, the general 
factors that affect the control of bureaucrats by legislators do not differ 
across political systems. The conflict of interest between the Council and 
the Commission (i.e. Council amendments) increases the likelihood of 
establishing control procedures in the Union. Similarly, Epstein and 
(THalloran (1996; see also Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994) show how the 
US Congress increases administrative control of the executive branch 
during times of divided government. An interesting area of future 
research is to study how the institutional framework of the Union affects 
the choice of instruments for controlling the bureaucracy (e.g. ex-ante
16 See appendix to chapter 4 for details on bootstrapping.
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statutory control vs. ex-post oversight, see Bawn, 1997; Franchino, 2000; 
Huber et al., 1998) and the trade-off between political control and 
informational gains of delegation (Bawn, 1995).
Second, for European integration scholars, this study suggests that, if the 
Member States are disadvantaged by informational asymmetries or 
bureaucratic shirking, they show significant inventiveness in devising 
institutions that provide information and control the Commission. 
Although this chapter does not address the effectiveness of these 
committees, states seem well equipped to deal with uncertainty and 
unforeseen circumstances and to control the execution of Union policies, 
particularly where the national representatives are perfect agents of their 
governments.
Finally, under which conditions should we expect greater supranational 
bureaucratic input (or drift) into the process of integration? Combining the 
results of chapter 4 and 5, the use of qualified majority seems to be the 
most favourable factor, especially if only the Commission is in charge of 
implementation, because it increases ex-ante statutory discretion and 
reduces the likelihood of procedural control. Policy uncertainty increases 
both discretion and the likelihood of control. Preference convergence 
decreases the likelihood of control but does not affect discretion. However, 
the fact that the stringency of control is associated with broader discretion 
invites a note of caution about the existence of a Commission-led 
bureaucratic d rift
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APPENDIX
Population and sample characteristics
The population extends that of chapter 4 to all non-amending secondary 
legislation based on a Treaty article and adopted between July 1987 and 
September 1998 (1372 regulations and directives). The sample includes 1 
case with the advisory procedure, 7 with management, 18 with regulatory 
and 3 with safeguard (a Z-test rejects the hypothesis of a significant 
difference between sample and population proportions). See the appendix 
in chapter 4 for comments on sources and sampling strategy.
The cumulative logit model
The cumulative logit model is a special case of the multinomial logit 
model. It has been used because stringency of control is an ordinal 
variable. The model allows us to incorporate the ordering of this variable 
in the construction of the logits, which are formed by cumulative 
probabilities. From Agresti (1990: 321), the cumulative logits are defined 
as
' " I ' 1 ’ - 1'
where J is the number of categories of the ordinal variable (5 in our case) 
and 7cj is the probability at value x  of the independent variables that a case 
is from the jth category. Logits of conditional probabilities are generated 
computing J-l ordinary binomial regressions, re-coding cases for 
increasing values of the ordinal index. The likelihood-ratio and goodness- 
of-fit of the model has been computed by summing up the ratios of each 
binomial regression. This separate fitting of the model can be less efficient 
than simultaneous fitting, however Begg and Gray (1984) observe that 
inefficiency is reduced if there is a natural baseline category or if the 
number of cases in such category is large. The cumulative logit starts with 
no control as the baseline category, which fits both conditions. Thus the 
inefficiency of the estimators is limited.
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Alternative methods to incorporate ordinal response variables are the 
continuation-ratio and adjacent-categories logit models (Agresti, 1990: 318- 
21). Although their results are similar, they perform slightly worse than 
the cumulative logit because, while cumulative logits uses all J categories, 
these models exclude, at a certain point, the baseline or other categories. 
An alternative functional form to the logit, multinomial probit, requires 
the assumption of a normal distribution of the cumulative density 
function, which in our case is not warranted (Lawrence and Arshadi, 1995; 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 1998). Finally, the assumption of multinomial logit 
models about the independence of irrelevant alternatives17 is appropriate 
in cumulative logit models for ordinal responses because the logistic 
regressions estimate the probability of choice between more or less 
strictness of control, which is independent from other alternatives.
17 The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumes that each alternative is 
independent from alternatives rather than the reference category, otherwise we might 
risk to over- or underestimate probabilities (McFadden, 1984).
Table 5.1. Dimensions of Council control 
in the comitology procedures
Dimensions 
Procedures^ ^
Referral
rule
Timing o f 
control
Default
condition
Advisory
No referral, 
committee opinion 
only
Before 
Commission’s 
measurea
Commission’s 
measurea
Management 
variant a Qualified
majority
After 
Commission’s 
measure b Commission’s
measureManagement 
variant b
Before
Commission’s
measure
Regulatory 
variant a Blocking
minority
Before
Commission’s
measure
Commission’s
measure
Regulatory 
variant b
Commission’s 
measure (simple 
majority can reinstate 
status quo ante)
Safeguard 
variant a No committee, 
always referral
Before 
Commission’s 
measurec
Commission’s
measure
Safeguard 
variant b
Status quo ante
Notes: The Council adopts, amends or rejects the Commission’s measure by qualified majority, 
rejection is by simple majority in regulatory variant b.
* Timing of committee control and default in case of committee inaction
b The Commission may defer the application of a measure until the Council decides.
c For safeguard variant a, secondary legislation may specify control to take place after adoption
Figure 5.1. Incidence of comitology procedures
in non-amending legislation, 1987-98
Number of
acts 169 314 28 52 8 9 115 7 609 20 2 2 26 11
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
I
J ’ .< / * &  -j? & J?
J> <o GU 4 ^ -
0?  < /
□ No control
H Advisory
H Management
Regulatory
m Safeguard
Policy’ area
Notes: The total number o f  acts is 1372. Less than 3 percent (i.e. 41 acts) has two types of procedural control. 
Both have been accounted for, so this figure slightly overestimates the incidence of control.
Source: CELEX database and Official Journal of the European Communities.
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Table 5.2. Binomial logistic regressions for the comitology
procedures and for the two hypotheses
Variables Advisory Management Regulatory Safeguard
Constant
Legislative procedure 
Unanimity
Parliament
Conflict
Uncertainty
Number of casesc 
Degrees of freedom 
Log-likelihood ratio 
Goodness-of-frt 
% Correctly predicted
Model 1 Model 2
-4.5196 -4.4456
-5.2997 -4.3037
(-.09) (-.07)
_ d _ d
.5389
(.70)
.0007
(.21)
72 72
69 69
10.27 10.32
54.56 64.45
98.51 98.51
Model 1 Model 2 
-3.3018 -3.4850
3.1572b 3.2458b
(2.32) (2.35)
1.7192 1.7084
(1.25) (1.25)
.2566b 
(2 .11)
,0012c
(2.00)
78 78
75 75
34.26 34.88
72.62 82.28
93.53 93.59
Model 1 Model 2 
-3.2814 -3.6423
2.0530 2.5105c
(1.50) (1.87)
2.8988® 3.2239®
(2.98) (3.34)
.4062®
(3.48)
.0022®
(3.14)
89 89
86 86
44.56 47.18
91.71 98.06
92.13 92.13
Model 1 Model 2 
-3.8209 -4.6373
-6.4447 -6.7317
(-.06) (-.07)
-6.9879 -7.8351
( .10) (-.12)
.3543b
(2.32)
.0029c
(1.93)
74 74
71 71
20.01 21.18
71.51 73.66
97.30 95.95
Notes: t-ratios in brackets 
■ p < .01, two-tailed test 
b p < .05, two-tailed test 
'  p <. 10, two-tailed test
d There are no cases in the sample where the Parliament is involved
e This value sums up the number of cases without control and of those with the relevant control procedure (see Appendix)
Table 5.3. Binomial logistic regressions with parliamentary conflict
for the management and regulatory procedures
Variables Management Regulatory
Constant -3.3622 -1.7500
Legislative procedure 
Unanimity 3.3757b 1.6290
(2.02) (1.12)
Conflict with Parliament .2393° .4113a
(1.86) (2.69)
Number of cases 27 38
Degrees of freedom 24 35
Log-likelihood ratio 12.69 35.34
Goodness-of-fit 32.65 39.16
% Correctly predicted 92.59 78.95
Notes:
Subset of 44 cases where parliamentary opinion or vote is requested
(6 with management, 17 with regulatory control)
t-ratios in brackets
* p < .01, two-tailed test
b p < .05, two-tailed test
c p <. 10, two-tailed test
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Table 5.4. Cumulative logit model of procedural control stringency
Variables Increasing stringency of ex post controld
Model a (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -2.2048 -2.3392 -2.7920 -3.7132
Legislative procedure Number of cases 100
Unanimity 2.2512c 2.3481° 1.1600 -7.4547 Degrees of freedom 388
(1.87) (1.95) (1.18) (-.11) Log-likelihood ratio 237.72
Parliament 2.3866a 2.4891® 2.5090® -7.2683 Goodness-of-fit 372.51
(2.68) (2.78) (2.09) (-.15) % Correctly predicted 90.25
Conflict .3315® .3407® .3030® .1596
(3.47) (3.54) (3.67) (1.49)
Model b
Constant -2.4580 -2.5940 -2.7998 -3.5785
Legislative procedure Number of cases 100
Unanimity 2.5552b 2.6517b 1.3203 -7.3407 Degrees of freedom 388
(2.13) (2.20) (1.33) (-.11) Log-likelihood ratio 253.63
Parliament 2.5758® 2.6733® 2.6301® -7.1879 Goodness-of-fit 378.33
(2.94) (3.04) (3.31) (-.15) % Correctly predicted 89.25
Uncertainty .0017® .0017® .0013® .0005
(2.83) (2.83) (3.25) (.71)
Model c e
Constant -1.3247 -1.5319 -1.2228 -3.8621
Legislative procedure Number of cases 44
Unanimity 1.9558 2.1459° .2441 -6.7763 Degrees of freedom 164
(1.53) (1.66) (.24) (-.10) Log-likelihood ratio 145.6'
Conflict with Parliament .3709® .3947® . 1687b .0629 Goodness-of-fit 171.0:
(2.58) (2.68) (2.19) (.38) % Correctly predicted 83.52
Notes: t-ratios in brackets 
* p < .01, two-tailed test 
b p < .05, two-tailed test 
c p < . 10, two-tailed test
d Single digits in brackets stand for the J-l cumulative logits measuring increasing stringency (see Appendix) 
e Subset of cases where parliamentary opinion or vote is requested
Table 5.5. Rank correlation tests between ex-ante discretion and procedural control 
and 95 percent endpoints of the null hypothesis
Test Statistics *
Spearman r, .99
Kendall S 605.4
Number of cases 100
Percentile
a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
-.00005 .00003 *
-23.4 22.6 *
Bias Corrected
a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
-.00005 .00003 *
-36.4 16.6 *
Percentile-tb
a/2 1 - a/2 sign.
-.00005 .00004 *
-25.1 22.7 *
Note: * a  < .05 double tailed significance level of the statistics.
‘Bootstrapped z-statistics’ for co-graduation are computed using the standard error estimated 
with the bootstrapped sampling distribution (see Mooney and Duval, 1993:35).
They are not reported to simplify the table but they are available from the author.
* Mean bootstrapped values
b This interval has been computed taking 50 resamples per each resample
C on clu sion
The Commission can affect the trajectory of European integration because 
it can strategically use its formal powers, especially the monopoly of 
legislative initiation, to pursue its objective, namely broad executive 
discretion. This outcome is more likely 1) when qualified majority is used 
in the Council and 2) when only the Commission is in charge of 
implementation. There are three other relevant factors. First, the 
Commission has used informational advantages and a longer time horizon 
than that of Union legislators to reach its objectives. Second, if Union 
legislators are uncertain about the optimum course of policy actions, they 
tend to delegate broader discretion, but also to establish stricter 
procedural control. Third, limited conflict amongst legislators decreases 
the likelihood of procedural control. However, a final caveat about the 
actual degree of executive discretion of the Commission is advisable 
because broader discretion correlates positively with the stringency of 
control.
In this conclusion, I summarize the hypotheses, the findings and the 
problems I have encountered whilst applying theories of bureaucratic and 
executive politics to the European Union. I also consider the challenges 
facing those scholars interested in pursuing this research strategy. I 
conclude by suggesting how this thesis has contributed to the European 
Union and the more general political science literature.
The preferences of the Commission: the preeminence of bureau-shaping 
The rational choice literature makes different assumptions about what 
drives bureaucratic behavior. Chapter 3 tests and compares two of such 
strands of literature. The classical work of Niskanen (1971) about budget- 
maximizing bureaucrats is compared with Dunleavy7 s (1985, 1991) 
contribution. This suggests that budget-maximization is more likely in 
delivery agencies at the early stages of development and focuses on the
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programme and bureau components of the agency budget In other types 
of agencies, such as regulatory or control ones, bureaucrats hold bureau- 
shaping preferences that consist of innovative work tasks, managerial 
discretion and broad scope of activities.
Bureaucratic preferences of the Commission are tested across the twenty- 
year development of the competition and regional policies of the Union. 
Agency type and stage of development have been found as being relevant 
factors guiding bureaucratic preferences. Budgetary preferences 
selectively focus both on the delivery component of the agency and on the 
bureau and programme components of the budget. They are also more 
intense at the early stages of development. However, there is no sign of 
budget-related preferences dominating work-related ones. The latter are 
present in both agencies and tend to persist over time. Circumstances that 
facilitate the pursuit of the Commission's objectives include longer time 
horizons, informational advantages and the strategic use of its executive 
instruments.
The case study approach has the obvious problem of generalization. Do 
these results apply to all policies and administrative departments of the 
European Union? This should be an area of interesting future research. 
The research design also needs improving. We need to focus more of our 
attention on those cases where bureaucratic motivations are clearly 
mutually exclusive in order to assess the Commission's true underlying 
preferences. And, we need to fine-tune our understanding of the specific 
circumstances that are favorable for the Commission. For instance, the 
impact of information asymmetries needs to be controlled for time 
horizons and cost of no-agreement to assess its true relevance. As I have 
found out, these exercises are rigged by problems of scarcity of clear and 
well-controlled empirical examples. Nevertheless, they are stimulating 
challenges for the academic community.
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The facilitating factors: uncertainly, decision rules and policy types 
Legislators delegate policy-making functions to their agents for 
informational and credibility reasons. For instance, monitoring compliance 
is an especially important activity delegated to the Commission. Although 
these are the underlying reasons, there are more factors that determine the 
exact extent of the executive discretion delegated to the Commission. I 
have used the literature on executive politics and a formal model of the 
Union legislative politics to enlist four variables that shape discretion. In 
his seminal work, McCubbins (1985) suggests that the uncertainty facing 
legislators about policy actions is an important determ inant The formal 
model limits this relation to cases of non-amending legislation because of 
the Commission's monopoly power of initiation. A similar limitation 
applies to the second facilitating factor, namely the convergence of 
preferences between the pivotal legislator and the agent This variable has 
been originally suggested by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989). The legislative 
procedures of the Union also play a role. Proposition 1 of the formal 
model suggests that the discretion delegated to the Commission is larger 
in case of qualified majority than unanimity. The chapter considers other 
institutional and procedural variables, such as the role of the Parliament in 
the co-operation procedure and of the opinions issued by the Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. Finally, I add a fourth variable. 
Some types of Union policies require extensive involvement of national 
administrations dining implementation. In these cases, as in federal states, 
the top bureaucratic tier of government is relatively more constrained in 
implementation.
I have used statistical analysis to assess the significance of these variables 
in chapter 4 .1 have applied bootstrapped regression analysis to a stratified 
sample of non-amending legislation. Legislators' uncertainty and policy 
types are significant determinants of the Commission's executive 
discretion. The impact of formal decision rules is debatable, but formal or
164
informal unanimity diminishes discretion relative to qualified majority. 
Finally, other variables do not play a significant role.
Statistical analysis is certainly not immune to problems. The 
operationalization of discretion, uncertainty and preference distribution is 
open to debate. A more condensed operationalization of the discretion 
variable and an alternative approach to uncertainty would be welcome. 
The poor performance of the preference variable is of concern, given its 
primacy in formal modeling. In this case, a detailed and issue-specific data 
set about the preferences of legislators would be of great support for fine­
grained quantitative analyses of the Union legislative politics.1 This would 
also help increasing the sample size and probably avoid the use of 
demanding, though rigorous, bootstrapping procedures. Finally, the 
Parliament is the emerging legislative institution in the Union. Its role in 
the different legislative procedures needs more detailed and rigorous 
investigation. The analysis should also be extended to amending 
legislation.
We have hence a methodological, an empirical and an analytical challenge 
ahead. I reserve further comments on formal modeling and decision rules 
to the section below.
The constraining factors: the committee procedures
When they delegate, legislators create to themselves a control problem. 
They need to minimize the losses arising from opportunistic behavior of 
the administrative agent. A common theme in the literature on legislative 
politics is the design of administrative procedures to control 
implementation.
Union legislators face similar problems and find similar solutions. They 
have designed a system of control procedures, named comitology, that 
oversee the implementation of the Union policies by the Commission. Two
1 This has already been done with respect to the EU voters (Commission of the EC, 19%) 
and party system (Hix and Lord, 1997).
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factors lead to the establishment of these procedures and increase the 
stringency of control. McCubbins (1985) and McCubbins and Page (1987) 
suggest uncertainty of and level of conflict among legislators. I have 
added a procedural variable, namely unanimity in the Council, as another 
measure of conflict. Chapter 5 tests also whether there is positive 
correlation between executive discretion and the stringency of procedural 
control, as suggested by Bawn (1997).
Statistical analysis has been employed also in this case, using a similar 
sample and techniques such logistic regression and co-graduation tests. 
Uncertainty, conflict and unanimity rule are significant factors for the 
establishment of control procedures. Conflict and uncertainty are also 
relevant variables determining the degree of control stringency. The 
literature on these committees emphasizes their role as arenas producing 
information to coordinate and standardize implementation. These results 
reassert their control function, since procedures are established also as a 
result of substantive issue-specific conflict among legislators. Finally, 
discretion is significantly correlated with the stringency of control. 
Operationalization has probably caused the problems of collinearity that I 
encountered in this chapter. Improvement on this front is needed. The 
conflict variable relies on assumptions about perfect anticipation of 
preferences by the Commission that is not always warranted empirically. 
Although it may be a very difficult task, amendments should be divided 
between those related to conflict and those to information asymmetry. As 
mentioned above, the role of the Parliament in the different legislative 
procedures needs more attention, especially with reference to its impact 
on the establishment of control procedures. Others variables, such as 
whether the legislative act in question distributes financial funds, might be 
of relevance too but need theoretical grounding. A last challenge is a 
controlled qualitative analysis of these committees to assess the relative 
importance of their informational and constraining functions.
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The contribution to the study of the European Union 
In this thesis I have argued that the intergovem m entalist focus on Treaty- 
amending negotiations provides a partial view of European integration. 
The process is ultimately driven by the implementation of the Union 
policies. As the policy space expands, integration can follow many 
trajectories and supranational institutions can play an important part. 
Analyzing why they play this role, their preferences and the conditions 
facilitating the achievement of their objectives is a primary task for 
students of the European Union.
This study also contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of the 
delegation of policy-making functions to the Commission. It has provided 
a detailed and theoretically grounded list of the variables that affect the 
Commission's executive discretion at the operational level. The 
underlying motives for delegation, namely information and credibility, are 
not negated. Increased uncertainty remains a key factor leading to broader 
discretion. I have no knowledge however that this has been empirically 
demonstrated in a quantitative analysis and applied to the operational 
level of the Union. The impact of decision rules is a consequence of Treaty 
negotiations. The maintenance of unanimity in some policies means that 
Member States w ant limited legislative and executive intervention. Again, 
this has not been shown either formally or (with its limits) empirically. 
Level of implementation is an additional interesting factor that is not 
mentioned by the intergovernmentalist literature. An extension of the 
formal model (Franchino, 2000) provides hypotheses about amending 
legislation whose test should further our understanding of delegation.
The second argument of the thesis is the abandonment of the 
neofunctionalist emphasis on unintended consequences and a 
reevaluation of its (unnoticed) link to bureaucratic politics and 
information asymmetries. Certainly, the Commission is 'the engine of 
integration' as neofunctionalists broadly put i t  Its tendency to enlarge the 
Union agenda is not in question. However, we should not ignore the fact
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that this institution holds a complex set of preferences whose theoretical 
foundations vary. Some are substantive, others are related to the level of 
government, and still others are related to the bureaus' functions and 
budgets. This thesis has used theories of bureaucratic behavior to analyze 
the latter two types of preferences. The exercise adds rigor to the analysis 
of the Commission. It is more detailed about the circumstances under 
which the Commission is likely to hold certain types of preferences. For 
instance, chapter 3 highlights the importance of agency type, the 
composition of the bureau budget and the stage of policy development. 
The combination of these factors with facilitating variables (e.g. 
information asymmetry and long time horizons) explains why some 
policies were designed in a certain way. The study of the Commission's 
aggregate behavior is a difficult task. Nevertheless, the disaggregation into 
component parts helps the analysis of this complex institution.
I have not concealed my appreciation for the formal models of the Union 
legislative politics, the so-called in stitu tiona list literature. My thesis has 
built on these models by formalizing the Commission's executive 
preferences and deriving testable propositions. This is a first small step 
toward a better understanding of the Union executive politics and, 
ultimately, of European integration. The core of the argument integrates 
the conditions facilitating bureaucratic drift (i.e. uncertainty, qualified 
majority and Union-level implementation) with those increasing the 
likelihood of procedural control (i.e. uncertainty, conflict and unanimity). 
It is across this complicated set of variables that integration proceeds and 
the kernel of the Union executive politics operates. My contribution 
consists in the identification and testing of these conditions. In the process, 
I have reasserted the control function of comitology against a literature 
predominantly emphasizing its informational role. I have also highlighted 
the correlation between discretion and control.
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The contribution to political science
This thesis should be seen as an encouragement and an invitation. The 
encouragement goes to EU students to abandon a sterile su i generis 
characterization of the Union. This is not only because the best work that 
has been produced in the last years has done so, but also because they are 
likely to be surprised by the explanatory power of classical political 
science theories. Similar applications to other international institutions 
should also be encouraged. The invitation goes to non-EU specialists to 
consider the Union as a valuable area for extending comparative analysis 
and carrying out cumulative research.
Whether analyzed from a comparative politics or international relations 
perspective, the Union should be no different. The same methods and 
theories can be applied. Chapter 3 has extended the domestic focus of the 
literature on bureaucratic preferences to the Union. Similar variables, such 
as information asymmetry and time horizons, operate in a similar way. 
These results are comparable with work on national administrations and 
open to advances in the study of bureaucracies. Students interested in how 
different institutions assist bureaucrats in reaching their objectives should 
consider the Union as a candidate of comparative analysis. Further, 
officials in other international institutions might show a similar pattern of 
behavior. Chapters 4 and 5 have extended to the Commission the 
executive politics literature on the factors that determine the discretion 
and control of an administrative agent Uncertainty, preferences and 
decision rules are relevant also at the Union level. Comparativists that 
study how institutions affect the choice of instruments for controlling the 
bureaucracy and the trade-off between control and informational gains of 
delegation should consider the Union as a potential case study. This work 
could also be extended to other international institutions to the extent that 
they have been delegated policy-making functions.
The thesis has also shown formal modeling as a way to rigorously distill 
the relations between dependent and independent variables. If
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appropriately designed, models do not lack empirical validity. Further, 
the rejection of other institutional and procedural variables in chapter 4 
suggests that models do focus on the essence of political processes. 
Certainly, more work is needed both formally (by relaxing their 
assumptions) and empirically to test their validity. Further, the 
significance of informal decision rules, as shown in chapter 4, invites 
formal theorists to take a closer look at the causal relevance of norms.
In sum, this thesis has contributed to political science by extending the 
national focus of theories of bureaucratic and executive politics to the 
European Union. The central tenets of those theories apply also to an 
institutionalized system of international governance that lacks the classical 
features of statehood. There is ample room for further research by 
applying this analysis to other international institutions or employing 
other theories to understand these institutions, and by extending the set of 
case studies for national comparitivists. The thesis has also shown that 
formal modeling, used with the necessary caveats and motivated by 
empirical inquiry, is a powerful instrument for political research.
The European Union can have a direct or indirect impact on the livelihood 
of almost 400 million people, and beyond. The Commission, as its 
bureaucratic and executive branch, is at its center. These institutions 
deserve unbiased, systematic and structured analysis that goes beyond 
short-term political rhetoric. Political science offers an array of theories 
and instruments to carry out such a demanding task. By doing so, we can 
further our understanding of this complex political system, expand the 
reach of political science and try to answer, with due caution, normative 
questions surrounding its role and existence.
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